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Abstract
Secure compilers generate compiled code that withstands target-level attacks such as alteration of
control flow, data leaks or memory corruption. Many existing secure compilers are proven to be fully
abstract, meaning that they reflect and preserve observational equivalence. Fully abstract compilation
is strong and useful but, in certain cases, comes at the cost of requiring expensive runtime constructs
3
in compiled code. These constructs may have no relevance for security, but are needed to accommodate
differences between the source and target languages that fully abstract compilation necessarily needs.
As an alternative to fully abstract compilation, this paper explores a different criterion for secure
compilation called robustly safe compilation or RSC . Briefly, this criterion means that the compiled code
preserves relevant safety properties of the source program against all adversarial contexts interacting with
the compiled program. We show that RSC can be proved more easily than fully abstract compilation and
also often results in more efficient code. We also present two different proof techniques for establishing
that a compiler attains RSC and, to illustrate them, develop three illustrative robustly-safe compilers
that rely on different target-level protection mechanisms. We then proceed to turn one of our compilers
into a fully abstract one and through this example argue that proving RSC can be simpler than proving
fully abstraction.
To better explain and clarify notions, this paper uses colours.
For a better experience, please print or view this paper in colours.1
1 Introduction
Low-level adversaries, such as those written in C or assembly can attack co-linked code written in a high-level
language in ways that may not be feasible in the high-level language itself. For example, such an adversary
may manipulate or hijack control flow, cause buffer overflows, or directly access private memory, all in
contravention to the abstractions of the high-level language. Specific countermeasures such as Control Flow
Integrity [3] or Code Pointer Integrity [45] have been devised to address some of these attacks individually.
An alternative approach is to devise a secure compiler, which seeks to defend against entire classes of
such attacks. Secure compilers often achieve security by relying on different protection mechanisms, e.g.,
cryptographic primitives [4, 5, 24, 28], types [11, 12], address space layout randomisation [6, 40], protected
module architectures [10, 58, 61, 63] (also know as enclaves [50]), tagged architectures [7, 43], etc. Once
designed, the question researchers face is how to formalise that such a compiler is indeed secure, and how
to prove this. Basically, we want a criterion that specifies secure compilation. A widely-used criterion for
compiler security is fully abstract compilation (FAC ) [2, 38, 56], which has been shown to preserve many
interesting security properties like confidentiality, integrity, invariant definitions, well-bracketed control flow
and hiding of local state [10, 40, 58, 59].
Informally, a compiler is fully abstract if it preserves and reflects observational equivalence of source-
level components (i.e., partial programs) in their compiled counterparts. Most existing work instantiates
observational equivalence with contextual equivalence: co-divergence of two components in any larger context
they interact with. Fully abstract compilation is a very strong property, which preserves all source-level
abstractions.
Unfortunately, preserving all source-level abstractions also has downsides. In fact, while FAC preserves
many relevant security properties, it also preserves a plethora of other non-security ones, and the latter may
force inefficient checks in the compiled code. For example, when the target is assembly, two observationally
equivalent components must compile to code of the same size [10, 58], else full abstraction is trivially vio-
lated. This requirement is security-irrelevant in most cases. Additionally, FAC is not well-suited for source
languages with undefined behaviour (e.g., C and LLVM) [43] and, if used naïvely, it can fail to preserve even
simple safety properties [64] (though, fortunately, no existing work falls prey to this naïvety).
Motivated by this, recent work started investigating alternative secure compilation criteria that overcome
these limitations. These security-focussed criteria take the form of preservation of hyperproperties or classes
of hyperproperties, such as hypersafety properties or safety properties [9, 36]. This paper investigates one
of these criteria, namely, Robustly Safe Compilation (RSC ) which has clear security guarantees and, as we
show, can often be attained more efficiently than FAC.
Informally, a compiler attains RSC if it is correct and it preserves robust safety of source components
in the target components it produces. Robust safety is an important security notion that has been widely
1Specifically, in this paper we use a blue, sans-serif font for elements of the source language, an orange, bold font for elements
of the first two target languages and a pink italics font for elements of the third target language. Elements common to all
languages are typeset in a black , italic font (to avoid repeating similar definitions twice), thus, C is a source-level component,
C and C are target-level components and C is generic notation for either a source-level or a target-level component. This kind
of syntax highlighting has been proven to be effective for colourblind and black-&-white readers too.
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adopted to formalise security, e.g., of communication protocols [15,19,37]. Before explaining RSC , we explain
robust safety as a language property.
Robust Safety as a Language Property Informally, a program property is a safety property if it
encodes that “bad” sequences of events do not happen when the program executes [14, 69]. A program is
robustly safe if it has relevant (specified) safety properties despite active attacks from adversaries [15,68,76].
As the name suggests, robust safety relies on the notions of safety and robustness which we now explain.
Safety. As mentioned, safety asserts that “no bad sequence of events happens”, so we can specify a
safety property by the set of finite observations which characterise all bad sequences of events. A whole
program has a safety property if its behaviours exclude these bad observations. Many security properties
can be encoded as safety, including integrity, weak secrecy and functional correctness.
Example 1 (Integrity). Integrity ensures that an attacker does not tamper with invariants on state. For
example, consider the function charge_account( amount ) in the snippet below, which deducts amount from
an account as part of an electronic card payment. A card PIN is required if amount is larger than 10 euros. So
the function checks whether amount > 10, requests the PIN if this is the case, and then changes the account
balance. We expect this function to have a safety (integrity) property on the account balance: a reduction of
more than 10 euros to the account balance must be preceded by a call to request_pin(). Here, the relevant
observation is a trace (sequence) of account balances and calls to request_pin(). Bad observations for this
safety property are those where an account balance is at least 10 euros less than the previous one, without a
call to request_pin() in between. Note that this function seems to have this safety property, but it may not
have the safety property robustly: a target-level adversary may transfer control directly to the “else” branch
of the check amount > 10 after setting amount to more than 10, to violate the safety property.
1 function charge_account( amount : Int ){
2 if amount > 10; { request_pin(); }
3 charge_account(amount);
4 return;
5 }

Example 2 (Weak Secrecy). Weak secrecy asserts that a program secret never flows explicitly to the attacker.
For example, consider code that manages network_h, a handler (socket descriptor) for a sensitive network
interface. This code does not expose network_h directly to external code but it provides an API to use it.
This API makes some security checks internally. If the handler is directly accessible to outer code, then it
can be misused in insecure ways (since the security checks may not be made). If the code has weak secrecy
wrt network_h then we know that the handler is never passed to an attacker. In this case we can define bad
observations as those where network_h is passed to external code (e.g., as a parameter, as a return value on
or on the heap). 
Example 3 (Correctness). Program correctness can also be formalised as a safety property. Consider a
program that computes the nth Fibonacci number. The program reads n from an input source and writes its
output to an output source. Correctness of this program is a safety property. Observations here are pairs of
an input (read by the program) and the corresponding output (produced by the programs) so, for example,
outputting 13 is only allowed if 7 were passed as input. A bad observation is one where the input is n (for
some n) but the output is different from the nth Fibonacci number, e.g., input 4 and output 5 as well as
input 3 and output 6 are bad observations. 
These examples not only illustrate the expressiveness of safety properties, but also show that safety
properties are quite coarse-grained : they are only concerned with (sequences of) relevant events like calls to
specific functions, changes to specific heap variables, inputs, and outputs. They do not specify or constrain
how the program computes between these events, leaving the programmer and the compiler considerable
flexibility in optimizations. However, safety properties are not a panacea for security, and there are security
properties that are not safety. For example, noninterference [79,81], the standard information flow property,
is not safety. Nonetheless, many interesting security properties are safety. In fact, many non-safety prop-
erties including noninterference can be conservatively approximated as safety properties [22]. Hence, safety
properties are a meaningful goal to pursue for secure compilation.
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Robustness. We often want to reason about properties of a component of interest that hold irrespective
of any other components the component interacts with. These other components may be the libraries the
component is linked against, or the language runtime. Often, these surrounding components are modelled
as the program context whose hole the component of interest fills. From a security perspective, the context
represents the attacker in the threat model. When the component of interest links to a context, we have a
whole program that can run. A property holds robustly for a component if it holds in any context that the
component of interest can be linked to.
Robust Safety Preservation as a Compiler Property A compiler attains robustly safe compilation
or RSC if it maps any source component that has a safety property robustly to a compiled component that
has the same safety property robustly. Thus, safety has to hold robustly in the target language, which often
does not have the powerful abstractions (e.g., typing) that the source language has. Hence, the compiler
must insert enough defensive runtime checks into the compiled code to prevent the more powerful target
contexts from launching attacks (violations of safety properties) that source contexts could not launch.
This is unlike correct compilation, which either considers only those target contexts that behave like source
contexts [44, 53, 73] or considers only whole programs [47].
As mentioned, safety properties are usually quite coarse-grained. This means that RSC still allows the
compiler to optimise code internally, as long as the sequence of observable events is not affected. For example,
when compiling the fibonacci function of Example 3, the compiler can do any internal optimisation such
as caching intermediate results, as long as the end result is correct. Crucially, however, cached results must
be protected from tampering by a (target-level) attacker, else the output can be incorrect, breaking RSC .
A RSC -attaining compiler focuses only on preserving security (as captured by robust safety) instead of
contextual equivalence (typically captured by full abstraction). So, such a compiler can produce code that
is more efficient than code compiled with a fully abstract compiler as it does not have to preserve all source
abstractions (we illustrate this later).
Finally, robust safety scales naturally to thread-based concurrency [1, 37, 62]. Thus RSC also scales
naturally to thread-based concurrency (we demonstrate this too). This is unlike FAC , where thread-based
concurrency can introduce additional undesired abstractions that also need to be preserved.
RSC is a very recently proposed criterion for secure compilers. Recent work [8, 9, 36] defines RSC
abstractly in terms of preservation of program behaviours, but the development is limited to the definition
only. Other recent work [7] defines a form of RSC for source languages with undefined behaviour and where
attackers are components that become compromised as execution progresses. Our goal in this paper is to
examine how RSC can be realized and established, and to show that in certain cases it leads to compiled code
that is more efficient than what FAC leads to. To this end, we consider a specific setting where observations
are values in specific (sensitive) heap locations at cross-component calls. We define robust safety and RSC
for this specific setting (Section 2). Unlike previous work [9, 15, 36] which assumed that the domain of
traces (behaviours) is the same in the source and target languages, our RSC definition allows for different
trace domains in the source and target languages, as long as they can be suitably related. This relation is
analogous to that found in recent work [8] that studied the necessary properties of trace relations in order
to preserve security through compilation. The second contribution of our paper is two proof techniques to
establish RSC .
• The first technique is an adaption of trace-based backtranslation, an existing technique for proving
FAC [7,10,63]. To illustrate this technique, we build a compiler from an untyped source language to an
untyped target language with support for fine-grained memory protection via so-called capabilities [25,
80] (Section 3). Here, we guarantee that if a source program is robustly safe, then so is its compilation.
• The second proof technique shows that if source programs are verified for robust safety, then one can
simplify the proof of RSC so that no backtranslation is needed. In this case, we develop a compiler
from a typed source language where the types already enforce robust safety, to a target language similar
to that of the first compiler (Section 4). In this instance, both languages also support shared-memory
concurrency. Here, we guarantee that all compiled target programs are robustly safe.
To argue that RSC is general and is not limited to compilation targets based on capabilities, we also develop
a third compiler.
6
• This compiler starts from the same source language as our second compiler but targets an untyped
concurrent language with support for coarse-grained memory isolation, modelling recent hardware
extensions such as Intel’s SGX [50] (Section 17).
The final contribution of this paper is a comparison between RSC and FAC (Section 6). For this,
• We first introduce FAC and discuss its advantages and limitations.
• Then, we present a series of code examples that describe different ways in which a fully abstract
compiler introduces inefficiencies in compiled code in order to attain FAC . We then sketch a fourth
compiler by turning the first one into a fully abstract one and show how the changes introduced to
attain FAC make compiled code inefficient.
• Finally, we argue that this compiler attains FAC and highlight how the proof is significantly more
complex than before.
Finally, the paper discusses related work (Section 7) and concludes (Section 8).
This paper supersedes and extends the work of Patrignani and Garg [66] by providing full details of the
languages and compilers formalisations. Additionally, it describes how the RSC theory scales to different
protection mechanisms (Section 17) and it presents in much more detail the comparison with FAC . For
the sake of brevity and clarity, we limit proofs to sketches, the interested reader will find full proofs and
additional lemmas in the companion technical report [65].
2 Robustly Safe Compilation
This section first discusses robust safety as a language (not a compiler) property (Section 2.1) and then
presents RSC as a compiler property along with an informal discussion of techniques to prove it (Section 2.2).
2.1 Safety and Robust Safety
To explain robust safety, we first describe a general imperative programming model that we use. Programmers
write components on which they want to enforce safety properties robustly. A component is a list of function
definitions that can be linked with other components (the context) in order to obtain a runnable whole
program (functions in “other” components are like extern functions in C). Additionally, every component
declares a set of “sensitive” locations that contain all the data that is safety-relevant. For instance, in
Example 1 this set may contain the account balance and in Example 3 it may contain the I/O buffers. We
explain the relevance of this set after we define safety properties.
We want safety properties to specify that a component never executes a “bad” sequence of events. For
this, we first need to fix a notion of events. We have several choices here, e.g., our events could be inputs
and outputs, all syscalls, all changes to the heap (as in CompCert [48]), etc. Here, we make a specific
choice motivated by our interest in robustness: we define events as calls/returns that cross a component
boundary, together with the state of the heap at that point. Consequently, our safety properties can constrain
the contents of the heap at component boundaries. This choice of component boundaries as the point of
observation is meaningful because, in our programming model, control transfers to/from an adversary happen
only at component boundaries (more precisely, they happen at cross-component function call and returns).
This allows the compiler complete flexibility in optimizing code within a component, while not reducing the
ability of safety properties to constrain observations of the adversary.
Concretely, a component behaviour is a trace, i.e., a sequence of actions recording component boundary
interactions and, in particular, the heap at these points. Actions, the items on a trace, have the following
grammar:
Actions α ::= call f v H ? | call f v H ! | ret H ! | ret H ?
These actions respectively capture call and callback to a function f with parameter v when the heap is H as
well as return and returnback with a certain heap H . More precisely, a callback is a call from the component
to the context, so it generates label call f v H ! while a returnback is a return from such a callback, i.e.,
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the context returning to the component, and it generates the label ret H ?. We use ? and ! decorations
to indicate whether the control flow of the action goes from the context to the component (?) or from the
component to the context (!). Well-formed traces have alternations of ? and ! decorated actions, starting
with ? since execution starts in the context. For a sequence of actions α, relevant(α) is the list of heaps H
mentioned in the actions of α.
Next, we need a representation of safety properties. Generally, properties are sets of traces, but safety
properties specifically can be specified as automata (or monitors in the sequel) [69]. We choose this repre-
sentation since monitors are less abstract than sets of traces and they are closer to enforcement mechanisms
used for safety properties, e.g., runtime monitors. Briefly, a safety property is a monitor that transitions
states in response to events of the program trace. At any point, the monitor may refuse to transition (it gets
stuck), which encodes property violation. While a monitor can transition, the property has not been vio-
lated. Schneider [69] argues that all properties codable this way are safety properties and that all enforceable
safety properties can be coded this way.
Formally, a monitor M in our setting consists of a set of abstract states {σ}, the transition relation
 , an initial state σ0 , the set of heap locations that matter for the monitor, {l}, and the current state σc
(we indicate a set of elements of class e as {e}). The transition relation  is a set of triples of the form
(σs ,H , σf ) consisting of a starting state σs , a final state σf and a heap H . The transition (σs ,H , σf ) is
interpreted as “state σs transitions to σf when the heap is H ”. When determining the monitor transition
in response to a program action, we restrict the program’s heap to the location set {l}, i.e., to the set of
locations the monitor cares about. This heap restriction is written H
∣∣
{l}
. We assume determinism of the
transition relation: for any σs and (restricted heap) H , there is at most one σf such that (σs ,H , σf ) ∈ .
Given the behaviour of a program as a trace α and a monitor M specifying a safety property, M ⊢ α
denotes that the trace satisfies the safety property. Intuitively, to satisfy a safety property, the sequence
of heaps in the actions of a trace, restricted to the locations that the monitor cares about, must never
get the monitor stuck (Rule Valid trace). Every single restricted heap must allow the monitor to step
according to its transition relation (Rule Monitor Step). Note that we overload the  notation here to
also denote an auxiliary relation, the monitor small-step semantics (Rule LU-Monitor Step Trace Base and
Rule LU-Monitor Step Trace).
(Valid trace)
M ; relevant(α) M ′
M ⊢ α
(Monitor Step-base)
M ;∅ M
(Monitor Step-ind)
M ;H  M ′′ M ′′;H  M ′
M ;H ·H  M ′
(Monitor Step)
(σc ,H
∣∣
{l}
, σf ) ∈ 
({σ} , , σ0 , {l} , σc);H  ({σ} , , σ0 , {l} , σf )
With this setup in place, we can formalise safety, attackers and robust safety. In defining (robust) safety
for a component, we only admit monitors (safety properties) whose {l} agrees with the sensitive locations
declared by the component. Making the set of safety-relevant locations explicit in the component and
the monitor gives the compiler more flexibility by telling it precisely which locations need to be protected
against target-level attacks (the compiler may choose to not protect the rest). At the same time, it allows
for expressive modelling. For instance, in Example 3, the safety-relevant locations could be the I/O buffers
from which the program performs inputs and outputs, and the safety property can constrain the input and
output buffers at corresponding call and return actions involving the Fibonacci function.
Definition 1 (Safety, attacker and robust safety).
M ⊢ C : safe
def
= if ⊢ C : whole then if Ω0 (C )
α
==⇒ _ then M ⊢ α
C ⊢ A : atk
def
= C = {l} ,F and {l} ∩ fn(A) = ∅
M ⊢ C : rs
def
= ∀A. if M ⌢C and C ⊢ A : atk then M ⊢ A [C ] : safe
A whole program C is safe for a monitor M , written M ⊢ C : safe, if the monitor accepts any trace the
program generates from its initial state (Ω0 (C)).
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An attacker A is valid for a component C , written C ⊢ A : atk , if A’s free names (denoted fn(A)) do not
refer to the locations that the component cares about. This is a basic sanity check: if we allow an attacker to
mention heap locations that the component cares about, the attacker will be able to modify those locations,
causing all but trivial safety properties to not hold robustly.
A component C is robustly safe wrt monitor M , written M ⊢ C : rs, if C composed with any attacker
is safe wrt M . As mentioned, for this setup to make sense, the monitor and the component must agree on
the locations that are safety-relevant. This agreement is denoted M ⌢C .
2.2 Robustly Safe Compilation
Robustly-safe compilation ensures that robust safety properties and their meanings are preserved across
compilation. But what does it means to preserve meanings across languages? If a source safety property
says never write 3 to a location, and we compile to an assembly language by mapping numbers to binary, the
corresponding target property should say never write 0x11 to an address.
In order to relate properties across languages, we assume a relation ≈ : v× v between source and target
values that is total in the first component, so it maps any source value v to a target value v: ∀v.∃v.v≈v.
This value relation is used to define a relation between heaps: H≈H, which intuitively holds when related
locations point to related values. This is then used to define a relation between actions: α≈α, which holds
when the two actions are the “same” modulo this relation, i.e., call · · · ? only relates to call · · · ? and
the arguments of the action (values and heap) are related. Next, we require a relationM≈M between source
and target monitors, which means that the source monitor M and the target monitorM code the same safety
property, modulo the relation ≈ on values assumed above. The precise definition of this relation depends on
the source and target languages; specific instances are shown in Sections 3.3.1 and 4.3.2
We denote a compiler from language S to language T by J·KST. A compiler J·KST attains RSC , if it maps
any component C that is robustly safe wrt M to a component C that is robustly safe wrt M, provided that
M≈M.
Definition 2 (Robustly Safe Compilation).
⊢ J·KST : RSC def= ∀C,M,M. if M ⊢ C : rs and M≈M then M ⊢ JCKST : rs
A consequence of the universal quantification over monitors here is that the compiler cannot be property-
sensitive. A robustly-safe compiler preserves all robust safety properties, not just a specific one, e.g., it does
not just enforce that fibonacci is correct. This seemingly strong goal is sensible as compiler writers will
likely not know what safety properties individual programmers will want to preserve.
Remark #1: Safety Through Assertions Some readers may wonder why we do not follow existing
work and specify safety as “programmer-written assertions never fail” [34, 37, 49, 76]. Unfortunately, this
approach does not yield a meaningful criterion for specifying a compiler, since assertions in the compiled
program (if any) are generated by the compiler itself. Thus a compiler could just erase all assertions and the
compiled code it generates would be trivially (robustly) safe – no assertion can fail if there are no assertions
in the first place!
Remark #2: Compiling Monitors In our development, we assume that a source and a target monitor
are related and do not actually compile a source monitor to obtain a related target monitor. While such
compilation is feasible, it is at odds with our view of monitors as specifications of safety properties. Compiling
monitors and, in particular, compiling monitors with the same compiler that we want to prove security of,
leads to a circularity—we must understand the compiler to understand the target safety property, which, in
turn, acts as the specification for the compiler! Consequently, we choose not to compile monitors and talk
only of an abstract, compiler-independent relation between source and target monitors.
2Accounting for the difference in the representation of safety properties sets us apart from recent work [9,36], which assumes
that the source and target languages have the same trace alphabet. The latter works only in some settings.
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2.2.1 Proving RSC
Proving that a compiler attains RSC can be done either by proving that a compiler satisfies Definition 2
or by proving something equivalent. To this end, Definition 16 below presents an alternative, equivalent
formulation of RSC . We call this characterisation property-free as it does not mention monitors explicitly
(it mentions the relevant( · ) function for reasons we explain below).
Definition 3 (Property-Free RSC ).
⊢ J·KST : PF -RSC def= ∀C,A,α.
if JCKST ⊢ A : atk and ⊢ A [JCKST] : whole and Ω0 (A [JCKST]) α==⇒ _
then ∃A, α. C ⊢ A : atk and ⊢ A [C] : whole and Ω0 (A [C])
α
==⇒ _
and relevant(α)≈ relevant(α)
PF -RSC states that if the compiled code produces a behaviour in a target context, then the source code
also produces a related behaviour in some source context. In other words, target contexts cannot induce
more (bad) behaviours in the compiled code than source contexts can in the source code.
PF -RSC and RSC should, in general, be equivalent (Theorem 7).
Proposition 1 (PF -RSC and RSC are equivalent).
∀J·KST,⊢ J·KST : PF -RSC ⇐⇒ ⊢ J·KST : RSC
Informally, a property is safety if and only if it implies programs not having any trace prefix from a given
set of bad prefixes (i.e., finite traces). Hence, not having a safety property robustly amounts to some context
being able to induce a bad prefix. Consequently, preserving all robust safety properties (RSC ) amounts to
ensuring that all target prefixes can be generated (by some context) in the source too (PF -RSC ). Formally,
since Definition 2 relies on the monitor relation, we can prove Theorem 7 only after such a relation is finalised.
We give such a monitor relation and proof in Section 3.3 (see Theorem 3). However, in general this result
should hold for any cross-language monitor relation that correctly relates safety properties. If the proposition
does not hold, then the relation does not capture how safety in one language is represented in the other.
Assuming Theorem 7, we can prove PF -RSC for a compiler in place of RSC . PF -RSC can be proved
with a backtranslation technique. This technique has been often used to prove full abstraction [7, 9, 10, 36,
43,54,58,59,63] and it aims at building a source context starting from a target one. In fact PF -RSC , leads
directly to a backtranslation-based proof technique since it can be rewritten (eliding irrelevant details) as:
If ∃A,α. Ω0
(
A
[JCKST]) α==⇒ _
then ∃A, α. Ω0 (A [C])
α
==⇒ _ and relevant(α)≈ relevant(α)
Essentially, given a target context A, a compiled program JCKST and a target trace α that A causes JCKST
to have, we need to construct, or backtranslate to, a source context A that will cause the source program
C to simulate α. Such backtranslation based proofs can be quite difficult, depending on the features of
the languages and the compiler. However, backtranslation for RSC (as we show in Section 3.3.1) is not as
complex as backtranslation for FAC (Section 6.3).
A simpler proof strategy is also viable for RSC when we compile only those source programs that have
been verified to be robustly safe (e.g., using a type system). The idea is this: from the verification of the
source program, we can find an invariant which is always maintained by the target code, and which, in turn,
implies the robust safety of the target code. For example, if the safety property is that values in the heap
always have their expected types, then the invariant can simply be that values in the target heap are always
related to the source ones (which have their expected types). This is tantamount to proving type preservation
in the target in the presence of an active adversary. This is harder than standard type preservation (because
of the active adversary) but is still much easier than backtranslation as there is no need to map target
constructs to source contexts syntactically. We illustrate this proof technique in Section 4.
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2.2.2 RSC Implies Compiler Correctness
As stated in Section 1, RSC implies (a form of) compiler correctness. While this may not be apparent from
Definition 2, it is more apparent from its equivalent characterization in Definition 16. We elaborate this
here.
Whether concerned with whole programs or partial programs, compiler correctness states that the be-
haviour of compiled programs refines the behaviour of source programs [20,39,44,48,53,73]. So, if {α} and
{α} are the sets of compiled and source behaviours, then a compiler should force {α}⊂∼{α}, where ⊂∼ is the
composition of ⊆ and of the relation ≈−1.
If we consider a source component C that is whole, then it can only link against empty contexts, both in the
source and in the target. Hence, in this special case, PF -RSC simplifies to standard refinement of traces,
i.e., whole program compiler correctness. Hence, assuming that the correctness criterion for a compiler
is concerned with the same observations as safety properties (values in safety-relevant heap locations at
component crossings in our illustrative setting), PF -RSC implies whole program compiler correctness.
However, PF -RSC (or, equivalently, RSC ) does not imply, nor is implied by, any form of compositional
compiler correctness (CCC) [44,53,73]. CCC requires that the behaviours produced by a compiled component
linked against a target context that is related (in behaviour) to a source context can also be produced by the
source component linked against the related source context. In contrast, PF -RSC allows picking any source
context to simulate the behaviours. Hence, PF -RSC does not imply CCC. On the other hand, PF -RSC
universally quantifies over all target contexts, while CCC only quantifies over target contexts related to
a source context, so CCC does not imply PF -RSC either. Hence, compositional compiler correctness, if
desirable, must be imposed in addition to PF -RSC .
We could remedy this and generalise our criterion even more by adding an additional parameter, a
relation between source and target contexts that binds the quantified target and source contexts. Our
criterion chooses the weakest of these relations, where all source contexts are related to all target ones, in
order to not impose any constraints on A thus making the attackers in our threat model as powerful as
possible. Existing compositional compiler correctness criteria would instantiate this relation e.g., between
a source context and its compilation [44, 73] or between a source context and something that behaves like
its compilation [53]. As we focus on security, we choose not to pollute our definition with an additional
parameter and leave this relation out.
Note that the lack of implications between PF -RSC and CCC is unsurprising: the two criteria capture
two very different aspects of compilation: security (against all contexts) and compositional preservation of
behaviour (against well-behaved contexts).
3 RSC via Trace-based Backtranslation
This section illustrates how to prove that a compiler attains RSC by means of a trace-based backtranslation
technique [7, 58, 63]. To present such a proof, we first introduce our source language LU, an untyped, first-
order imperative language with abstract references and hidden local state (Section 13). Then, we present
our target language LP, an untyped imperative target language with a concrete heap, whose locations are
natural numbers that the context can compute. LP provides hidden local state via a fine-grained capability
mechanism on heap accesses (Section 10). Finally, we present the compiler J·KLULP and prove that it attains
RSC (Section 3.3) by means of a trace-based backtranslation. The section conclude with an example detailing
why RSC preserves security (Example 5).
To avoid focussing on mundane details, we deliberately use source and target languages that are fairly
similar. However, they differ substantially in one key point: the heap model. This affords the target-level
adversary attacks like guessing private locations and writing to them that do not obviously exist in the
source (and makes our proofs nontrivial). We believe that (with due effort) the ideas here will generalize to
languages with larger gaps and more features.
3.1 The Source Language LU
LU is an untyped imperative while language [55]. Its syntax is presented in Figure 1. Components C are
triples of function definitions, interfaces and a special location written ℓroot, which defines the locations
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Components C ::= ℓroot;F; I Contexts A ::= H;F [·] Interfaces I ::= f
Functions F ::= f(x) 7→ s; return; Values v ::= unit | true | false | n ∈ N | 〈v, v〉 | ℓ
Expressions e ::= x | v | e⊕ e | e⊗ e | 〈e, e〉 | e.1 | e.2 | !e Heaps H ::= ∅ | H; ℓ 7→ v
Statements s ::= skip | s; s | let x = e in s | if e then s else s | call f e | let x = new e in s | x := e
Eval . Ctxs . E ::= [·] | e⊕ E | E⊕ n | e⊗ E | E⊗ n | 〈e,E〉 | 〈E, v〉 | E.1 | E.2 | !E
Monitors M ::= ({σ} , , σ0, ℓroot, σc) Mon. States σ ∈ S
Mon. Reds .  ::= ∅ | ; (s,H, s) Prog. States Ω ::= C,H ⊲ (s)f
Labels λ ::= ǫ | α Actions α ::= call f v H? | call f v H! | ret H! | ret H?
Figure 1: Syntax of LU. We indicate a list of elements e1 , · · · , en as e.
that are monitored for safety, as explained below. Each function definition maps a function name and a
formal argument to a body s. An interface is a list of functions that the component relies on the context to
provide (similar to C’s extern declarations). Attackers A (program contexts) are function definitions that
represent untrusted code that a component interacts with. A function body is a statement. Statements s are
rather standard. They define local variables, manipulate the heap, do recursive function calls and branch
conditionally. Statements use effect-free expressions e, which contain arithmetic and comparison operations,
pairing and projections, and location dereference. Heaps H are maps from abstract locations ℓ to values v.
As explained in Section 2.1, safety properties are specified by monitors. Note that in place of the set
{l} of safety-relevant locations, the description of a monitor here (as well as a component above) contains
a single location ℓroot. The interpretation is that any location reachable in the heap starting from ℓroot is
relevant for safety. This set of locations can change as the program executes, and hence this is more flexible
than statically specifying all of {l} upfront. This representation of the set by a single location is made
explicit in the following monitor rule:
(LU-Monitor Step)
M = ({σ} , , σ0, ℓroot, σc) M
′ = ({σ} , , σ0, ℓroot, σf)
(σc,H
′, σf) ∈ H
′ ⊆ H dom(H′) = reach(ℓroot,H)
M;H M′
reach(ℓ,H) = {ℓ | ∃e. H ⊲ e →֒→ ℓ ∧ ℓ ∈ dom(H)}
Other than this small point, monitors, safety, robust safety and RSC are defined as in Section 2. In
particular, a monitor and a component agree if they mention the same ℓroot:
M⌢C
def
= (M = ({σ} , , σ0, ℓroot, σc)) and (C = (ℓroot;F; I))
A program state Ω includes the function bodies C, the heap H, a statement s being executed and a
stack of function calls f (often omitted in the semantics rules for simplicity). The latter is used to populate
judgements of the form I ⊢ f, f′ : internal/in/out, presented in Figure 2. These determine whether calls
and returns are internal (within the attacker or within the component), directed from the attacker to the
component (in) or directed from the component to the attacker (out).
(LU-Jump-Internal)
((f′ ∈ I ∧ f ∈ I) ∨ (f′ /∈ I ∧ f /∈ I))
I ⊢ f, f′ : internal
(LU-Jump-IN)
f ∈ I ∧ f′ /∈ I
I ⊢ f, f′ : in
(LU-Jump-OUT)
f /∈ I ∧ f′ ∈ I
I ⊢ f, f′ : out
Figure 2: Auxiliary rules to determine the direction of calls and returns.
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This information is used to determine whether the semantics should generate a label (as in Rules ELU-callback,
ELU-call, ELU-retback and ELU-return) or no label (as in Rules ELU-call-internal and ELU-ret-internal) since
internal calls should not be observable.
(ELU-ctx)
H ⊲ e →֒→ e′
H ⊲ E [e] →֒→ E [e′]
(ELU-val)
H ⊲ v →֒→ v
(ELU-dereference)
H ⊲ e →֒→ ℓ
ℓ 7→ v ∈ H
H⊲!e →֒→ v
(ELU-op)
n⊕ n′ = n′′
H ⊲ n⊕ n′ →֒→ n′′
(ELU-comp)
n⊗ n′ = b
H ⊲ n⊗ n′ →֒→ b
(ELU-p1)
H ⊲ 〈v, v′〉 .1 →֒→ v
(ELU-p2)
H ⊲ 〈v, v′〉 .1 →֒→ v′
(ELU-sequence)
C,H ⊲ skip; s
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s
(ELU-step)
C,H ⊲ s
λ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s′
C,H ⊲ s; s′′
λ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s′; s′′
(ELU-if)
H ⊲ e →֒→ v
v ≡ true⇒ s′′ = s v ≡ false⇒ s′′ = s′
C,H ⊲ if e then s else s′
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s′′
(ELU-letin)
H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ let x = e in s
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s[v / x]
(ELU-update)
H ⊲ e →֒→ v
H = H1; ℓ 7→ v
′;H2 H
′ = H1; ℓ 7→ v;H2
C,H ⊲ ℓ := e
ǫ
−−→ C,H′ ⊲ skip
(ELU-alloc)
H ⊲ e →֒→ v ℓ /∈ dom(H)
C,H ⊲ let x = new e in s −→
C,H; ℓ 7→ v ⊲ s[ℓ / x]
(ELU-call)
f′ = f′′; f′ f(x) 7→ s; return; ∈ C.funs
C.intfs ⊢ f′, f : in H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ (call f e)f′
call f v H?
−−−−−−−−−→
C,H ⊲ (s; return;[v / x])f′;f
(ELU-callback)
f′ = f′′; f′ f(x) 7→ s; return; ∈ F
C.intfs ⊢ f′, f : out H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ (call f e)f′
call f v H!
−−−−−−−−−→
C,H ⊲ (s; return;[v / x])f′;f
(ELU-return)
f′ = f′′; f′ C.intfs ⊢ f, f′ : out
C,H ⊲ (return;)f′;f
ret H!
−−−−−→ C,H ⊲ (skip)f′
(ELU-retback)
f′ = f′′; f′ C.intfs ⊢ f, f′ : in
C,H ⊲ (return;)f′;f
ret H?
−−−−−−→ C,H ⊲ (skip)f′
(ELU-call-internal)
C.intfs ⊢ f, f′ : internal f′ = f′′; f′
f(x) 7→ s; return; ∈ C.funs H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ (call f e)f′
ǫ
−−→
C,H ⊲ (s; return;[v / x])f′;f
(ELU-ret-internal)
f′ = f′′; f′ C.intfs ⊢ f, f′ : internal
C,H ⊲ (return;)f′;f
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ (skip)f′
(ELU-single)
Ω =⇒ Ω′′ Ω′′
α
−−→ Ω′
Ω
α
==⇒ Ω′
(ELU-silent)
Ω
ǫ
−−→ Ω′
Ω =⇒ Ω′
(ELU-transitive)
Ω
α
==⇒ Ω′′ Ω′′
α′
==⇒ Ω′
Ω
α·α′
====⇒ Ω′
Figure 3: Semantics of LU. ⊕ includes +,−,×. ⊗ includes ==, <,> etc; [v / x] substitutes value v for
variable x.
LU has a big-step semantics for expressions that relies on evaluation contexts, a small-step semantics for
statements that has labels λ and a semantics that accumulates labels in traces by omitting silent actions ǫ and
concatenating the rest. These semantics follow the judgements below. The rules defining these judgments
are presented in Figure 3:
Expressions H ⊲ e →֒→ v Statements Ω
λ
−−→ Ω′ Traces Ω
α
==⇒ Ω′
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Unlike existing work on compositional compiler correctness which only relies on having the component [44],
our semantics relies on having both the component and the context (i.e., a whole program).
3.2 The Target Language LP
Components C ::= kroot;F; I Statements s ::= · · · | let x = hide e in s | ifz e then s else s
Expressions e ::= · · · | !e with e Values v ::= n ∈ N | 〈v,v〉 | k
Heaps H ::= ∅ | H;n 7→ v : η | H;k Monitors M ::= ({σ}, ,σ0,kroot,σc)
Tags η ::= ⊥ | k Actions α ::= call f v H? | call f v H! | ret H! | ret H?
Figure 4: Syntax of LP. Elided bits (· · · ) and omitted ones are the same as in LU (Figure 1).
LP is an untyped, imperative language that follows the structure of LU and it has similar expressions
and statements (Figure 4). However, there are critical differences (that make the compiler interesting). The
main difference is that heap locations in LP are concrete natural numbers. Upfront, an adversarial context
can guess locations used as private state by a component and clobber them. To support hidden local state,
a location can be “hidden” explicitly via the statement let x = hide e in s, which allocates a new capability
k, an abstract token that grants access to the location n to which e points [72]. Subsequently, all reads
and writes to n must be authenticated with the capability, so reading and writing a location take another
parameter, the capability, as in !e with e and x := e with e. In both cases, the e after the with is the
capability. Unlike locations, capabilities cannot be guessed. To make a location private, the compiler can
make the capability of the location private. To bootstrap this hiding process, we assume that a component
has one location that can only be accessed by it, a priori in the semantics (in our formalisation, we always
focus on only one component and we assume that, for this component, this special location is at address 0).
In detail, LP heaps H are maps from natural numbers (locations) n to values v and a tag η as well as
capabilities. The tag η can be ⊥, which means that n is globally available (not protected) or a capability
k, which protects n. A globally available location can be freely read and written but one that is protected
by a capability requires the same capability to be supplied at the time of read/write (Rule ELP-assign-top,
Rule ELP-deref-top).
LP has a big-step semantics for expressions, a labelled small-step semantics and a semantics that accu-
mulates traces. These judgments follow similar judgements in the semantics of LU (Figure 5).
A second difference between LP and LU is that LP has no booleans, while LU has them. This makes the
compiler and the related proofs interesting, as discussed in the proof of Theorem 9.
In LP, the locations of interest to a monitor are all those that can be reached from the address 0.
Location 0 itself is protected with a capability kroot that is assumed to occur only in the code of the
component in focus, so a component is defined as C ::= kroot;F; I. We can now give a precise definition of
component-monitor agreement for LP as well as a precise definition of attacker, which must care about the
kroot capability.
M⌢C
def
= (M = ({σ}, ,σ0,kroot,σc)) and (C = (kroot;F; I))
C ⊢ A : atk
def
= C = (kroot;F; I),A = F′,kroot /∈ fn(F′)
A monitor and compiler agree if they agree on kroot. An attacker is valid if it does not contain kroot in
its code a priori (it may obtain kroot during its interaction with the component, if the component is not
carefully written).
3.3 Compiler from LU to LP
We now present J·KLULP , the compiler from LU to LP, detailing how it uses the capabilities of LP to achieve
RSC . Then, we prove that J·KLULP attains RSC .
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(ELP-deref)
n 7→ v : η ∈ H (η = ⊥) or (η = k and v′ = k)
H ⊲ !n with v′ →֒→ H ⊲ v
(ELP-if)
H ⊲ e →֒→ n
n ≡ 0⇒ s′′ = s n 6≡0⇒ s′′ = s′
C,H ⊲ ifz e then s else s′
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s′′
(ELP-new)
H = H1;n 7→ (v,η) H ⊲ e →֒→ v
H′ = H;n+ 1 7→ v : ⊥
C,H ⊲ let x = new e in s −→
C,H′ ⊲ s[n+ 1 / x]
(ELP-hide)
H ⊲ e →֒→ n H = H1;n 7→ v : ⊥;H2
k /∈ dom(H) H′ = H1;n 7→ v : k;H2;k
C,H ⊲ let x = hide e in s −→
C,H′ ⊲ s[k / x]
(ELP-assign)
H ⊲ e →֒→ v H = H1;n 7→ _ : η;H2
H′ = H1;n 7→ v : η;H2
(η = ⊥) or (η = k and v′ = k)
C,H ⊲ n := e with v′ −→
C,H′ ⊲ skip
Figure 5: Expression and state semantics of LP. Omitted rules are the same as in LU (Figure 3).
q
ℓroot;F; I
yLU
LP
= kroot;
q
F
yLU
LP
;
q
I
yLU
LP
if ℓroot≈β 〈0,kroot〉Jf(x) 7→ s; return;KLULP = f(x) 7→ JsKLULP ; return; JfKLULP = f
JtrueKLULP = 0 if true≈β 0JfalseKLULP = 1 if false≈β 1JnKLULP = n if n≈β nJxKLULP = xJℓKLULP = 〈n,v〉 if ℓ≈β 〈n,v〉J!eKLULP = !JeKLULP .1 with JeKLULP .2
J〈e1, e2〉KLULP = 〈Je1KLULP , Je2KLULP〉
Je.1KLULP = JeKLULP .1Je.2KLULP = JeKLULP .2Je⊕ e′KLULP = JeKLULP ⊕ Je′KLULPJe⊗ e′KLULP = JeKLULP ⊗ Je′KLULP
JskipKLULP = skipJsu; sKLULP = JsuKLULP ; JsKLULPJcall f eKLULP = call f JeKLULPJlet x = e in sKLULP = let x = JeKLULP in JsKLULPt
if e then st
else se
|LU
LP
=
ifz JeKLULP then JstKLULP
else JseKLULP
t
let x = new e
in s
|LU
LP
=
let xloc = new JeKLULP in
let xcap = hide xloc in
let x = 〈xloc,xcap〉 in JsKLULP
Jx := e′KLULP =
let x1 = x.1 in
let x2 = x.2 in
x1 := JeKLULP with x2
Figure 6: J·KLULP , compilation of components and functions, expressions and statements from LU to LP.
J·KLULP takes as input a LU component C and returns a LP component (Figure 6). The compiler performs a
simple pass on the structure of functions, expressions and statements, using the information of the intended
cross-language relation (β) to compile values. The only non-straightforward cases are the compilation of
booleans and locations. Concerning the former, the compiler codes source booleans true to 0 and false to 1.
Concerning the latter, each LU location is encoded as a pair of a LP location and the capability to access
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the location. Location update and dereference are compiled accordingly and thus project each pair to the
location and the capability in order to use each part.
This compiler solely relies on the capability abstraction of the target language as a defence mechanism
to attain RSC . Unlike existing secure compilers, J·KLULP needs neither dynamic checks nor other constructs
that introduce runtime overhead to attain RSC [10, 35, 43, 58, 63].
3.3.1 Proof of RSCJ·KLULP attains RSC (Theorem 9). In order to set up this theorem, we need to instantiate the cross-language
relation for values, which we write as ≈β here. The relation is parametrised by a partial bijection β : ℓ×n×η
from source heap locations to target heap locations such that:
• if (ℓ1,n,η) ∈ β and (ℓ2,n,η) ∈ β then ℓ1 = ℓ2;
• if (ℓ,n1,η1) ∈ β and (ℓ,n2,η2) ∈ β then n1 = n2 and η1 = η2.
The bijection determines when a source location and a target location (and its capability) are related.
On values, ≈β is defined as follows:
• true≈β 0;
• false≈β n for any n 6= 0;
• n≈β n;
• ℓ≈β 〈n,k〉 if (ℓ,n,k) ∈ β;
• ℓ≈β 〈n,_〉 if (ℓ,n,⊥) ∈ β;
• 〈v1, v2〉≈β 〈v1,v2〉 if v1≈β v1 and v2≈β v2.
This relation is then used to define the heap, monitor state and action relations (Figure 7). Heaps are related,
written H≈βH, when locations related in β point to related values. States are related, written Ω≈βΩ, when
they have related heaps. The action relation α≈β α is defined following the intuition of Section 2.2.
(Heap relation)
H≈βH1;H2 ℓ≈β 〈n,_〉 v≈β v H = H1;n 7→ v : η;H2
H; ℓ 7→ v≈βH
(Empty relation)
∅≈β k
(Related states – Whole)
Ω = M;F,F′; I;H ⊲ s Ω =M;F,
q
F′
yLU
LP
; I;H ⊲ s M≈βM H≈βH
Ω≈βΩ
(Call relation)
f ≈ f v≈β v H≈βH
call f v H?≈β call f v H?
(Callback relation)
f ≈ f v≈β v H≈βH
call f v H!≈β call f v H!
(Return relation)
H≈βH
ret H!≈β ret H!
(Returnback relation)
H≈βH
ret H?≈β ret H?
(Epsilon relation)
ǫ≈β ǫ
Figure 7: Heap, state and action relations.
With this relation we define a backwards simulation lemma (Lemma 1) that is necessary for the RSC
proof (and that can also yield whole program compiler correctness).
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Lemma 1 (Backward simulation).
if C,H ⊲ JsKLULP α!==⇒ Ω′ and C,H ⊲ s≈βC,H ⊲ JsKLULP and α!≈β α!
then C,H ⊲ s
α!
==⇒ Ω′ and ∃β′ ⊇ β.Ω′≈β′ Ω
′
The partial bijection β grows as we consider successive steps of program execution in our proof. For ex-
ample, if executing let x = new e in s creates some source location ℓ, then executing its compiled counterpart
will create some target location n. At this point we add (ℓ,n,⊥) to β.
Monitor Relation In Section 2.2, we left the monitor relation abstract. Here, we define it for our two
languages. Two monitors are related when they can simulate each other on related heaps. Given a monitor-
specific relation σ≈σ on monitor states, we say that a relation R on source and target monitors is a
bisimulation if the following hold whenever M = ({σ} , , σ0, ℓroot, σc) and M = ({σ}, ,σ0,kroot,σc) are
related by R:
1. σ0≈σ0, and σc≈σc, and
2. For all β containing (ℓroot,0,kroot) and all H,H with H≈βH:
(a) (σc,H,_) ∈ iff (σc,H,_) ∈ , and
(b) (σc,H, σ′) ∈ and (σc,H,σ′) ∈ imply
({σ} , , σ0, ℓroot, σ
′)R({σ}, ,σ0,kroot,σ
′).
In words, R is a bisimulation only if MRM implies that M and M simulate each other on heaps related by
any β that relates ℓroot to 0. In particular, this means that neither M nor M can be sensitive to the specific
addresses allocated during the run of the program. However, they can be sensitive to the “shape” of the heap
or the values stored in the heap. Note that the union of any two bisimulations is a bisimulation. Hence,
there is a largest bisimulation, which we denote as ≈. Intuitively, M≈M implies that M and M encode the
same safety property (up to the relation ≈β). With all the boilerplate for RSC in place, we state our main
theorem.
Theorem 1 (J·KLULP attains RSC ). ⊢ J·KLULP : RSC
We outline our proof of Theorem 9, which relies on a backtranslation we denote 〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU . Intuitively, 〈〈·〉〉
LP
LU
takes a target trace α and builds a set of source contexts such that one of them when linked with the source
program C, produces a related trace α in the source (Theorem 10). In prior work, backtranslations return
a single context [11, 12, 23, 30, 54, 58, 63]. This is because they all, explicitly or implicitly, assume that ≈ is
injective from source to target. Under this assumption, the backtranslation is unique: a target value v will
be related to at most one source value v. We do away with this assumption (e.g., the target value 0 is related
to both source values 0 and true) and thus there can be multiple source values related to any given target
value. This results in a set of backtranslated contexts, of which at least one will reproduce the trace as we
need it.
We bypass the lengthy technical setup for this proof and provide an informal description of why the
backtranslation achieves what it is supposed to using an example (Example 4). We refer the interested
reader to the accompanying technical report for full details on the backtranslation [65].
Notation Example 4 needs to reason about lists of finite length whose elements are pairs, which are not
a base type in our language. However, they can be easily encoded as sequences of pairs, with unit being
the empty list. Thus, list 〈1, 1〉 :: 〈2, 2〉 :: 〈3, 3〉 is 〈〈1, 1〉 , 〈〈2, 2〉 , 〈〈3, 3〉 , unit〉〉〉. To maintain a lightweight
notation, we use some syntactic sugar to encode lists of finite length to our language. We use metavariable
L to indicate a list. Adding element v to list L is denoted as L :: v and it amounts to turning L into 〈v, L〉.
Given an element 〈v, n〉, we use notation L(n) to look that element up and return v (or unit if no element
〈v, n〉 is in L). We can easily encode this lookup as a series of projections on the the list and then on each
element of the list (note that our language is untyped, so this is possible).
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Example 4 (Trace backtranslation). 〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU first generates empty method bodies for all context methods
called by the compiled component. Then it backtranslates each action on the given trace, generating code
blocks that mimic that action and places that code inside the appropriate method body. The figure below
shows an example trace on the left and the code blocks generated for each action in the trace on the right.
(1) call f 0 (
︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 7→ 4 : ⊥,
︷ ︸︸ ︷
2 7→ 3 : ⊥)?
(2) ret (1 7→ 4 : ⊥,2 7→ 〈3,k〉 : ⊥,
︷ ︸︸ ︷
3 7→ 11 : k)!
(3) call f 2 (1 7→ 55 : ⊥︸ ︷︷ ︸,2 7→ 〈3,k〉 : ⊥,3 7→ 15 : k︸ ︷︷ ︸)?
main(z) 7→
let x = new 4 in L :: 〈x, 1〉 ;
let x = new 3 in L :: 〈x, 2〉 ;
call f 0;

 (1)
let x =!L(2) in L :: 〈x, 3〉 ; ] (2)
let x = new L(1) in x := 55;
let x = new L(3) in x := 15;
call f 2;

 (3)
Backtranslated code maintains a support data structure at runtime, a list of locations denoted L that
are known to the target. Locations are looked up in this list based on their second field n, which is their
target-level address. Since we have access to the whole trace, we know how many locations we will add to
L so we know its length. In order to backtranslate the first call, we need to set up the heap with the right
values and then perform the call. In the diagram, dotted lines describe which source statement generates
which part of the heap. The return only generates code that will update the list L to ensure that the context
has access to all the locations it knows in the target too. In order to backtranslate the last call we look up
the locations to be updated in L so we can ensure that when the call f 2 statement is executed, the heap is
in the right state. 
For the backtranslation to be used in the proof we need to prove its correctness, i.e., that 〈〈α〉〉L
P
LU generates
a context A that, together with C, generates a trace α related to the given target trace α.
Theorem 2 (〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU is correct).
if A
[JCKLULP] α==⇒ Ω then ∃A ∈ 〈〈α〉〉LPLU .A [C] α==⇒ Ω and α≈β α and Ω≈βΩ.
This theorem immediately implies that ⊢ J·KLULP : PF -RSC , which, by Theorem 3 below, implies that
⊢ J·KLULP : RSC .
Theorem 3 (PF -RSC and RSC are equivalent for J·KLULP).
⊢ J·KLULP : PF -RSC ⇐⇒ ⊢ J·KLULP : RSC
The intuition behind the proof of Theorem 3 follows the intuition we gave after Theorem 7. The only
missing element in the proof is to demonstrate that related monitor states either both step or both get stuck
on related source and target actions. We prove this by showing an invariant, namely that the monitor states
always remain related. This follows from the rules of Figure 7. Finally, recall that the function relevant(α)
returns just the heap of the action. This, with the relatedness of heaps, ensures that either both monitors
step or both get stuck on related actions.
Example 5 (Compiling a secure program). To illustrate RSC at work, consider the following source com-
ponent Ca, which manages an account whose balance is security-relevant. The balance is stored in a location
(ℓroot that is tracked by the monitor. Ca provides functions to deposit to the account as well as to print the
account balance.
deposit(x) 7→ let q=abs(x) in let amt = !ℓroot in ℓroot := amt+ q
balance() 7→ !ℓroot
18
Ca never leaks the sensitive location ℓroot to an attacker. Additionally, an attacker has no way to decrement
the amount of the balance since deposit only adds the absolute value abs(x) of its input x to the existing
balance.
By compiling Ca with J·KLULP , we obtain the following target program.
deposit(x) 7→ let q=abs(x) in
let amt=!0 with kroot in 0 := amt+ q with kroot
balance() 7→ !0 with kroot
Recall that location ℓroot is mapped to location 0 and protected by the kroot capability. In the compiled
code, while location 0 is freely computable by a target attacker, capability kroot is not. Since that capability
is not leaked to an attacker by the code above, an attacker will not be able to tamper with the balance
stored in location 0, even though it has direct access to 0. 
4 RSC via Bisimulation
If the source language has a verification system that enforces robust safety, proving that a compiler attains
RSC may be simpler than that of Section 3 in some cases, as a backtranslation may not be needed at all.
To demonstrate this, we consider a specific class of monitors, namely those that enforce type invariants on a
specific set of locations. Our source language, Lτ , is similar to LU but it has a type system that accepts only
source programs whose traces the source monitor never rejects. Our target language is mostly unchanged.
Our compiler J·KLτLpi is directed by typing derivations, and its proof of RSC relies on a cross-language invariant
of program execution rather than a backtranslation. A second, independent goal of this section is to show
that RSC is compatible with concurrency. Consequently, our source and target languages include constructs
for forking threads.
4.1 The Source Language Lτ
Components C ::= ∆;F; I Statements s ::= · · · | (‖ s) | endorse x = e as ϕ in s
Heaps H ::= ∅ | H; ℓ 7→ v : τ Types τ ::= Bool | Nat | τ × τ | Ref τ | UN
Superf . Types ϕ ::= Bool | Nat | UN× UN | Ref UN
Monitors M ::= ({σ} , , σ0,∆, σc) Mon. Trans .  ::= ∅ | ; (σ, σ)
Envs . Γ ::= ∅ | Γ; (x : τ) Store Env . ∆ ::= ∅ | ∆; (ℓ : τ)
Processes π ::= (s) Soups Π ::= ∅ | Π ‖ π Prog. States Ω ::= C,H ⊲ Π | fail
Figure 8: Syntax of Lτ . Elided and omitted elements are the same as in LU (Figure 1).
Lτ extends LU with concurrency, so it has a fork statement (‖ s), processes and process soups [21] and
an extensive type system (Figure 8). Components define a set of safety-relevant locations ∆, so and heaps
carry type information. ∆ also specifies a type for each safety-relevant location.
Lτ has an unconventional type system that enforces robust type safety [1, 15, 34, 37, 49, 62], which means
that no context can cause the static types of sensitive heap locations to be violated at runtime. Using a
special type UN that is described below, a program component statically partitions heap locations it deals
with into those it cares about (sensitive or “trusted” locations) and those it does not care about (“untrusted”
locations). Call a value shareable if only untrusted locations can be extracted from it using the language’s
elimination constructs. The type system then ensures that a program component only ever shares shareable
values with the context. This ensures that the context cannot violate any invariants (including static types,
which is what we care about in this section) of the trusted locations, since it can never gets direct access to
them.
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⊢ C : UN Component C is well-typed. C ⊢ F : τ Function F takes arguments of type τ .
∆, Γ ⊢ ⋄ Well-formed environments. ∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ Expression e has type τ in Γ and ∆.
τ ⊢ ◦ Type τ is insecure. C,∆, Γ ⊢ s Statement s is well-typed in C, Γ and ∆.
(TLτ -bool-pub)
Bool ⊢ ◦
(TLτ -nat-pub)
Nat ⊢ ◦
(TLτ -pair-pub)
τ ⊢ ◦ τ ′ ⊢ ◦
τ × τ ′ ⊢ ◦
(TLτ -un-pub)
UN ⊢ ◦
(TLτ -references-pub)
Ref UN ⊢ ◦
(TLτ -coercion)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ τ ⊢ ◦
∆, Γ ⊢ e : UN
(TLτ -endorse)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : UN C,∆, Γ; (x : ϕ) ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ endorse x = e as ϕ in s
Figure 9: Typing judgements and rules of Lτ . For space constraints, unsurprising typing rules are omitted.
Type UN stands for “untrusted” or “shareable” and contains all values that can be passed to the context.
Every type that is not a subtype of UN is implicitly trusted and cannot be passed to the context. Untrusted
locations are explicitly marked UN at their allocation points in the program. Other types are deemed
shareable via subtyping. Intuitively, a type is safe if values in it can only yield locations of type UN by the
language’s elimination constructs. For example, UN× UN is a subtype of UN. We write τ ⊢ ◦ to mean that
τ is a subtype of UN.
Further, Lτ contains an endorsement statement (endorse x = e as ϕ in s) that dynamically checks the
top-level constructor of a value of type UN and gives it a more precise superficial type ϕ [26]. This allows a
program to safely inspect values coming from the context. It is similar to existing type casts [52] but it only
inspects one structural layer of the value (this simplifies the compilation).
(ELτ -endorse)
H ⊲ e →֒→ v ∆,∅ ⊢ v : ϕ
∆ = {ℓ : τ | ℓ 7→ v : τ ∈ H}
C,H ⊲ endorse x = e as ϕ in s −→ C,H ⊲ s[v / x]
(ELτ -fork)
Π = Π1 ‖ (‖ s) ; s
′ ‖ Π2
Π′ = Π1 ‖ skip; s
′ ‖ Π2 ‖ s
C,H ⊲ Π −→ C,H ⊲ Π′
Figure 10: Semantics of Lτ . Omitted elements are the same as in LU (Figure 3).
The operational semantics of Lτ updates that of LU to deal with concurrency and endorsement (Figure 10).
For concurrency, the program state Ω contains a soup (i.e., a multiset) Π of processes, where each process
is a statement executing as in the program state for LU, and a soup takes a step if any process in it does.
The latter performs a runtime check on the endorsed value [67], which performs a syntactic check on a value
given some superficial type ϕ. Superficial types ϕ only allow checking types “on the surface”, so pairs and
references are not nested; in order to endorse a nested pair, multiple endorse statements must be used.
Monitors M check at runtime that the set of trusted heap locations ∆ have values of their intended static
types. Accordingly, the description of the monitor includes a list of trusted locations and their expected
types (in the form of an environment ∆). The type τ of any location in ∆ must be trusted, so τ 6⊢ ◦. To
facilitate the monitor’s checks, every heap location carries a type at runtime (in addition to a value). The
monitor transitions should, therefore, be of the form (σ,∆, σ′), but since ∆ never changes (it maps trusted
locations to static types), we write the transitions as pairs of states only.
A monitor and a component agree if they have the same ∆:
M⌢C
def
= ({σ} , , σ0,∆, σc)⌢(∆;F; I)
Other definitions (safety, robust safety and actions) are as in Section 2.
Importantly, we show that a well-typed component generates traces that are always accepted by an
agreeing monitor, so every component typed at UN is robustly safe.
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Theorem 4 (Typability Implies Robust Safety in Lτ ).
If ⊢ C : UN and C⌢M then M ⊢ C : rs
Richer Source Monitors In Lτ , source language monitors only enforce the property of type safety on
specific memory locations (robustly). This can be generalized substantially to enforce arbitrary invariants
other than types on locations. The only requirement is to find a type system (e.g., based on refinements or
Hoare logics) that can enforce robust safety in the source (for example, as in the work of Swasey et al. [76]).
Our compilation and proof strategy should work with little modification. Another easy generalization is
allowing the set of locations considered by the monitor to grow over time, as in Section 3.
4.2 The Target Language Lpi
Our target language, Lπ , extends the previous target language LP, with support for concurrency (forking,
processes and process soups), atomic co-creation of a protected location and its protecting capability and
for examining the top-level construct of a value according to a pattern B (Figure 11).
Statements s ::= · · · | (‖ s) | let x = newhide e in s | destruct x = e as B in s or s
Patterns B ::= nat | pair Monitors M ::= ({σ}, ,σ0,H0,σc)
(ELpi-destruct-nat)
H ⊲ e →֒→ n
C,H ⊲ destruct x = e as nat in s or s′
−→ C,H ⊲ s[n / x]
(ELpi-new)
H = H1;n 7→ (v,η) H ⊲ e →֒→ v
k /∈ dom(H) s′ = s[〈n+ 1,k〉 / x]
C,H ⊲ let x = newhide e in s
−→ C,H;n+ 1 7→ v : k;k ⊲ s′
Figure 11: Syntax and semantics of Lπ. Elided elements are either the same as LP (Figures 4 and 5) or Lτ
(Figure 8).
Monitors are also updated to consider a fixed set of locations (a heap part H0). Atomic co-creation
of locations and capabilities is provided to match modern security architectures such as Cheri [80] (which
implement capabilities at the hardware level). This atomicity is not strictly necessary and we prove that
RSC is attained both by a compiler relying on it and by one that allocates a location and then protects it
non-atomically. The former compiler (with this atomicity in the target) is a bit easier to describe, so we
start with it (Section 4.3) before moving to the non-atomic one (Section 4.4).
4.3 Compiler from Lτ to Lpi
The high-level structure of the compiler, J·KLτLpi , is similar to that of our earlier compiler J·KLULP (Section 3.3).
However, J·KLτLpi is defined by induction on the type derivation of the source component to be compiled. Most
cases are a straightforward adaptation of the analogous cases from Figure 6, so we omit them. We show
only a few instructional cases in Figure 12. When compiling a component we ensure that monitor-sensitive
locations from ∆ are allocated to related locations and initialised to valid values, i.e., values that respect
the cross-language relation. Such a set up of heaps is denoted with ∆ ⊢β0 H0. The most interesting case is
that of allocation, which explicitly uses type information to achieve security efficiently, protecting only those
locations whose type is not UN. The interested reader can find the full compiler formalisation (including
auxiliary functions) in the accompanying technical report [65].
New Monitor Relation As monitors have changed, we also need a new monitor relation M≈M. Infor-
mally, a source and a target monitor are related if the target monitor can always step whenever the target
heap satisfies the types specified in the source monitor’s ∆ (up to renaming by the partial bijection β0).
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uv C ≡ ∆;F; I C ⊢ F : UNnames(F) ∩ names(I) = ∅ ∆ ⊢ ok
⊢ C : UN
}~L
τ
Lpi
= H0;
q
F
yLτ
Lpi
;
q
I
yLτ
Lpi
if ∆ ⊢β0 H0
t
F ≡ f(x : UN) 7→ s; return; C,∆; x : UN ⊢ s
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C,∆, Γ ⊢ let x = newτ e in s
{Lτ
Lpi
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
let xo = new J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi
in let x = 〈xo,0〉
in JC,∆, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ sKLτLpi if τ = UN
let x = newhide J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi
in JC,∆, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ sKLτLpi otherwiseuv ∆, Γ ⊢ e : BoolC,∆, Γ ⊢ st C,∆, Γ ⊢ se
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Lpi
=
let xl = x.1 in let xc = x.2
in xl := J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi with xc
Figure 12: J·KLτLpi , compilation of components and functions, expressions and statements from Lτ to Lπ
(excerpts).
We write ⊢ H : ∆ to mean that for each location ℓ ∈ ∆, ⊢ H(ℓ) : ∆(ℓ). Given a partial bijection β
from source to target locations, we say that a target monitor M = ({σ}, ,σ0,H0,σc) is good, written
⊢ M : β,∆, if for all σ ∈ {σ} and all H≈βH such that ⊢ H : ∆, there is a σ′ such that (σ,H,σ′) ∈  .
For a fixed partial bijection β0 between the domains of ∆ and H0, we say that the source monitor M and
the target monitor M are related, written M≈M, if ⊢M : β0,∆ for the ∆ in M. With this setup, we define
RSC as in Section 2. Our main theorem is that J·KLτLpi attains RSC under this definition.
Theorem 5 (Compiler J·KLτLpi attains RSC ). ⊢ J·KLτLpi : RSC
To prove that J·KLτLpi attains RSC we do not rely on a backtranslation. Here, we know statically which
locations can be monitor-sensitive: they must all be trusted, i.e., must have a type τ satisfying τ 0 ◦. Using
this, we set up a simple cross-language relation and show it to be an invariant on runs of source and compiled
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target components. The relation captures the following:
• Heaps (both source and target) can be partitioned into two parts, a trusted part and an untrusted
part;
• The trusted source heap contains only locations whose type is trusted (τ 0 ◦);
• The trusted target heap contains only locations related to trusted source locations and these point
to related values; more importantly, every trusted target location is protected by a capability;
• In the target, any capability protecting a trusted location does not occur in attacker code, nor is it
stored in an untrusted heap location.
We need to prove that this relation is preserved by reductions both in compiled and in attacker code.
The former follows from the proof of source robust safety (Theorem 11). The latter is simple since all trusted
locations are protected with capabilities, attackers have no access to trusted locations, and capabilities are
unforgeable and unguessable (by the semantics of Lπ).
At this point, knowing that monitors are related, and that source traces are always accepted by source
monitors, we can conclude that target traces are always accepted by target monitors too. Note that this
kind of an argument requires all compilable source programs to be robustly safe and is, therefore, impossible
for our first compiler J·KLULP . Overall, avoiding the backtranslation results in a proof much simpler than that
of Section 3.
4.4 Non-Atomic Allocation of Capabilities
The compiler of Figure 12 uses a new target language construct, newhide, that simultaneously allocates a
new location and protects it with a capability. This atomic construct is what certain capability machines
provide, and it simplifies our proof of security in the concurrent setting at hand. If allocation and protection
were not atomic, then a concurrent adversary thread could protect a location that had just been allocated
and acquire the capability to it before the allocating thread could do so. This would break the cross-language
relation we use in our proof. However, note that this is not really an attack since it does not give the adversary
any additional power to violate the safety property enforced by the monitor. The reason is that the thread
allocating the location gets stuck when it tries to acquire the capability itself (since the adversary obtained
the capability), and, by the design of our compiler, it will not try to use the location before obtaining the
capability. Consequently, it is possible to do away with the newhide construct for compiling allocation.
Figure 13 shows how compilation can also be done using the let xk = hide x in . . . construct of Section 3.
s
∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ C,∆, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ let x = newτ e in s
{Lτ
Lpi
=


let x = new 0 in
let xk = hide x in
let xc = J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi in
x := xc with xk;JC,∆, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ sKLτLpi
if τ 6= UN
Figure 13: Non-atomic implementation of capability allocation, only the interesting case for τ 6= UN is
reported, the other is analogous to the one in Figure 12.
The price to pay is a slightly more involved cross-language relation, which must relate states where either
(i) the heaps are partitioned as before, or (ii) the target execution is stuck trying to acquire a capability for
a location that should be trusted.
We refer the interested reader to the accompanying technical report for details of the new relation and
the proof that this alternative compiler also attains RSC [65].
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5 RSC Relying on Target Memory Isolation
Both compilers presented so far used a capability-based target language. To avoid giving the false impression
that RSC is only useful for this kind of a target, we show here how to attain RSC when the protection
mechanism in the target is completely different. We consider a new target language, LI , which does not
have capabilities, but instead offers coarse-grained memory isolation based on enclaves (Section 17.1). This
mechanism is supported (in hardware) in mainstream x86-64 and ARM CPUs (Intel calls this SGX [50];
ARM calls it TrustZone [77]). It is also straightforward to implement purely in software using any VM-
based, process-based, or in-process isolation technique. We present a compiler J·KLτLI from our last source
language Lτ to LI and prove that it attains RSC (Section 17.2).
5.1 LI , a Target Language with Coarse-Grained Memory Isolation
Language LI replaces Lπ’s capabilities with a simple security abstraction called an enclave. An enclave is
a collection of code and memory locations, with the properties that: (a) only code within the enclave can
access the memory locations of the enclave, and (b) code from outside can transfer control only to designated
entry points in the enclave’s code. For simplicity, LI supports only one enclave. Generalizing this to many
enclaves is straightforward, but not necessary for our purposes.
To model the enclave, LI components carry additional information E , the list of functions that reside
in the enclave. Only functions that are listed in E can create, read and write locations in the enclave,
using statements and expressions. Locations in LI are integers (not natural numbers). By convention, non-
negative locations are outside the enclave (accessible from any function), while negative locations are inside
the enclave (accessible only from functions in E ).
Components C ::= H0 ;F ; I ;E Enclave funcs . E ::= f Heaps H ::= ∅ | H ; n 7→ v
Values v ::= n ∈ Z | 〈v , v〉 | k Expressions e ::= · · · | !e
Statements s ::= · · · | x := e | let x = new e in s | let x = newiso e in s
Figure 14: Syntax of LI . Elided and omitted elements are the same as in LP (Figure 4) or Lπ (Figure 11).
The semantics (Figure 15) are almost those of Lπ , but the expression semantics change to C ;H ; f ⊲ e →֒→ v ,
recording which function f is currently executing. The operational rule for any memory operation checks
that either the access is to a location outside the enclave or that f ∈ E (formalised by C ⊢ f : prog).
Monitors of LI are the same as those of Lπ .
(ELI -deref)
n 7→ v ∈ H (n ≥ 0 ) or (n < 0 and C ⊢ f : prog)
C ;H ; f ⊲!n →֒→ v
(ELI -isolate)
H = n 7→ _;H1 C ;H ; f ⊲ e →֒→ v C ⊢ f : prog
C ,H ⊲ (let x = newiso e in s)f ;f
ǫ
−−→ C , n − 1 7→ v ;H ⊲ (s [n − 1 / x ])f ;f
(ELI -assign)
C ;H ; f ⊲ e →֒→ v H = H1 ; n 7→ _;H2 H ′ = H1 ; n 7→ v ;H2
(n ≥ 0 ) or (n < 0 and C ⊢ f : prog)
C ,H ⊲ (n := e)f ;f
ǫ
−−→ C ,H ′ ⊲ (skip)f ;f
Figure 15: Semantics of LI . Omitted rules are as in LP (Figure 5) and Lτ (Figure 10).
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5.2 Compiler from Lτ to LI
uv C ≡ ∆;F; I C ⊢ F : UN ∆ ⊢ oknames(F) ∩ names(I) = ∅
⊢ C : UN
}~L
τ
LI
= H0 ;
q
F
yLτ
LI
;
q
I
yLτ
LI
; dom(F) if ∆ ⊢ϕ H0
uwwv
C,∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ
C,∆, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢
let x = newτ e in s
}~
Lτ
LI
=


let x = new J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLI
in JC,∆, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ sKLτLI if τ = UN
let x = newiso J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLI
in JC,∆, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ sKLτLI else
Figure 16: J·KLτLI , compilation of components and statements from Lτ to LI (excerpts).
The high-level structure of the compiler J·KLτLI is similar to that of J·KLτLpi from Section 4.3 (Figure 16).
Compiler J·KLτLI ensures that all the (and only the) functions of the (trusted) component we write are part
of the enclave, i.e., constitute E . Additionally, the compiler populates the safety-relevant heap H0 based
on the information in ∆ according to bijection ϕ (captured by the judgement ∆ ⊢ϕ H0 , whose details we
elide here). Importantly, J·KLτLI also ensures that trusted locations are stored in the enclave. As before, the
compiler relies on typing information for this. Locations whose types are shareable (subtypes of UN) are
placed outside the enclave while those that are trusted (not subtypes of UN) are placed inside (second rule
in Figure 16).
For this compiler we need a different partial bijection that drops capabilities and considers integers instead
of natural numbers. We indicate such a bijection with ϕ. Its type is ℓ× n, but it has the same properties as
β in Section 3.3.1.
The cross-language relation ≈ is mostly unchanged. The only change is for relating locations, as defined
below:
• ℓ≈ϕ n if (ℓ,n) ∈ ϕ
Our main theorem is that J·KLτLI attains RSC .
Theorem 6 (Compiler J·KLτLI attains RSC ). ⊢ J·KLτLI : RSC
The intuition behind the proof is simple: all trusted locations (including safety-relevant locations) are
in the enclave and adversarial code cannot tamper with them. The proof follows the idea of the proof of
Theorem 13: we build a cross-language relation, which we show to be an invariant on executions of source
and corresponding compiled programs. The only change is that every location in the trusted target heap is
isolated in the enclave.
6 Fully Abstract Compilation
Our next goal is to compare RSC to fully abstract compilation (or FAC ) at an intuitive level. We first
define FAC (Section 6.1). Then, we present a series of examples of how FAC may result in inefficiencies in
compiled code (Section 6.2). Relying on these examples, we present what is needed to write a fully abstract
compiler from LU to LP, the languages of our first compiler (Section 6.3). We use this compiler to compare
RSC and FAC concretely, showing that, at least on this example, RSC permits more efficient code and
affords simpler proofs that FAC (Section 6.4).
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Remark This does not imply that one should always prefer RSC to FAC blindly. In some cases, one may
want to establish full abstraction for reasons other than security, so there FAC is preferable. Also, when
the target language is typed [11,12,23,54] or has abstractions similar to those of the source, full abstraction
may have no downsides (in terms of efficiency of compiled code and simplicity of proofs) relative to RSC .
However, in many settings, including those we consider, target languages are not typed, and often differ
significantly from the source in their abstractions. In such cases, RSC is a worthy alternative.
6.1 Formalising Fully Abstract Compilation
As stated in Section 1, FAC requires the preservation and reflection of observational equivalence, and most
existing work instantiates observational equivalence with contextual equivalence (≃ctx ). Contextual equiv-
alence and FAC are defined below. Informally, two components C1 and C2 are contextually equivalent
if no context C interacting with them can tell them apart, i.e., they are indistinguishable. Contextual
equivalence can encode security properties such as confidentiality, integrity, invariant maintenance and non-
interference [6,10,58,64]. We do not explain this well-known observation here, but refer the interested reader
to the survey of Patrignani et al. [59]. Informally, a compiler J·KST is fully abstract if it translates (only)
contextually-equivalent source components into contextually-equivalent target ones.
Definition 4 (Contextual equivalence and fully abstract compilation).
C1 ≃ctx C2
def
= ∀C.C [C1 ]⇑ ⇐⇒ C [C2 ]⇑, where ⇑ means execution divergence
⊢ J·KST : FAC def= ∀C1,C2.C1≃ctx C2 ⇐⇒ JC1KST≃ctx JC2KST
The security-relevant direction of FAC is ⇒ [31]. This direction is security-relevant because the proof
thesis concerns target contextual equivalence (≃ctx ). Unfolding the definition of ≃ctx on the right of the
implication yields a universal quantification over all possible target contexts C, which captures malicious
attackers. In fact, there may be target contexts C that can interact with compiled code in ways that are
impossible in the source language. Compilers that attain FAC with untyped target languages often insert
checks in compiled code that detect such interactions and respond to them securely [64], often by halting
the execution [6, 10, 31, 40, 43, 46, 58, 59]. These checks are often inefficient, but must be performed even if
the interactions are not security-relevant. We now present examples of this.
6.2 FAC and Inefficient Compiled Code
We illustrate various ways in which FAC forces inefficiencies in compiled code via a running example.
Consider a password manager written in an object-oriented language that is compiled to an assembly-like
language. We elide most code details and focus only on the relevant aspects.
1 private db: Database;
2
3 public testPwd( user: Char[8], pwd: BitString): Bool{
4 if( db.contains( user )){ return db.get( user ).getPassword() == pwd; }
5 }
6 ...
7 private class Database{ ... }
The source program exports the function testPwd to check whether a user’s stored password matches a
given password pwd. The stored password is in a local database, which is represented by a piece of local state
in the variable db. The details of db are not important here, but the database is marked private, so it is not
directly accessible to the context of this program in the source language.
Example 6 (Extensive checks). A fully-abstract compiler for the program above must generate code that
checks that the arguments passed to testPwd by the context are of the right type [10, 35, 43, 58, 63]. The
code expects an array of characters of length 8. A parameter of a different type (e.g., an array of objects)
cannot be passed in the source, so it must also be prevented in the target. Since the target is untyped, code
must be inserted to check the argument. Specifically, a fully abstract compiler will generate code similar to
the following (we assume that arrays are passed as pointers into the heap).
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1 label testpwd
2 for i = 0; i< 8; i++ // 8 is the legth of the user field in the previous snippet
3 add r0 i
4 load the memory word stored at address r0 into r1
5 test that r1 is a valid char encoding
6 ...
Basically, this code dynamically checks that the first argument is a character array of length 8. Such a check
can be very inefficient when the length is very long. 
The problem here is that FAC forces these checks on all arguments, even those that have no security
relevance. In contrast, RSC does not need these checks. Indeed, none of our earlier compilers (J·KLULP , J·KLτLpi
and J·KLτLI ) insert them. Note that any robustly safe source program will already have programmer-inserted
checks for all parameters that are relevant to the safety property of interest, and these checks will be compiled
to the target. For other parameters, the checks are irrelevant, both in the source and the target, so there is
no need to insert them.
Example 7 (Component size in memory). Let us now consider two different ways to implement the Database
class: as a List and as a RedBlackTree. As the class is private, its internal behaviour and representation
of the database is invisible to the outside. Let Clist be the program with the List implementation and Ctree
be the program with the RedBlackTree implementation; in the source language, these are equivalent.
However, a subtlety arises when considering the assembly-level, compiled counterparts of Clist and Ctree:
the code of a RedBlackTree implementation consumes more memory than the code of a List implementation.
Thus, a target-level context can distinguish Clist from Ctree by just inspecting the sizes of the code segments.
So, in order for the compiler to be fully abstract, it must produce code of a fixed size [10, 58]. This wastes
memory and makes it impossible to compile some components. An alternative would be to spread the
components in an overly-large memory at random places i.e., use address-space layout randomization or
ASLR, so that detecting different code sizes has a negligible chance of success [6,40]. However, ASLR is now
known to be broken [16, 41]. 
Again, we see that FAC introduces an inefficiency in compiled code (pointless code memory consumption)
even though this has no security implication here. In contrast, RSC does not require this unless the safety
property(ies) of interest care about the size of the code (which is very unlikely in a security context, since
security by code obscurity is a strongly discouraged practice).
Example 8 (Wrappers for heap resources). Assume that the Database class is implemented as a List.
Shown below are two implementations of the newList method inside List which we call Cone and Ctwo. The
only difference between Cone and Ctwo is that Ctwo allocates two lists internally; one of these (shadow) is used
for internal purposes only.
1 public newList(): List{
2
3 ell = new List();
4 return ell;
5 }
1 public newList(): List{
2 shadow = new List();
3 ell = new List();
4 return ell;
5 }
Again, Cone and Ctwo are equivalent in a source language that does not allow pointer comparison. To
attain FAC when the target allows pointer comparisons, the pointers returned by newList in the two im-
plementations must be the same, but this is very difficult to ensure since the second implementation does
more allocations. A simple solution to this problem is to wrap ell in a proxy object and return the
proxy [10, 51, 58, 63]. Compiled code needs to maintain a lookup table mapping the proxy to the original
object. Proxies must have allocation-independent addresses. Proxies work but they are inefficient due to the
need to look up the table on every object access.
Another way to attain FAC is to weaken the source language, introducing an operation to distinguish
object identities in the source [56]. However, this is a widely discouraged practice, as it changes the source
language from what it really is and the implication of such a change may be difficult to fathom for program-
mers and verifiers alike. 
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In this example, FAC forces all privately allocated locations to be wrapped in proxies, but RSC does
not require this. Our target languages LP, Lπ and LI support address comparison (addresses are natural
numbers or integers in their heaps) but J·KLULP and J·KLτLpi just use capabilities to attain security efficiently,
while J·KLτLI just relies on enclaves. On the other hand, for attaining FAC , capabilities or enclaves would
be insufficient since they do not hide addresses; proxies would still be required (this point is concretely
demonstrated in Section 6.3).
Example 9 (Strict termination vs divergence). Consider a source language that is strictly terminating while
a target language that is not. Below is an extension of the password manager to allow database encryption
via an externally-defined function. As the database is not directly accessible from external code, the two
implementations below Cenc (which does the encryption) and Cskip which skips the encryption are equivalent
in the source.
1 public encryptDB( func : Database →Bitstring)
: void {
2 func( this.db );
3 return;
4 }
1 public encryptDB( func : Database →Bitstring)
: void {
2
3 return;
4 }
If we compile Cenc and Cskip to an assembly language, the compiled counterparts cannot be equivalent,
since the target-level context can detect which function is compiled by passing a func that diverges. Calling
the compilation of Cenc with such a func will cause divergence, while calling the compilation of Cskip will
immediately return. 
This case presents a situation where FAC is outright impossible. The only way to get FAC is to make
the source language artificially non-terminating. (See the work of Devriese et al. [32] for more details
of this particular problem.) On the other hand, RSC can be easily attained even in such settings since
it is completely independent of termination in the languages (unless the safety properties of interest are
termination-sensitive, which is usually not the case). For the specific examples we have considered, even if
our source languages LU and Lτ were restricted to terminating programs only, the same compilers and the
same proofs of RSC would still work.
Remark It is worth noting that many of the inefficiencies above might be resolved by just replacing
contextual equivalence with a different equivalence in the statement of FAC . However, it is not known
how to do this generally for arbitrary sources of inefficiency and, further, it is unclear what the security
consequences of such instantiations of FAC would be. On the other hand, RSC is uniform and it does
address all these inefficiencies.
An issue that can normally not be addressed just by tweaking equivalences is side-channel leaks, as they
are, by definition, not expressible in the language. Neither FAC nor RSC deals with side channels, but
recent results describe how to account for side channels in secure compilers [17].
6.3 Towards a Fully Abstract Compiler from LU to LP
In this section, we describe what it would take to build a fully abstract compiler from LU to LP. Along the
way, we note how this compiler would be less efficient than the RSC compiler we described earlier. In fact,
to get a fully abstract compiler, we need to adjust the languages. We describe these language changes first.
6.3.1 Language Extensions to LU and LP
This section lists the language extensions required for a fully-abstract compiler from LU to LP. It is not
possible to motivate all the language changes before explaining the details of the compiler, so some of the
justification is postponed to Section 6.3.2.
A first concern for full abstraction is that a target context can always determine the memory consumption
of two compiled components, analogously to Example 7. To ensure that this does not break full abstraction,
we add a source expression size that returns the number of locations ℓ allocated in the heap.
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In the target language LP, we need to know whether an expression is a pair, whether it is a location,
and we need to be able to compare two capabilities. Accordingly, we add the operations isloc(e), ispair(e)
and eqcap(e, e), respectively.
Finally, compiled code needs private functions for its runtime checks that must not be visible to the
context. LP does not have this functionality: all functions defined by a component can be called by the
context. Accordingly, we modify LP so that all functions F defined in a component are private to it by
default. Each component explicitly includes the list of functions it exports; only these functions can be
called by the context.
6.3.2 The
q
·
yLU
LP
Compiler
The fully abstract compiler
q
·
yLU
LP
is similar to the RSC attaining compiler J·KLULP , but with critical dif-
ferences. We know that fully abstract compilation preserves all source abstractions in the target language.
Here, the only abstraction that distinguishes LP from LU is that locations are abstract in LU, but concrete
natural numbers in LP. Thus, locations allocated by compiled code must not be passed directly to the
context as this would reveal the allocation order (as seen in Example 8). Instead of passing the location
〈n,k〉 to the context, the compiler arranges for an opaque handle 〈n′,kcom〉 (that cannot be used to access
any location directly) to be passed. Such an opaque handle is often called a mask or seal in the literature
and this technique is often called dynamic sealing [74].
To ensure that masking is done properly,
q
·
yLU
LP
inserts code at entry points and at exit points to
compiled code (i.e., at function calls, before returning, before and after callbacks), wrapping the compiled
code in a way that enforces masking. This notion of wrapping is standard in literature on fully abstract
compilation [35, 63]. The wrapper keeps a list L of component-allocated locations that are shared with the
context in order to know their masks. When a component-allocated location is shared, it is added to the
list L. The mask of a location is its index in this list. If the same location is shared again it is not added
again but its previous index is used. So if 〈n,k〉 is the 4th element of L, its mask is 〈4,kcom〉. To implement
lookup in L we must compare capabilities too, for we rely on the newly added operation eqcap. To ensure
capabilities do not leak to the context, the second field of the pair is a constant capability kcom, which
protects a dummy location the compiled code does not actually use. Technically speaking, this is exactly
how existing fully abstract compilers operate (e.g., as in the work of Patrignani et al. [58]).
As should be clear, this kind of masking is very inefficient at runtime. However, even this masking is not
sufficient for full abstraction. Next, we explain additional things the compiler must do.
Determining when a Location is Passed to the Context. A component-allocated location can be
passed to the context not just as a function argument but on the heap. So before passing control to the
context the compiled code needs to scan the whole heap where a location can be passed and mask any
component-allocated locations it finds. Dually, when receiving control the compiled code must scan the
heap to unmask all masked locations. The problem now is determining what parts of the heap to scan
and how. Specifically, the compiled code needs to keep track of all the locations (and related capabilities)
that are shared, i.e., (i) passed from the context to the component and (ii) passed from the component
to the context. These are the locations through which possible communication of locations can happen.
Compiled code keeps track of these shared locations in a list S. Intuitively, on the first function call from the
context to the compiled component, assuming the parameter is a location, the compiled code will register
that location and all other locations reachable from it in S. On subsequent ? (incoming) actions, the
compiled code will register all new locations available as parameters or reachable from S. Then, on any !
(outgoing) action, the compiled code must scan whatever locations (that the compiled code has created) are
now reachable from S and add them to S. We need the new instructions isloc and ispair in LP to compute
these reachable locations. Of course, this kind of scanning of locations reachable from S at every call/return
between components can be extremely costly.
Enforcing the Masking of Locations The functions mask and unmask are added by the compiler to
the compiled code. The first function takes a location (which intuitively contains a value v) and replaces
(in v) any pair 〈n,k〉 of a location protected with a component-created capability k with its index in the
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masking list L. The second function replaces any pair 〈n,kcom〉 with the nth element of the masking list L.
These functions should not be directly accessible to the context (else it can unmask any masked location
and break full abstraction). This is why LP needs private functions.
Letting the Context use Masked Locations Masked locations cannot be used directly by the context
for reading and writing. Thus, compiled code must provide a read and a write function (both of which are
public) that implement reading and writing for masked locations.
As should be clear, code compiled through
q
·
yLU
LP
has a lot of runtime overhead in calculating the heap
reachable from S and inmasking and unmasking locations. Additionally, it also has code memory overhead:
the functions read, write, mask, unmask and list manipulation code must be included. Finally, there is
data overhead in maintaining S, L and other supporting data structures to implement the runtime checks
described above. In contrast, the code compiled through J·KLULP (which is just robustly safe and not fully
abstract) has none of these overheads.
6.4 Proving that J · KLU
LP
is a Fully Abstract Compiler
Using
q
·
yLU
LP
as a concrete example, we now discuss why proving FAC can be harder than proving RSC .
Consider the hard part of FAC , the forward implication, C1≃ctx C2 ⇒ JC1KST≃ctx JC2KST. The contrapositive
of this statement is JC1KST 6≃ctx JC2KST ⇒ C1 6≃ctx C2. By unfolding the definition of 6≃ctx we see that, given
a target context C that distinguishes JC1KST from JC2KST, it is necessary to show that there exists a source
context C that distinguishes C1 from C2. That source context C must be built (backtranslated) starting
from the already given target context C that differentiates JC1KST from JC2KST.
A backtranslation directed by the syntax of the target context C is hopeless here since the target ex-
pressions iscap and isloc cannot be directly backtranslated to valid source expressions. Hence, we resort
to another well-known technique [10, 63]. First, we define a fully abstract (labeled) trace semantics for the
target language. A trace semantics is fully abstract when two components are contextually inequivalent iff
their trace semantics differ in at least one trace. So if we write TR (C) to denote the traces of the component
C, we can formally state full abstraction of the trace semantics as: TR
(r
C1
zLU
LP
)
= TR
(r
C2
zLU
LP
)
⇐⇒r
C1
zLU
LP
≃ctx
r
C2
zLU
LP
. Given this trace semantics, the statement of the forward implication of full ab-
straction reduces to:
TR
(r
C1
zLU
LP
)
6= TR
(r
C2
zLU
LP
)
⇒ C1 6≃ctx C2.
The advantage of this formulation over the original one is that now we can construct a distinguishing source
context for C1 and C2 using the trace on which TR
(r
C1
zLU
LP
)
and TR
(r
C2
zLU
LP
)
disagree. While this
proof strategy of constructing a source context from a trace is similar to our proof of RSC , it is fundamentally
much harder and much more involved. There are two reasons for this.
First, fully abstract trace semantics are much more complex than our simple trace semantics of LP
from earlier sections. The reason is that our earlier trace semantics include the entire heap in every action,
but this breaks full abstraction of the trace semantics: such trace semantics also distinguish contextually
equivalent components that differ in their internal private state. In a fully abstract trace semantics, the
trace actions must record only those heap locations that are shared between the component and the context.
Consequently, the definition of the trace semantics must inductively track what has been shared in the past.
In particular, the definition must account for locations reachable indirectly from explicitly shared locations.
This complicates both the definition of traces and the proofs that build on the definition.
Second, the source context that the backtranslation constructs from a target trace must simulate the
shared part of the heap at every context switch. Since locations in the target may be masked now, the
source context must maintain a map with the source locations corresponding to the target masked ones,
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which complicates the source context substantially. Call this map B. Now, this affects two patterns of target
traces that need to be handled in a special way: call read v H? · ret H′! and call write v H? · ret H′!.
Normally, these patterns would be translated to source-level calls to the same functions (read and write), but
this is not possible. In fact, the source code has no read or write function, and the target-level calls to these
functions need to be backtranslated to the corresponding source constructs (! and :=, respectively). The
locations used by these constructs must be looked up from B as these are reads and writes to masked locations.
Moreover, calls and returns to read can be simply ignored since the effects of reads are already captured by
later actions in traces. Calls and returns to write cannot be ignored as they set up a component location
(albeit masked) in a certain way and that affects the behaviour of the component. We show in Example 10
how to backtranslate calls and returns to write.
Example 10 (Backtranslation of traces). Consider the trace below and its backtranslation.
(1) call f 0 1 7→ 4?
(2) ret 1 7→ 〈1,kcom〉 !
(3)
[
call write 〈〈1,kcom〉 ,5〉 1 7→ 〈1,kcom〉 ?
ret 1 7→ 〈1,kcom〉 !
main(x) 7→
let x = new 4 in L :: 〈x, 1〉
call f 0
]
(1)
let x =!L(1) in B :: 〈x, 1〉 ] (2)
!B(1) := 5
]
(3)
The first action, where the context registers the first location in the list L, is as before. Then in the
second action the compiled component passes to the context (in location 1) a masked location with index
1 and, later, the context writes 5 to it. The backtranslated code must recognise this pattern and store the
location that, in the source, corresponds to the mask 1 in the list B (action 2). In action 3, when it is time
to write 5 to that location, the code looks up the location to write to from B. 
It should be clear that this proof of FAC is substantially harder than our corresponding proof of RSC ,
which needed neither fully abstract traces, nor tracking any mapping in the backtranslated source contexts.
7 Related Work
Recent work [9, 36] presents new criteria for secure compilation that ensure preservation of subclasses of
hyperproperties. Hyperproperties [27] are a formal representation of predicates on programs, i.e., they are
predicates on sets of traces. Hyperproperties capture many security-relevant properties including not just
conventional safety and liveness, which are predicates on traces, but also properties like non-interference,
which is a predicate on pairs of traces. Modulo technical differences, our definition of RSC coincides with
the criterion of “robust safety property preservation” in [9, 36]. We show, through concrete instances, that
this criterion can be easily realized by compilers, and develop two proof techniques for establishing it. We
further show that the criterion leads to more efficient compiled code than does FAC . Additionally, the
criteria in [9, 36] assume that behaviours in the source and target are represented using the same alphabet.
Hence, the definitions (somewhat unrealistically or ideally) do not require a translation of source properties
to target properties. That line of work has been extended to consider criteria that preserve hyperproperties
between languages with different trace models which are connected by a trace relation similar to ours [8].
Like this last work, we consider differences in the representation of behaviour in the source and in the target
and this is accounted for in our monitor relationM≈M. Unlike this last work, we provide different instances
where the relation is instantiated in order to show how the theory scales to different protection mechanisms.
A slightly different account of the difference between traces across languages is presented by Patrignani and
Garg [64] in the context of reactive black-box programs.
Abate et al. [7] define a variant of robustly-safe compilation called RSCC specifically tailored to the case
where (source) components can perform undefined behaviour. RSCC does not consider attacks from arbitrary
target contexts but from compiled components that can become compromised and behave in arbitrary ways.
To demonstrate RSCC, Abate et al. [7] rely on two backends for their compiler: software fault isolation and
tag-based monitors. On the other hand, we rely on capability machines and memory isolation (the latter in
the companion report). RSCC also preserves (a form of) safety properties and can be achieved by relying
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on a trace-based backtranslation; it is unclear whether proofs can be simplified when the source is verified
and concurrent, as in our second compiler.
ASLR [6, 40], protected module architectures [10, 46, 58, 63], tagged architectures [43], capability ma-
chines [78] and cryptographic primitives [4, 5, 24, 28] have been used as targets for FAC . We believe all
of these can also be used as targets of RSC -attaining compilers. In fact, some targets such as capability
machines seem to be better suited to RSC than FAC , as we demonstrated.
Ahmed et al. prove full abstraction for several compilers between typed languages [11,12,54]. As compiler
intermediate languages are often typed, and as these types often serve as the basis for complex static analyses,
full abstraction seems like a reasonable goal for (fully typed) intermediate compilation steps. In the last few
steps of compilation, where the target languages are unlikely to be typed, one could establish robust safety
preservation and combine the two properties (vertically) to get an end-to-end security guarantee.
There are three other criteria for secure compilation that we would like to mention: securely compart-
mentalised compilation (SCC) [43], trace-preserving compilation (TPC) [64] and non-interference-preserving
compilation (NIPC) [13,17,18,29]. SCC is a re-statement of the “hard” part of full abstraction (the forward
implication), but adapted to languages with undefined behaviour and a static notion of components. Thus,
SCC suffers from much of the same efficiency drawbacks as FAC . TPC is a stronger criterion than FAC ,
that most existing fully abstract compilers also attain. Again, compilers attaining TPC also suffer from the
drawbacks of compilers attaining FAC .
NIPC preserves a single property: noninterference (NI). However, this line of work does not consider
active target-level adversaries yet. Instead, the focus is on compiling whole programs. Since noninterference
is not a safety property, it is difficult to compare NIPC to RSC directly. However, noninterference can also
be approximated as a safety property [22]. So, in principle, RSC (with adequate massaging of observations)
can be applied to stronger end-goals than NIPC.
Swamy et al. [75] embed an F∗ model of a gradually and robustly typed variant of JavaScript into an F∗
model of JavaScript. Gradual typing supports constructs similar to our endorsement construct in Lτ . Their
type-directed compiler is proven to attain memory isolation as well as static and dynamic memory safety.
However, they do not consider general safety properties, nor a general criterion for compiler security.
Two of our target languages rely on capabilities for restricting access to sensitive locations from the
context. Although capabilities are not mainstream in any processor, fully functional research prototypes
such as Cheri exist [80]. Capability machines have previously been advocated as a target for efficient secure
compilation [33] and preliminary work on compiling C-like languages to them exists, but the criterion applied
is FAC [70, 71, 78].
On the other hand, one of our target languages relies on coase-grained isolation, a feature that is being
increasingly supported in hardware (Intel calls this SGX [50]; ARM calls it TrustZone [77]). Coarse-grained
isolation has also been advocated as a target for secure compilation [10,46,57]. The criterion applied in these
works is FAC , which is what lets us draw a starker comparison in Section 6.
8 Conclusion
This paper has examined robustly safe compilation (RSC ), a soundness criterion for compilers with direct
relevance to security. We have shown that the criterion is easily realizable and may lead to more efficient
code than does fully abstract compilation. We have also presented two techniques for establishing that a
compiler attains RSC . One is an adaptation of an existing technique, backtranslation, and the other is based
on inductive invariants.
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9 The Untyped Source Language: LU
This is a sequential while language with monitors.
9.1 Syntax
Whole Programs P ::= ℓroot;H;F; I
Components C ::= ℓroot;F; I
Contexts A ::= H;F [·]
Interfaces I ::= f
Functions F ::= f(x) 7→ s; return;
Operations ⊕ ::= + | −
Comparison ⊗ ::= == | < | >
Values v ::= b ∈ {true, false} | n ∈ N | 〈v, v〉 | ℓ
Expressions e ::= x | v | e⊕ e | e⊗ e | 〈e, e〉 | e.1 | e.2 | !e
Statements s ::= skip | s; s | let x = e in s | if e then s else s
| call f e | let x = new e in s | x := e
Eval . Ctxs . E ::= [·] | e⊕ E | E⊕ n | e⊗ E | E⊗ n
| 〈e,E〉 | 〈E, v〉 | E.1 | E.2 | !E
Heaps H ::= ∅ | H; ℓ 7→ v
Monitors M ::= ({σ} , , σ0, ℓroot, σc)
Mon. States σ ∈ S
Mon. Reds .  ::= ∅ | ; (s,H, s)
Substitutions ρ ::= ∅ | ρ[v / x]
Prog. States Ω ::= C,H ⊲ (s)f
Labels λ ::= ǫ | α
Actions α ::= call f v H? | call f v H! | ret H! | ret H?
Traces α ::= ∅ | α · α
9.2 Dynamic Semantics
Rules LU-Jump-Internal to LU-Jump-OUT dictate the kind of a jump between two functions: if inter-
nal to the component/attacker, in(from the attacker to the component) or out(from the component to
the attacker). Rule LU-Plug tells how to obtain a whole program from a component and an attacker.
Rule LU-Whole tells when a program is whole. Rule LU-Initial State tells the initial state of a whole pro-
gram. Rule LU-Monitor Step tells when a monitor makes a single step given a heap.
Helpers
(LU-Jump-Internal)
((f′ ∈ I ∧ f ∈ I)∨
(f′ /∈ I ∧ f /∈ I))
I ⊢ f, f′ : internal
(LU-Jump-IN)
f ∈ I ∧ f′ /∈ I
I ⊢ f, f′ : in
(LU-Jump-OUT)
f /∈ I ∧ f′ ∈ I
I ⊢ f, f′ : out
(LU-Plug)
A ≡ H;F [·] C ≡ ℓroot;F′; I ⊢ C,F : whole
main ∈ names(F)
A [C] = ℓroot;H; ℓroot 7→ 0;F;F′; I
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(LU-Whole)
C ≡ ℓroot;F′; I names(F) ∩ names(F′) = ∅
names(I) ⊆ names(F) ∪ names(F′) fv(F) ∪ fv(F′) = ∅
⊢ C,F : whole
(LU-Initial State)
P ≡ ℓroot;H;F; I C ≡ ℓroot;F; I
Ω0 (P) = C;H, ℓroot 7→ 0 ⊲ call main 0
9.2.1 Component Semantics
H ⊲ e →֒→ e′ Expression e reduces to e′.
C,H ⊲ s
ǫ
−−→ C′,H′ ⊲ s′ Statement s reduces to s′ and evolves the rest accordingly,
emitting label λ.
Ω
α
==⇒ Ω′ Program state Ω steps to Ω′ emitting trace α.
H ⊲ e →֒→ e′
(ELU-ctx)
H ⊲ e →֒→ e′
H ⊲ E [e] →֒→ E [e′]
(ELU-val)
H ⊲ v →֒→ v
(ELU-p1)
H ⊲ 〈v, v′〉 .1 →֒→ v
(ELU-p2)
H ⊲ 〈v, v′〉 .1 →֒→ v′
(ELU-op)
n⊕ n′ = n′′
H ⊲ n⊕ n′ →֒→ n′′
(ELU-comp)
n⊗ n′ = b
H ⊲ n⊗ n′ →֒→ b
(ELU-dereference)
H ⊲ e →֒→ ℓ ℓ 7→ v ∈ H
H⊲!e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ s
λ
−−→ C′,H′ ⊲ s′
(ELU-sequence)
C,H ⊲ skip; s
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s
(ELU-step)
C,H ⊲ s
λ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s′
C,H ⊲ s; s′′
λ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s′; s′′
(ELU-if-true)
H ⊲ e →֒→ true
C,H ⊲ if e then s else s′
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s
(ELU-if-false)
H ⊲ e →֒→ false
C,H ⊲ if e then s else s′
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s
(ELU-letin)
H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ let x = e in s
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s[v / x]
(ELU-alloc)
H ⊲ e →֒→ v ℓ /∈ dom(H)
C,H ⊲ let x = new e in s
ǫ
−−→ C,H; ℓ 7→ v ⊲ s[ℓ / x]
(ELU-update)
H ⊲ e →֒→ v
H = H1; ℓ 7→ v
′;H2 H
′ = H1; ℓ 7→ v;H2
C,H ⊲ ℓ := e
ǫ
−−→ C,H′ ⊲ skip
(ELU-call-internal)
C.intfs ⊢ f, f′ : internal f′ = f′′; f′
f(x) 7→ s; return; ∈ C.funs H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ (call f e)f′
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ (s; return;[v / x])f′;f
(ELU-callback)
f′ = f′′; f′ f(x) 7→ s; return; ∈ F
C.intfs ⊢ f′, f : out H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ (call f e)f′
call f v H!
−−−−−−−−−→ C,H ⊲ (s; return;[v / x])f′;f
(ELU-call)
f′ = f′′; f′ f(x) 7→ s; return; ∈ C.funs
C.intfs ⊢ f′, f : in H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ (call f e)f′
call f v H?
−−−−−−−−−→ C,H ⊲ (s; return;[v / x])f′;f
(ELU-ret-internal)
f′ = f′′; f′ C.intfs ⊢ f, f′ : internal
C,H ⊲ (return;)f′;f
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ (skip)f′
(ELU-retback)
f′ = f′′; f′ C.intfs ⊢ f, f′ : in
C,H ⊲ (return;)f′;f
ret H?
−−−−−−→ C,H ⊲ (skip)f′
(ELU-return)
f′ = f′′; f′ C.intfs ⊢ f, f′ : out
C,H ⊲ (return;)f′;f
ret H!
−−−−−→ C,H ⊲ (skip)f′
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Ω
α
==⇒ Ω′
(ELU-single)
Ω =⇒ Ω′′
Ω′′
α
−−→ Ω′
Ω
α
==⇒ Ω′
(ELU-silent)
Ω
ǫ
−−→ Ω′
Ω =⇒ Ω′
(ELU-trans)
Ω
α
==⇒ Ω′′
Ω′′
α′
==⇒ Ω′
Ω
α·α′
====⇒ Ω′
9.3 Monitor Semantics
Let reach(ℓo,H) return a set of locations {ℓ} in H such that it is possible to reach any ℓ ∈ {ℓ} from ℓo just
by expression evaluation.
reach(ℓ,H) = {ℓ | ∃e. H ⊲ e →֒→ ℓ ∧ ℓ ∈ dom(H)}
To ensure monitor transitions have a meaning, they are assumed to be closed under bijective renaming
of locations.
M;H M′
(LU-Monitor Step)
M = ({σ} , , σ0, ℓroot, σc) M
′ = ({σ} , , σ0, ℓroot, σf)
(σc,H
′, σf) ∈ H
′ ⊆ H dom(H′) = reach(ℓroot,H)
M;H M′
(LU-Monitor Step Trace Base)
M;∅ M
(LU-Monitor Step Trace)
M;H M′′ M′′;H M′
M;H · H M′
(LU-valid trace)
M;H M′ relevant(α) = H
M ⊢ α
Monitor actions are the only part of traces that matter for safety, so we define function relevant( · )
that takes a general trace and elides all but the heap of actions. This function is used by both languages so
we typeset it in black.
relevant(∅) = ∅
relevant(call f v H? · α) = H · relevant(α)
relevant(call f v H ! · α) = H · relevant(α)
relevant(ret H ! · α) = H · relevant(α)
relevant(ret H? · α) = H · relevant(α)
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10 The Target Language: LP
10.1 Syntax
Whole Programs P ::= kroot;F; I
Components C ::= kroot;F; I
Contexts A ::= F [·]
Interfaces I ::= f
Functions F ::= f(x) 7→ s; return;
Operations ⊕ ::= + | −
Comparison ⊗ ::= == | < | >
Values v ::= n ∈ N | 〈v,v〉 | k
Expressions e ::= x | v | e⊕ e | e⊗ e | 〈e, e〉 | e.1 | e.2 | !e with e
Statements s ::= skip | s; s | let x = e in s | ifz e then s else s | call f e
| x := e with e | let x = new e in s | let x = hide e in s
Eval . Ctxs . E ::= [·] | e⊕E | E⊕ n | e⊗E | E⊗ n | !E with v | !e with E
| 〈e,E〉 | 〈E,v〉 | E.1 | E.2
Heaps H ::= ∅ | H;n 7→ v : η | H;k
Tag η ::= ⊥ | k
Monitors M ::= ({σ} , , σ0,kroot, σc)
Mon. States σ ∈ S
Mon. Reds .  ::= ∅ | ; (s,H, s)
Substitutions ρ ::= ∅ | ρ[v / x]
Prog. States Ω ::= C,H ⊲ (s)f
Labels λ ::= ǫ | α
Actions α ::= call f v H? | call f v H! | ret H! | ret H?
Traces α ::= ∅ | α · α
10.2 Operational Semantics of LP
Helpers
(LP-Jump-Internal)
((f ′ ∈ I ∧ f ∈ I)∨
(f ′ /∈ I ∧ f /∈ I))
I ⊢ f , f ′ : internal
(LP-Jump-IN)
f ∈ I ∧ f ′ /∈ I
I ⊢ f , f ′ : in
(LP-Jump-OUT)
f /∈ I ∧ f ′ ∈ I
I ⊢ f , f ′ : out
(LP-Plug)
A ≡ F [·] C ≡ kroot;F′; I
⊢ C,F : whole main(x) 7→ s; return; ∈ F
A [C] = kroot;F;F′; I
(LP-Whole)
C ≡ kroot;F′; I
names(F) ∩ names(F′) = ∅ names(I) ⊆ names(F)
⊢ C,F : whole
(LP-Initial State)
P ≡ kroot;F; I C ≡ kroot;F′; I
Ω0 (P) = C,kroot;0 7→ 0 : kroot ⊲ call main 0
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10.2.1 Component Semantics
H ⊲ e →֒→ e′ Expression e reduces to e′.
C,H ⊲ s
ǫ
−−→ C′,H′ ⊲ s′ Statement s reduces to s′ and evolves the rest accordingly,
emitting label λ.
Ω
α
==⇒ Ω′ Program state Ω steps to Ω′ emitting trace α.
H ⊲ e →֒→ e′
(ELP-val)
H ⊲ v →֒→ v
(ELP-p1)
H ⊲ 〈v,v′〉 .1 →֒→ v
(ELP-p2)
H ⊲ 〈v,v′〉 .1 →֒→ v′
(ELP-op)
n⊕ n′ = n′′
H ⊲ n⊕ n′ →֒→ n′′
(ELP-comp)
if n⊗ n′ = true then n′′ = 0 else n′′ = 1
H ⊲ n⊗ n′ →֒→ n′′
(ELP-deref-top)
n 7→ v : ⊥ ∈ H
H⊲!n with _ →֒→ v
(ELP-deref-k)
n 7→ (v,k) ∈ H
H⊲!n with k →֒→ v
(ELP-ctx)
H ⊲ e →֒→ e′
H ⊲E [e] →֒→ E [e′]
C;H ⊲ s
λ
−−→ C′;H′ ⊲ s′
(ELP-sequence)
C,H ⊲ skip; s
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s
(ELP-step)
C,H ⊲ s
λ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s′
C,H ⊲ s; s′′
λ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s′; s
(ELP-if-true)
H ⊲ e →֒→ 0
C,H ⊲ ifz e then s else s′
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s
(ELP-if-false)
H ⊲ e →֒→ n n 6≡ 0
C,H ⊲ ifz e then s else s′
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s′
(ELP-letin)
H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ let x = e in s
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s[v / x]
(ELP-new)
H = H1;n 7→ (v, η) H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ let x = new e in s
ǫ
−−→ C,H;n+ 1 7→ v : ⊥ ⊲ s[n+ 1 / x]
(ELP-hide)
H ⊲ e →֒→ n k /∈ dom(H)
H = H1;n 7→ v : ⊥;H2 H
′ = H1;n 7→ v : k;H2;k
C,H ⊲ let x = hide e in s
ǫ
−−→ C,H′ ⊲ s[k / x]
(ELP-assign-top)
H ⊲ e →֒→ v
H = H1;n 7→ _ : ⊥;H2 H′ = H1;n 7→ v : ⊥;H2
C,H ⊲ n := e with _
ǫ
−−→ C,H′ ⊲ skip
(ELP-assign-k)
H ⊲ e →֒→ v
H = H1;n 7→ _ : k;H2 H′ = H1;n 7→ v : k;H2
C,H ⊲ n := e with k
ǫ
−−→ C,H′ ⊲ skip
(ELP-call-internal)
C.intfs ⊢ f , f ′ : internal f ′ = f ′′; f ′
f(x) 7→ s; return; ∈ C.funs H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ (call f e)f ′
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ (s; return;[v / x])f ′;f
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(ELP-callback)
f ′ = f ′′; f ′ f(x) 7→ s; return; ∈ F
C.intfs ⊢ f ′, f : outH ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ (call f e)f ′
call f v H!
−−−−−−−−−→ C,H ⊲ (s; return;[v / x])f ′;f
(ELP-call)
f ′ = f ′′; f ′ f(x) 7→ s; return; ∈ C.funs
C.intfs ⊢ f ′, f : in H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ (call f e)f ′
call f v H?
−−−−−−−−−→ C,H ⊲ (s; return;[v / x])f ′;f
(ELP-ret-internal)
C.intfs ⊢ f , f ′ : internal f ′ = f ′′; f ′
C,H ⊲ (return;)f ′;f
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ (skip)f ′
(ELP-retback)
C.intfs ⊢ f , f ′ : in f ′ = f ′′; f ′
C,H ⊲ (return;)f ′;f
ret H?
−−−−−−→ C,H ⊲ (skip)f ′
(ELP-return)
C.intfs ⊢ f , f ′ : out f ′ = f ′′; f ′
C,H ⊲ (return;)f ′;f
ret H!
−−−−−→ C,H ⊲ (skip)f ′
Ω
α
==⇒ Ω′
(ELP-single)
Ω =⇒ Ω′′
Ω′′
α
−−→ Ω′
Ω
α
==⇒ Ω′
(ELP-silent)
Ω
ǫ
−−→ Ω′
Ω =⇒ Ω′
(ELP-trans)
Ω
α
==⇒ Ω′′
Ω′′
α′
==⇒ Ω′
Ω
α·α′
====⇒ Ω′
10.3 Monitor Semantics
Define reach(nr,kr,H) as the set of locations {n} such that it is possible to reach any n ∈ {n} from nr
using any expression and relying on capability kr as well as any capability reachable from nr. Formally:
reach(nr,kr,H) =
{
n
∣∣∣∣∣ H ⊲ e →֒→ !n with v →֒→ v
′
fv(e) = nr ∪ kr
}
M;H M′
(LP-Monitor Step)
M = ({σ} , , σ0,kroot, σc) M
′ = ({σ} , , σ0,kroot, σf )
(sc,H
′, sf ) ∈ H
′ ⊆ H dom(H′) = reach(0,kroot,H)
M;H M′
(LP-Monitor Step Trace Base)
M;∅ M
(LP-Monitor Step Trace)
M;H M′′ M′′;H M′
M;H ·H M′
(LP-valid trace)
M;H M′ relevant(α) = H
M ⊢ α
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11 Language and Compiler Properties
11.1 Safety, Attackers and Robust Safety
These properties hold for both languages are written in black and only once.
Definition 5 (Safety).
M ⊢ C : safe
def
= .
if ⊢ C : whole
then if Ω0 (C )
α
==⇒ _
then M ⊢ α
A program is safe for a monitor if the monitor accepts any trace the program generates.
Definition 6 ((Informal) Attacker).
C ⊢ A : attacker
def
= no location the component cares about ∈ fn(A)
An attacker is valid if it does not refer to the locations the component cares about. We leave the notion
of location the component cares about abstract and instantiate it on a per-language basis later on.
Definition 7 (Robust Safety).
M ⊢ C : rs
def
= ∀A.
if M⌢C
C ⊢ A : attacker
then M ⊢ A [C ] : safe
A program is robustly safe if it is safe for any attacker it is composed with.
The definition of M⌢C is to be specified on a language-specific basis, as the next section does for LU
and LP.
11.2 Monitor Agreement and Attacker for LP and LU
Definition 8 (LU: M⌢C).
({σ} , , σ0, ℓroot, σc)⌢(ℓroot;F; I)
A monitor and a component agree if they focus on the same initial location ℓroot.
Definition 9 (LP: M⌢C).
({σ} , , σ0,kroot, σc)⌢(kroot;F; I)
A monitor and a component agree if they use the same capabilty kroot to protect the initial location 0.
Definition 10 (LU attacker).
C ⊢ A : attacker
def
= C = (ℓroot;F; I),A = H;F′
ℓroot /∈ (fn(F′) ∪ H)
Definition 11 (LP attacker).
C ⊢ A : attacker
def
= C = (kroot;F; I),A = F′
kroot /∈ fn(F′)
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11.3 Cross-language Relations
Assume a partial bijection β : ℓ× n× η from source to target heap locations such that
• if (ℓ1,n, η) ∈ β and (ℓ2,n, η) then ℓ1 = ℓ2;
• if (ℓ,n1, η1) ∈ β and (ℓ,n2, η2) then n1 = n2 and η1 = η2.
we use this bijection to parametrise the relation so that we can relate meaningful locations.
For compiler correctness we rely on a β0 which relates initial locations of monitors.
Assume a relation ≈β : v × β × v that is total so it maps any source value to a target value v.
• ∀v.∃v.v≈β v.
This relation is used for defining compiler correctness. By inspecting the semantics of LU, Rules ELP-sequence
and ELP-if-true let us derive that
• true≈β 0;
• false≈β n where n 6= 0;
• ℓ≈β 〈n,v〉 where
{
v = k if (ℓ,n,k) ∈ β
v 6= k otherwise, so (ℓ,n,⊥) ∈ β
• 〈v1, v2〉≈β 〈v1,v2〉 iff v1≈β v1 and v2≈β v2.
We overload the notation and use the same notation to indicate the (assumed) relation between monitor
states: σ≈σ.
We lift this relation to sets of states point-wise and indicate it as follows: {σ}≈{σ}. In these cases the
bijection β is not needed as states do not have locations inside.
Function names are related when they are the same: f ≈β f .
Variables names are related when they are the same: x≈β x.
Substitutions are related when they replace related values for related variables: [v / x]≈β [v / x] iff v≈β v
and x≈β x.
α≈β α
(Call relation)
f ≈ f v≈β v H≈βH
call f v H?≈β call f v H?
(Callback relation)
f ≈ f v≈β v H≈βH
call f v H!≈β call f v H!
(Return relation)
H≈βH
ret H!≈β ret H!
(Returnback relation)
H≈βH
ret H?≈β ret H?
(Epsilon relation)
ǫ≈β ǫ
Definition 12 (MRM). Given a monitor-specific relation σ≈σ on monitor states, we say that a relation
R on source and target monitors is a bisimulation if the following hold whenever M = ({σ} , , σ0, ℓroot, σc)
and M = ({σ} , , σ0,kroot, σc) are related by R:
1. σ0≈σ0, and
2. σc≈ σc, and
3. For all β containing (ℓroot,0,kroot) and all H,H with H≈βH the following hold:
(a) (σc,H,_) ∈ iff (σc,H,_) ∈ , and
(b) (σc,H, σ′) ∈ and (σc,H, σ′) ∈ imply ({σ} , , σ0, ℓroot, σ′)R({σ} , , σ0,kroot, σ′).
Definition 13 (M≈M). M≈M is the union of all bisimulations MRM, which is also a bisimulation.
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H≈βH
(Heap relation)
H≈βH1;H2 ℓ≈β 〈n,_〉 v≈β v
H = H1;n 7→ v : η;H2
H; ℓ 7→ v≈βH
(Empty relation)
∅≈β k
The heap relation is crucial. A source heap H is related to a target heap H if for any location pointing
to a value in the former, a related location points to a related value in the target (Rule Heap relation). The
base case (Rule Empty relation) considers that in the target heap we may have keys, which are not related
to source elements.
As additional notation for states, we define when a state is stuck as follows
(Stuck state)
Ω = M ;F ; I ;H ⊲ s s 6≡ skip ∄Ω ′, λ.Ω
λ
−−→→ Ω ′
Ω×
A state that terminated is defined as follows; this definition is given for a concurrent version of the language
too (this is relevant for languages defined later):
(Terminated state)
Ω = M ;F ; I ;H ⊲ skip
Ω⇓
(Terminated soup)
Ω = M ;F ; I ;H ⊲Π ∀π ∈ Π .M ;F ; I ;H ⊲ π
⇓
Ω⇓
To define compiler correctness, we rely on a cross-language relation for program states. Two states are
related if their monitors are related and if their whole heap is related (Rule Related states – Whole).
Ω≈βΩ
(Related states – Whole)
Ω = M;F,F′; I;H ⊲ s
Ω =M;F,
q
F′
yLU
LP
; I;H ⊲ s
M≈βM H≈βH
Ω≈βΩ
11.4 Correct and Robustly-safe Compilation
Consider a compiler to be a function of this form: J·KST : C→ C, taking a source component and producing
a target component.
Definition 14 (Correct Compilation).
⊢ J·KST : CC def= ∀C, ∃β.
if Ω0
(JCKST) α==⇒ Ω
Ω⇓
Ω0 (C)≈β0 Ω0
(JCKST)
then Ω0 (C)
α
==⇒ Ω
β0 ⊆ β
Ω≈βΩ
α≈β α
Ω⇓
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Technically, any sequence α above is empty, as I is empty (the program is whole).
Definition 15 (Robust Safety Preserving Compilation).
⊢ J·KST : RSC def= ∀C,M,M.
if M ⊢ C : rs
M≈M
then M ⊢ JCKST : rs
11.4.1 Alternative definition for RSC
Definition 16 (Property-Free RSC).
⊢ J·KST : PF -RSC def= ∀C.
if ∀A, α.JCKST ⊢ A : attacker
⊢ A
[JCKST] : whole
Ω0
(JCKST) α==⇒ _
then ∃A, α.
C ⊢ A : attacker
⊢ A [C] : whole
Ω0 (C)
α
==⇒ _
relevant(α)≈β relevant(α)
The property-free characterisation of RSC is equivalent to its original characterisation.
Theorem 7 (PF -RSC and RSC are equivalent).
∀J·KST,⊢ J·KST : PF -RSC ⇐⇒ ⊢ J·KST : RSC
11.4.2 Compiling Monitors
We can change the definition of compiler to also compile the monitor so we are not given a target monitor
related to the source one, but the compiler gives us that monitor. Consider this compiler to have this type
and this notation:
r
·
zS
T
: C→ C.
Definition 17 (Robustly-safe Compilation with Monitors).
⊢
r
·
zS
T
: rs-pres(M)
def
= ∀C,M.
if M ⊢ C : rs
then
s
M
{S
T
⊢
s
C
{S
T
: rs
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12 Compiler from LU to LP
Definition 18 (Compiler LU to LP). J·KLULP : C→ CJCKLULP is defined as follows:q
ℓroot;F; I,M
yLU
LP
= kroot;
q
F
yLU
LP
;
q
I
yLU
LP
if ℓroot≈β 〈0,kroot〉 (J·KLULP-Comp)Jf(x) 7→ s; return;KLULP = f(x) 7→ JsKLULP ; return; (J·KLULP -Function)JfKLULP = f (J·KLULP-Interfaces)
Expressions
JtrueKLULP = 0 if true≈β 0 (J·KLULP -True)JfalseKLULP = 1 if false≈β 1 (J·KLULP -False)JnKLULP = n if n≈β n (J·KLULP-nat)JxKLULP = x (J·KLULP -Var)JℓKLULP = 〈n,v〉 if ℓ≈β 〈n,v〉 (J·KLULP-Loc)J〈e1, e2〉KLULP = 〈Je1KLULP , Je2KLULP〉 (J·KLULP -Pair)
Je.1KLULP = JeKLULP .1 (J·KLULP-P1)Je.2KLULP = JeKLULP .2 (J·KLULP-P2)J!eKLULP = !JeKLULP .1 with JeKLULP .2 (J·KLULP -Deref)Je⊕ e′KLULP = JeKLULP ⊕ Je′KLULP (J·KLULP-op)Je⊗ e′KLULP = JeKLULP ⊗ Je′KLULP (J·KLULP -cmp)
Statements
JskipKLULP = skip (J·KLULP-Skip)Jsu; sKLULP = JsuKLULP ; JsKLULP (J·KLULP-Seq)Jlet x = e in sKLULP = let x = JeKLULP in JsKLULP (J·KLULP -Letin)Jif e then st else seKLULP = ifz JeKLULP then JstKLULP else JseKLULP (J·KLULP-If)Jlet x = new e in sKLULP = let xloc = new JeKLULP in
let xcap = hide xloc in
let x = 〈xloc,xcap〉 in JsKLULP
(J·KLULP -New)
Jx := e′KLULP = let x1 = x.1 in
let x2 = x.2 in
x1 := JeKLULP with x2
(J·KLULP -Assign)
Jcall f eKLULP = call f JeKLULP (J·KLULP -call)
Note that the case for Rule (J·KLULP-New) only works because we are in a sequential setting. In a con-
current setting an adversary could access xloc before it is hidden, so the definition would change. See
Rule (J·KLτLpi -New) for a concurrent correct implementation.
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J[v / x]KLULP = [JvKLULP / x]
Optimisation We could optimise Rule (J·KLULP-Deref) as follows:
• rename the current expressions except dereferencing to b;
• reform expressions both in Lτ and LP as e ::= b | let x = b in e | !b. In the case of LP it would be
· · · | !b with b.
This allows expressions to compute e.g., pairs and projections.
• rewrite the Rule (J·KLULP -Deref) case for compiling !b into:
let x = JbKLULP in let x1 = x.1 in let x2 = x.2 in !x1 with x2.
• as expressions execute atomically, this would also scale to the compiler for concurrent languages defined
in later sections.
We do not use this approach to avoid nonstandard constructs.
12.1 Properties of the J·KLULP Compiler
Theorem 8 (Compiler J·KLULP is CC ). ⊢ J·KLULP : CC
Theorem 9 (Compiler J·KLULP is RSC ). ⊢ J·KLULP : RSC
12.2 Back-translation from LP to LU
12.2.1 Values Backtranslation
Here is how values are back translated.
〈〈·〉〉
LP
LU : v→ v
〈〈0〉〉
LP
LU = true
〈〈n〉〉
LP
LU = false if n 6= 0
〈〈n〉〉
LP
LU = n where n≈β n
〈〈k〉〉L
P
LU = 0
〈〈〈v,v′〉〉〉
LP
LU =
〈
〈〈v〉〉
LP
LU , 〈〈v
′〉〉
LP
LU
〉
〈〈〈n,v〉〉〉L
P
LU = ℓ where ℓ≈β 〈n,v〉
The backtranslation is nondeterministic, as ≈β is not injective. In this case we cannot make it injective
(in the next compiler we can index it by types and make it so but here we do not have them). This is
the reason why the backtranslation algorithm returns a set of contexts, as backtranslating an action that
performs call f v H? could result in either call f true H? or call f 0 H?. Now depending on f’s body,
which is the component to be compiled, supplying true or 0 may have different outcomes. Let us assume
that the compilation of f, when receiving call f v H? does not get stuck. If f contains if x then s else s′,
supplying 0 will make it stuck. However, because we generate all possible contexts, we know that we generate
also the context that will not cause f to be stuck. This is captured in Lemma 2 below.
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Lemma 2 (Compiled code steps imply existence of source steps).
∀
if Ω′′≈βΩ′′
Ω′′
α?
==⇒ C,H ⊲ JsKLULP ; s′ρ
C,H ⊲ JsKLULP ; s′ρ α!==⇒ Ω′
{α?} = {α? | α?≈β α?}
{ρ} = {ρ | ρ≈β ρ}
then ∃αj? ∈ {α?} , ρy ∈ {ρ} ,Cj,Hj, sj; s′jρ
′.
if Ω′′
αj?
===⇒ Cj,Hj ⊲ sj; s
′
jρ
′
then Cj,Hj ⊲ sj; s′jρy≈β C,H ⊲ JsKLULP ; s′ρ
Cj,Hj ⊲ sj; s
′
jρy
α!
==⇒ Ω′
α!≈β α!
Ω′≈β Ω
′
12.2.2 Skeleton
〈〈·〉〉
LP
LU : I→ F
〈〈f 〉〉L
P
LU = f(x) 7→ incrementCounter(); return; (〈〈·〉〉
LP
LU -fun)
Functions call incrementCounter() before returning to ensure that when a returnback is modelled, the
counter is incremented right before returning and not beforehand, as doing so would cause the possible
execution of other bactranslated code blocks. Its implementation is described below.
〈〈·〉〉
LP
LU : I→ A〈〈
I
〉〉LP
LU
= ℓi 7→ 1;
ℓglob 7→ 0
main(x) 7→ incrementCounter(); return;
incrementCounter() 7→ see below
register(x) 7→ see below
update(x) 7→ see below
〈〈f〉〉L
P
LU ∀f ∈ I
(〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -skel)
We assume compiled code does not implement functions incrementCounter, register and update, they could
be renamed to not generate conflicts if they were.
The skeleton sets up the infrastructure. It allocates global locations ℓi, which is used as a counter to
count steps in actions, and ℓglob, which is used to keep track of attacker knowledge, as described below.
Then it creates a dummy for all functions expected in the interfaces I as well as a dummy for the main.
Dummy functions return their parameter variable and they increment the global counter before that for
reasons explained later.
12.2.3 Single Action Translation
We use the shortcut ak to indicate a list of pairs of locations and tag to access them 〈n, η〉 that is what the
context has access to. We use functions .loc to access obtain all locations of such a list and .cap to obtain
all the capabilities (or 0 when η = ⊥) of the list.
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We use function incrementCounter to increment the contents of ℓi by one.
incrementCounter( ) 7→
let c = !ℓi in let l = ℓi in l := c+ 1
Starting from location ℓg we keep a list whose elements are pairs locations-numbers, we indicate this list
as Lglob.
We use function register(〈ℓ, n〉) which adds the pair 〈ℓ, n〉 to the list Lglob. Any time we use this we are
sure we are adding a pair for which no other existing pair in Lglob has a second projection equal to n. This
function can be defined as follows:
register(x) 7→
let xl = x.1
in let xn = x.2
in Lglob :: 〈xl, xn〉
Lglob is a list of pair elements, so it is implemented as a pair whose first projection is an element (a pair) and
its second projection is another list; the empty list being 0. Where :: is a recursive function that starts from
ℓglob and looks for its last element (i.e., it performs second projections until it hits a 0), then replaces that
second projection with 〈〈xl, xn〉 , 0〉
Lemma 3 (register(ℓ, n) does not add duplicates for n). For n supplied as parameter by 〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU , C;H ⊲ register(ℓ, n)
ǫ
−−→ C;H′ ⊲ skip
and 〈_, n〉 /∈ Lglob
Proof. Simple analysis of Rules (〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -call) to (〈〈·〉〉
LP
LU -ret-loc).
We use function update(n, v) which accesses the elements in the Lglob list, then takes the second projection
of the element: if it is n it updates the first projection to v, otherwise it continues its recursive call. If it
does not find an element for n, it gets stuck
Lemma 4 (update(n, v) never gets stuck). C;H ⊲ update(n, v)
ǫ
−−→ C;H′ ⊲ skip for n and v supplied as param-
eters by 〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU and H
′=H[ℓ 7→ v / ℓ 7→ _] for ℓ≈β 〈n,_〉.
Proof. Simple analysis of Rules (〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -call) and (〈〈·〉〉
LP
LU -retback).
We use the meta-level function reachable(H,v, ak) that returns a set of pairs 〈n 7→ v : η, e〉 such that
all locations in are reachable from H starting from any location in ak ∪ v and that are not already in ak
and such that e is a sequence of source-level instructions that evaluate to ℓ such that ℓ≈β 〈n,_〉.
Definition 19 (Reachable).
reachable(H,v, ak) =


〈n 7→ v : k, e〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
n ∈ reach(nst,kst,H)
where nst ∈ v ∪ ak.loc
and kst ∈ kroot ∪ ak.cap
and n 7→ v : k ∈ H
and H⊲!e →֒→ !n with k
and ∀H.H≈βH
H ⊲ 〈〈e〉〉
LP
LU →֒→ ℓ
and (ℓ,n,k) ∈ β


Intuitively, reachable( · ) finds out which new locations have been allocated by the compiled component
and that are now reachable by the attacker (the first projection of the pair, n 7→ v : η). Additionally, it
tells how to reach those locations in the source so that we can register(·) them for the source attacker (the
backtranslated context) to access.
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In this case we know by definition that e can only contain one ! and several ·.1 or ·.2. The base case for
values is as before.
〈〈·〉〉
LP
LU : e→ e
〈〈!e〉〉
LP
LU = !〈〈e〉〉
LP
LU
〈〈e.1〉〉
LP
LU = 〈〈e〉〉
LP
LU .1
〈〈e.2〉〉L
P
LU = 〈〈e〉〉
LP
LU .2
The next function takes the following inputs: an action, its index, the previous function’s heap, the
previous attacker knowledge and the stack of functions called so far. It returns a set of: code, the new
attacker knowledge, its heap, the stack of functions called and the function where the code must be put. In
the returned parameters, the attacker knowledge, the heap and the stack of called functions serve as input
to the next call.
〈〈·〉〉
LP
LU : α× n ∈ N×H× n× η × f →
{
s× n× η ×H× f × f
}
〈〈
call f v H?,
n,Hpre, ak, f
〉〉LP
LU
=




if !ℓi == n then
incrementCounter()
let x1 = new v1 in register(〈x1, n1〉)
· · ·
let xj = new vj in register(〈xj, nj〉)
update(m1, u1)
· · ·
update(ml, ul)
call f v
else skip


, ak′,H, f; f, f′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∀
v1 = 〈〈v1〉〉
LP
LU
· · ·
vj = 〈〈vj〉〉
LP
LU
u1 = 〈〈u1〉〉
LP
LU
· · ·
ul = 〈〈ul〉〉
LP
LU
v = 〈〈v〉〉L
P
LU


(〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -call)
where H \Hpre = Hn
Hn = n1 7→ v1 : η1, · · · ,nj 7→ vj : ηj
and H ∩Hpre = Hc
Hc =m1 7→ u1 : η
′
1, · · · ,ml 7→ ul : η
′
l
and ak′ = ak, 〈n1, η1〉 , · · · , 〈nj, ηj〉
and f = f′f′
〈〈
call f v H!,
n,Hpre, ak, f
〉〉LP
LU
=




if !ℓi == n then
incrementCounter()
let l1 = e1 in register(〈l1, n1〉)
· · ·
let lj = ej in register(〈lj, nj〉)
else skip


, ak′,H, f; f, f


(〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -callback-loc)
if reachable(H,v, ak) = 〈n1 7→ v1 : η1, e1〉 , · · · , 〈nj 7→ vj : ηj, ej〉
and ak′ = ak, 〈n1, η1〉 , · · · , 〈nj, ηj〉
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〈〈
ret H?,
n,Hpre, ak, f; f
〉〉LP
LU
=




if !ℓi == n then
//no incrementCounter() as explained
let x1 = new v1 in register(〈x1, n1〉)
· · ·
let xj = new vj in register(〈xj, nj〉)
update(m1, u1)
· · ·
update(ml, ul)
else skip


, ak′,H, f, f
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∀
v1 = 〈〈v1〉〉
LP
LU
· · ·
vj = 〈〈vj〉〉
LP
LU
u1 = 〈〈u1〉〉
LP
LU
· · ·
ul = 〈〈ul〉〉
LP
LU


(〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -retback)
where H \Hpre = Hn
Hn = n1 7→ v1 : η1, · · · ,nj 7→ vj : ηj
and H ∩Hpre = Hc
Hc =m1 7→ u1 : η
′
1, · · · ,ml 7→ ul : η
′
l
and ak′ = ak, 〈n1, η1〉 , · · · , 〈nj, ηj〉
〈〈
ret H!,
n,Hpre, ak, f; f
〉〉LP
LU
=




if !ℓi == n then
incrementCounter()
let l1 = e1 in register(〈l1, n1〉)
· · ·
let lj = ej in register(〈lj, nj〉)
else skip


, ak′,H, f, f′


(〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -ret-loc)
if reachable(H,0, ak) = 〈n1 7→ v1 : η1, e1〉 , · · · , 〈nj 7→ vj : ηj, ej〉
and ak′ = ak, 〈n1, η1〉 , · · · , 〈nj, ηj〉
and f = f′f′
This is the back-translation of functions. Each action is wrapped in an if statement checking that the
action to be mimicked is that one (the same function may behave differently if called twice and we need to
ensure this). After the if, the counter checking for the action index ℓi is incremented. This is not done in
case of a return immediately, but only just before the return itself, so the increment is added in the skeleton
already. (there could be a callback to the same function after the return and then we wouldn’t return but
execute the callback code instead)
When back-translating a ?-decorated, we need to set up the heap correctly before the call itself. That
means calculating the new locations that this action allocated (Hn), allocating them and registering them
in the Lglob list via the register(·) function. These locations are also added to the attacker knowledge ak′.
Then we need to update the heap locations we already know of. These locations are Hc and as we know
them already, we use the update(·) function.
When back-translating a !-decorated action we need to calculate what part of the heap we can reach from
there, and so we rely on the reachable( · ) function to return a list of pairs of locations n and expressions
e. We use n to expand the attacker knowledge ak′ as these locations are now reachable. We use e to reach
these locations in the source heap so that we can register them and ensure they are accessible through Lglob.
Finally, we use parameter f to keep track of the call stack, so making a call to f pushes f on the stack
(f; f) and making a return pops a stack f; f to f. That stack carries the information to instantiate the f in
the return parameters, which is the location where the code needs to be allocated.
〈〈·〉〉
LP
LU : α× n ∈ N×H× n× η × f →
{
s, f
}
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〈〈∅〉〉L
P
LU = ∅ (〈〈·〉〉
LP
LU -listact-b)
〈〈
αα, n,Hpre, ak, f
〉〉LP
LU
=

s, f; s, f
∣∣∣∣∣∣
s, ak′,H′, f′, f =
〈〈
α, n,Hpre, ak, f
〉〉LP
LU
s, f ∈
〈〈
α, n+ 1,H′, ak′, f′
〉〉LP
LU

 (〈〈·〉〉LPLU -listact-i)
This recursive call ensures the parameters are passed around correctly. Note that each element in a set
returned by the single-action back-translation has the same ak′, H and f′, the only elements that change are
in the code s due to the backtranslation of values. Thus the recursive call can pass those parameters taken
from any element of the set.
12.2.4 The Back-translation Algorithm 〈〈·〉〉
LP
LU
〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU : I× α→ {A}
〈〈
I, α
〉〉LP
LU
=


A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A = Askel ✶ s, f
for all s, f ∈
{
s, f
}
where
{
s, f
}
= 〈〈α, 1,H0,∅,main〉〉
LP
LU
H0 = 0 7→ 0 : kroot
Askel =
〈〈
I
〉〉LP
LU


(〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -main)
This is the real back-translation algorithm: it calls the skeleton and joins it with each element of the set
returned by the trace back-translation.
✶: A× s, f → A
A ✶ ∅ = A (〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -join)
H;F1; · · · ;F; · · · ;Fn ✶ s, f; s, f = H;F1; · · · ;F
′; · · · ;Fn ✶ s, f
where F = f(x) 7→ s′; return;
F′ = f(x) 7→ s; s′; return;
When joining we add from the last element of the list so that the functions we create have the concate-
nation of if statements (those guarded by the counter on ℓi) that are sorted (guards with a test for ℓi = 4 are
before those with a test ℓi = 5).
12.2.5 Correctness of the Back-translation
Theorem 10 (〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU is correct).
∀
if Ω0
(
A
[JCKLULP]) α==⇒ Ω
Ω
ǫ
=⇒ Ω′
I = names(A)
α ≡ α′ · α?
ℓi; ℓglob /∈ β
then ∃A ∈ 〈〈I, α〉〉L
P
LU
such that Ω0 (A [C])
α
==⇒ Ω
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and α≈β α
Ω≈βΩ
Ω.H.ℓi = ||α||+ 1
The back-translation is correct if it takes a target attacker that will reduce to a state together with a
compiled component and it produces a set of source attackers such that one of them, that together with the
source component will reduce to a related state performing related actions. Also it needs to ensure the step
is incremented correctly.
12.2.6 Remark on the Backtranslation
Some readers may wonder whether the hassle of setting up a source-level representation of the whole target
heap is necessary. Indeed for those locations that are allocated by the context, this is not. If we changed the
source semantics to have an oracle that predicts what a let x = new e in s statement will return as the new
location, we could simplify this. In fact, currently the backtranslation stores target locations in the list Lglob
and looks them up based on their target name, as it does not know what source name will be given to them.
The oracle would obviate this problem, so we could hard code the name of these locations, knowing exactly
the identifier that will be returned by the allocator. For the functions to be correct in terms of syntax, we
would need to pre-emptively allocate all the locations with that identifier so that their names are in scope
and they can be referred to.
However, the problem still persists for locations created by the component, as their names cannot be
hard coded, as they are not in scope. Thus we would still require reach to reach these locations, register to
add them to the list and update to update their values in case the attacker does so.
Thus we simplify the scenario and stick to a more standard, oracle-less semantics and to a generalised
approach to location management in the backtranslation.
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13 The Source Language: Lτ
This is an imperative, concurrent while language with monitors.
Whole Programs P ::= ∆;H;F; I
Components C ::= ∆;F; I
Contexts A ::= H;F [·]
Interfaces I ::= f
Functions F ::= f(x : τ) 7→ s; return;
Operations ⊕ ::= + | −
Comparison ⊗ ::= == | < | >
Values v ::= b ∈ {true, false} | n ∈ N | 〈v, v〉 | ℓ
Expressions e ::= x | v | e⊕ e | e⊗ e | !e | 〈e, e〉 | e.1 | e.2
Statements s ::= skip | s; s | let x : τ = e in s | if e then s else s
| x := e | let x = newτ e in s | call f e
| (‖ s) | endorse x = e as ϕ in s
Types τ ::= Bool | Nat | τ × τ | Ref τ | UN
Superficial Types ϕ ::= Bool | Nat | UN× UN | Ref UN
Eval . Ctxs . E ::= [·] | e⊕ E | E⊕ n | e⊗ E | E⊗ n
| !E | 〈e,E〉 | 〈E, v〉 | E.1 | E.2
Heaps H ::= ∅ | H; ℓ 7→ v : τ
Monitors M ::= ({σ} , , σ0,∆, σc)
Mon. States σ ∈ S
Mon. Reds .  ::= ∅ | ; (s, s)
Environments Γ ,∆ ::= ∅ | Γ; (x : τ)
Store Env . ∆ ::= ∅ | ∆; (ℓ : τ)
Substitutions ρ ::= ∅ | ρ[v / x]
Processes π ::= (s)f
Soups Π ::= ∅ | Π ‖ π
Prog. States Ω ::= C,H ⊲ Π
Labels λ ::= ǫ | α
Actions α ::= call f v? | call f v! | ret ! | ret ?
Traces α ::= ∅ | α · α
We highlight elements that have changed from LU.
13.1 Static Semantics of Lτ
The static semantics follows these typing judgements.
⊢ C : UN Component C is well-typed.
C ⊢ F : τ Function F takes arguments of type τ under component C.
∆, Γ ⊢ ⋄ Environments Γ and ∆ are well-formed.
∆ ⊢ ok Environment ∆ is safe.
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τ ⊢ ◦ Type τ is insecure.
∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ Expression e has type τ inΓ.
C,∆, Γ ⊢ s Statement s is well-typed in C and Γ.
C,∆, Γ ⊢ π Single process π is well-typed in C and Γ.
C,∆, Γ ⊢ Π Soup Π is well-typed in C and Γ.
⊢ H : ∆ Heap H respects the typing of ∆.
⊢ M Monitor M is valid.
13.1.1 Auxiliary Functions
We rely on these standard auxiliary functions: names( · ) extracts the defined names (e.g., function and
interface names). fv( · ) returns free variables while fn( · ) returns free names (i.e., a call to a defined
function). dom( · ) returns the domain of a particular element (e.g., all the allocated locations in a heap).
We denote access to the parts of C and P via functions .funs, .intfs and .mon. We denote access to parts
of M with a dot notation, so M.∆ means ∆ where M = ({σ} , , σ0,∆, σc).
13.1.2 Typing Rules
⊢ C
(TLτ -component)
C ≡ ∆;F; I C ⊢ F : UN names(F) ∩ names(I) = ∅ ∆ ⊢ ok
⊢ C : UN
C ⊢ F : UN
(TLτ -function)
F ≡ f(x : UN) 7→ s; return; C,∆; x : UN ⊢ s
C ≡ ∆;F; I ∀f ∈ fn(s), f ∈ dom(C.funs) ∨ f ∈ dom(C.intfs)
C ⊢ F : UN
∆, Γ ⊢ ⋄
(TLτ -env-e)
∅;∅ ⊢ ⋄
(TLτ -env-var)
∆, Γ ⊢ ⋄ x /∈ dom(Γ)
∆, Γ; (x : τ) ⊢ ⋄
(TLτ -env-loc)
∆, Γ ⊢ ⋄ l /∈ dom(∆)
∆; (l : τ); Γ ⊢ ⋄
∆, Γ ⊢ ok
(TLτ -safe-e)
∅ ⊢ ok
(TLτ -safe-loc)
∆ ⊢ ok l /∈ dom(Γ) UN /∈ τ
Γ; (l : τ) ⊢ ok
∆, Γ ⊢ UN
(TLτ -env-e)
∅ ⊢ UN
(TLτ -env-var)
∆, Γ ⊢ UN x /∈ dom(Γ)
Γ, (x : UN) ⊢ UN
(TLτ -env-loc)
∆, Γ ⊢ UN l /∈ dom(Γ)
Γ, (l : UN) ⊢ UN
τ ⊢ ◦
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(TLτ -bool-pub)
Bool ⊢ ◦
(TLτ -nat-pub)
Nat ⊢ ◦
(TLτ -pair-pub)
τ ⊢ ◦ τ ′ ⊢ ◦
τ × τ ′ ⊢ ◦
(TLτ -un-pub)
UN ⊢ ◦
(TLτ -references-pub)
Ref UN ⊢ ◦
∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ
(TLτ -true)
∆, Γ ⊢ ⋄
∆, Γ ⊢ true : Bool
(TLτ -false)
∆, Γ ⊢ ⋄
∆, Γ ⊢ false : Bool
(TLτ -nat)
∆, Γ ⊢ ⋄
∆, Γ ⊢ n : Nat
(TLτ -var)
x : τ ∈ Γ
∆, Γ ⊢ x : τ
(TLτ -loc)
l : τ ∈ ∆
∆, Γ ⊢ l : Ref τ
(TLτ -pair)
∆, Γ ⊢ e1 : τ
∆, Γ ⊢ e2 : τ
′
∆, Γ ⊢ 〈e1, e2〉 : τ × τ
′
(TLτ -proj-1)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ × τ ′
∆, Γ ⊢ e.1 : τ
(TLτ -proj-2)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ × τ ′
∆, Γ ⊢ e.2 : τ ′
(TLτ -dereference)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : Ref τ
∆, Γ ⊢ !e : τ
(TLτ -op)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : Nat ∆, Γ ⊢ e′ : Nat
∆, Γ ⊢ e⊕ e′ : Nat
(TLτ -cmp)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : Nat ∆, Γ ⊢ e′ : Nat
∆, Γ ⊢ e⊗ e′ : Bool
(TLτ -coercion)
C,∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ τ ⊢ ◦
C,∆, Γ ⊢ e : UN
C,∆, Γ ⊢ s
(TLτ -skip)
C,∆, Γ ⊢ skip
(TLτ -function-call)
((f ∈ dom(C.funs)) ∨ (f ∈ dom(C.intfs)))
∆, Γ ⊢ e : UN
∆, Γ ⊢ call f e
(TLτ -sequence)
C,∆, Γ ⊢ su
C,∆, Γ ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ su; s
(TLτ -letin)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ
C, Γ; x : τ ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ let x : τ = e in s
(TLτ -assign)
∆, Γ ⊢ x : Ref τ
∆, Γ ⊢ e′ : τ
C,∆, Γ ⊢ x := e′
(TLτ -new)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ
C, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ let x = newτ e in s
(TLτ -if)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : Bool
C,∆, Γ ⊢ st C,∆, Γ ⊢ se
C,∆, Γ ⊢ if e then st else se
(TLτ -fork)
C,∆, Γ ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ (‖ s)
(TLτ -endorse)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : UN C,∆, Γ; (x : ϕ) ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ endorse x = e as ϕ in s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ π
(TLτ -process)
C,∆, Γ ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ (s)f
C,∆, Γ ⊢ Π
(TLτ -soup)
C,∆, Γ ⊢ π C,∆, Γ ⊢ Π
C,∆, Γ ⊢ π ‖ Π
⊢ H : ∆
(Lτ -Heap-ok-i)
ℓ : 7→ v : τ ∈ H
⊢ H : ∆ ∅ ⊢ v : τ
⊢ H : ∆; ℓ : τ
(Lτ -Heap-ok-b)
⊢ H : ∅
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⊢ M
(Lτ -Monitor)
M ≡ ({s} , , s0,∆, sc) ∀s∃s
′.(s, s′) ∈ 
⊢ M
Notes Monitor typing just ensures that the monitor is coherent and that it can’t get stuck for no good
reason.
13.1.3 UN Typing
Attackers cannot have newτ t terms where τ is different from UN.
∆, Γ ⊢UN e : UN
(TULτ -base)
A = H;F [·] ∆ ⊢UN F
dom(H) ∩ dom(∆) = ∅ dom(∆) ∩ (fv(F) ∪ fv(H)) = ∅
∆ ⊢UN A
(TULτ -true)
∆, Γ ⊢ ⋄
∆, Γ ⊢UN true : UN
(TULτ -false)
∆, Γ ⊢ ⋄
∆, Γ ⊢UN false : UN
(TULτ -nat)
∆, Γ ⊢ ⋄
∆, Γ ⊢UN n : UN
(TULτ -var)
x : τ ∈ Γ
∆, Γ ⊢UN x : UN
(TULτ -loc)
l : UN /∈ ∆
∆, Γ ⊢UN l : UN
(TULτ -pair)
∆, Γ ⊢UN e1 : UN
∆, Γ ⊢UN e2 : UN
∆, Γ ⊢UN 〈e1, e2〉 : UN
(TULτ -proj-1)
∆, Γ ⊢UN e : UN
∆, Γ ⊢UN e.1 : UN
(TULτ -proj-2)
∆, Γ ⊢UN e : UN
∆, Γ ⊢UN e.2 : UN
(TULτ -dereference)
∆, Γ ⊢UN e : UN
∆, Γ ⊢UN !e : UN
(TULτ -op)
∆, Γ ⊢UN e : UN ∆, Γ ⊢UN e
′ : UN
∆, Γ ⊢UN e⊕ e
′ : UN
(TULτ -cmp)
∆, Γ ⊢UN e : UN ∆, Γ ⊢UN e
′ : UN
∆, Γ ⊢UN e⊗ e
′ : UN
C,∆, Γ ⊢UN s
(TULτ -skip)
C,∆, Γ ⊢UN skip
(TULτ -function-call)
((f ∈ dom(C.funs)) ∨ (f ∈ dom(C.intfs)))
∆, Γ ⊢UN e : UN
∆, Γ ⊢UN call f e
(TULτ -sequence)
C,∆, Γ ⊢UN su
C,∆, Γ ⊢UN s
C,∆, Γ ⊢UN su; s
(TULτ -letin)
∆, Γ ⊢UN e : UN
C, Γ; x : UN ⊢UN s
C,∆, Γ ⊢UN let x : UN = e in s
(TULτ -assign)
∆, Γ ⊢UN x : UN
∆, Γ ⊢UN e
′ : UN
C,∆, Γ ⊢UN x := e
′
(TULτ -new)
∆, Γ ⊢UN e : UN
C, Γ; x : UN ⊢UN s
C,∆, Γ ⊢UN let x = newUN e in s
(TULτ -if)
∆, Γ ⊢UN e : Bool
C,∆, Γ ⊢UN st C,∆, Γ ⊢UN se
C,∆, Γ ⊢UN if e then st else se
(TULτ -fork)
C,∆, Γ ⊢UN s
C,∆, Γ ⊢UN (‖ s)
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13.2 Dynamic Semantics of Lτ
Function mon-care( · ) returns the part of a heap the monitor cares for (Rule Lτ -Monitor-related heap).
Rules Lτ -Jump-Internal to Lτ -Jump-OUT dictate the kind of a jump between two functions: if internal to
the component/attacker, in(from the attacker to the component) or out(from the component to the attacker).
Rule Lτ -Plug tells how to obtain a whole program from a component and an attacker. Rule Lτ -Initial State
tells the initial state of a whole program. Rule Lτ -Initial-heap produces a heap that satisfies a ∆, initialised
with base values. Rule Lτ -Monitor Step tells when a monitor makes a single step given a heap.
mon-care( · )
(Lτ -Monitor-related heap)
H′ = {ℓ 7→ v : τ | ℓ 7→ v : τ ∈ H}
⊢ mon-care(H,∆) = H′
Helpers
(Lτ -Jump-Internal)
((f′ ∈ I ∧ f ∈ I)∨
(f′ /∈ I ∧ f /∈ I))
I ⊢ f, f′ : internal
(Lτ -Jump-IN)
f ∈ I ∧ f′ /∈ I
I ⊢ f, f′ : in
(Lτ -Jump-OUT)
f /∈ I ∧ f′ ∈ I
I ⊢ f, f′ : out
(Lτ -Plug)
A ≡ H;F [·] C ≡ ∆;F′; I
⊢ C,F : whole ∆ ⊢ H0 main(x : UN) 7→ s; return; ∈ F
A [C] = ∆;H ∪ H0;F;F′; I
(Lτ -Whole)
C ≡ ∆;F′; I
names(F) ∩ names(F′) = ∅
names(I) ⊆ names(F) ∪ names(F′)
⊢ C,F : whole
(Lτ -Initial State)
P ≡ ∆;H;F; I
C ≡ ∆;F; I
Ω0 (P) = C,H ⊲ call main 0
∆ ⊢ H0
(Lτ -Initial-heap)
∆ ⊢ H ∅ ⊢ v : τ
∆, ℓ : τ ⊢ H; ℓ 7→ v : τ
M;H M′
(Lτ -Monitor Step)
M = ({σ} , , σ0,∆, σc) M
′ = ({σ} , , σ0,∆, σf)
(σc, σf) ∈ ⊢ H : ∆
M;H M′
(Lτ -Monitor Step Trace Base)
M;∅ M
(Lτ -Monitor Step Trace)
M;H M′′ M′′;H M′
M;H · H M′
(Lτ -valid trace)
M;H M′ relevant(α) = H
M ⊢ α
13.2.1 Component Semantics
H ⊲ e →֒→ e′ Expression e reduces to e′.
C,H ⊲ π
λ
−−→ C′,H′ ⊲ π Process π reduces to π′ and evolves the rest accordingly.
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C,H ⊲ Π
λ
−−→ C′,H′ ⊲ Π′ Soup Π reduce to Π′ and evolve the rest accordingly.
Ω
α
==⇒ Ω′ Program state Ω steps to Ω′ emitting trace α.
H ⊲ e →֒→ e′
(ELτ -val)
H ⊲ v →֒→ v
(ELτ -p1)
H ⊲ 〈v, v′〉 .1 →֒→ v
(ELτ -p2)
H ⊲ 〈v, v′〉 .1 →֒→ v′
(ELτ -op)
n⊕ n′ = n′′
H ⊲ n⊕ n′ →֒→ n′′
(ELτ -comp)
n⊗ n′ = b
H ⊲ n⊗ n′ →֒→ b
(ELτ -dereference)
H ⊲ e →֒→ ℓ ℓ 7→ v : τ ∈ H
H⊲!ℓ →֒→ v
(ELτ -ctx)
H ⊲ e →֒→ e′
H ⊲ E [e] →֒→ E [e′]
C,H ⊲ π
ǫ
−−→ C′,H′ ⊲ π′
(ELτ -sequence)
C,H ⊲ skip; s
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s
(ELτ -step)
C,H ⊲ s
λ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s′
C,H ⊲ s; s′′
λ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s′; s
(ELτ -if-true)
H ⊲ e →֒→ true
C,H ⊲ if e then s else s′
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s
(ELτ -if-false)
H ⊲ e →֒→ false
C,H ⊲ if e then s else s′
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s′
(ELτ -letin)
H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ let x : τ = e in s
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s[v / x]
(ELτ -alloc)
ℓ /∈ dom(H) H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ let x = newτ e in s
ǫ
−−→ C,H; ℓ 7→ v : τ ⊲ s[ℓ / x]
(ELτ -update)
H = H1; ℓ 7→ v
′ : τ ;H2
H′ = H1; ℓ 7→ v : τ ;H2
C,H ⊲ ℓ := v
ǫ
−−→ C,H′ ⊲ skip
(ELτ -endorse)
H ⊲ e →֒→ v ∆,∅ ⊢ v : ϕ ∆ = {ℓ : τ | ℓ 7→ v : τ ∈ H}
C,H ⊲ endorse x = e as ϕ in s
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s[v / x]
(ELτ -call-internal)
C.intfs ⊢ f, f′ : internal f′ = f′′; f′
f(x : τ) : τ ′ 7→ s; return; ∈ C.funs H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ (call f e)f′
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ (s; return;[v / x])f′;f
(ELτ -callback)
f′ = f′′; f′ f(x : τ) : τ ′ 7→ s; return; ∈ F
C.intfs ⊢ f′, f : out H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ (call f e)f′
call f v!
−−−−−−−→ C,H ⊲ (s; return;[v / x])f′;f
(ELτ -call)
f′ = f′′; f′ f(x : τ) : τ ′ 7→ s; return; ∈ C.funs
C.intfs ⊢ f′, f : in H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ (call f e)f′
call f v?
−−−−−−−→ C,H ⊲ (s; return;[v / x])f′;f
(ELτ -ret-internal)
C.intfs ⊢ f, f′ : internal f′ = f′′; f′
C,H ⊲ (return;)f′;f
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ (skip)f′
(ELτ -retback)
C.intfs ⊢ f, f′ : in f′ = f′′; f′
C,H ⊲ (return;)f′;f
ret ?
−−−−→ C,H ⊲ (skip)f′
(ELτ -return)
C.intfs ⊢ f, f′ : out f′ = f′′; f′ H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ (return;)f′;f
ret !
−−−−→ C,H ⊲ (skip)f′
C,H ⊲ Π
λ
−−→ C′,H′ ⊲ Π′
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(ELτ -par)
Π = Π1 ‖ (s)f ‖ Π2
Π′ = Π1 ‖ (s
′)f′ ‖ Π2
C,H ⊲ (s)f
λ
−−→ C′,H′ ⊲ (s′)f′
C,H ⊲ Π
λ
−−→ C′,H′ ⊲ Π′
(ELτ -fail)
Π = Π1 ‖ (s)f ‖ Π2
C,H ⊲ (s)f
ǫ
−−→ fail
C,H ⊲ Π
ǫ
−−→ fail
(ELτ -fork)
Π = Π1 ‖ ((‖ s) ; s
′)f ‖ Π2
Π′ = Π1 ‖ (skip; s
′)f ‖ Π2 ‖ (s)∅
C,H ⊲ Π
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ Π′
Ω
α
==⇒ Ω′
(ELτ -single)
Ω =⇒ Ω′′
Ω′′
α
−−→ Ω′
Ω
α
==⇒ Ω′
(ELτ -silent)
Ω
ǫ
−−→ Ω′
Ω =⇒ Ω′
(ELτ -trans)
Ω
α
==⇒ Ω′′
Ω′′
α′
==⇒ Ω′
Ω
α·α′
====⇒ Ω′
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14 Lπ: Extending LP with Concurrency and Informed Monitors
14.1 Syntax
This extends the syntax of Section 10.1 with concurrency and a memory allocation instruction that atomically
hides the new location.
Whole Programs P ::= H0;F; I
Components C ::= H0;F; I
Statements s ::= · · · | (‖ s) | destruct x = e as B in s or s
| let x = newhide e in s
Patterns B ::= nat | pair
Monitors M ::= ({σ} , , σ0,H0, σc)
Single Process π ::= (s)f
Processes Π ::= ∅ | Π ‖ π
Prog. States Ω ::= C,H ⊲Π
14.2 Dynamic Semantics
Following is the definition of the mon-care( · ) function for Lπ .
mon-care( · )
(Lpi-Monitor-related heap)
H′ = {n 7→ v : η | n ∈ dom(H0) and n 7→ v : η ∈ H}
mon-care(H,H0) = H′
Helpers
(Lpi -Plug)
A ≡ F [·] C ≡ H0;F′; I
⊢ C,F : whole main(x) 7→ return;s ∈ F
C ⊢att A ∀n 7→ v : k ∈ H0,k ∈ H0
A [C] = H0;F;F′; I
(Lpi-Initial State)
P ≡ H0;F; I
Ω0 (P) = P,H0 ⊲ call main 0
M;H M′
(Lpi-Monitor Step)
M = ({σ} , , σ0,H0, σc) M
′ = ({σ} , , σ0,H0, σf )
(sc, mon-care(H,H0), sf ) ∈ 
M;H M′
(Lpi-Monitor Step Trace Base)
M;∅ M
(Lpi-Monitor Step Trace)
M;H M′′ M′′;H M′
M;H ·H M′
(Lpi-valid trace)
M;H M′
M ⊢ mon H
14.2.1 Component Semantics
C,H ⊲Π
ǫ
−−→ C′,H′ ⊲Π′ Processes Π reduce to Π′ and evolve the rest accordingly.
C,H ⊲ s
ǫ
−−→ C′,H′ ⊲ s′
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(ELpi-destruct-nat)
H ⊲ e →֒→ n
C,H ⊲ destruct x = e as nat in s or s′
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s[n / x]
(ELpi-destruct-pair)
H ⊲ e →֒→ 〈v,v′〉
C,H ⊲ destruct x = e as pair in s or s′
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s[〈v,v′〉 / x]
(ELpi-destruct-not)
otherwise
C,H ⊲ destruct x = e as B in s or s′
ǫ
−−→ C,H ⊲ s′
(ELpi-new)
H = H1;n 7→ (v, η) H ⊲ e →֒→ v k /∈ dom(H)
C,H ⊲ let x = newhide e in s
ǫ
−−→ C,H;n+ 1 7→ v : k;k ⊲ s[〈n+ 1,k〉 / x]
C,H ⊲Π →֒→ C′,H′ ⊲Π′
(ELpi-par)
Π = Π1 ‖ (s)f ‖ Π2
Π′ = Π1 ‖ (s
′)f ′ ‖ Π2
C,H ⊲ (s)f →֒→ C
′,H′ ⊲ (s′)f ′
C,H ⊲Π →֒→ C′,H′ ⊲Π′
(ELpi-fork)
Π = Π1 ‖ ((‖ s))f ‖ Π2
Π′ = Π1 ‖ (0)f ‖ Π2 ‖ (s)∅
C,H ⊲Π →֒→ C,H ⊲Π′
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15 Extended Language Properties and Necessities
15.1 Monitor Agreement for Lτ and Lpi
Definition 20 (Lτ : M⌢C).
({σ} , , σ0,∆, σc)⌢(∆;F; I)
A monitor and a component agree if they focus on the same set of locations ∆.
Definition 21 (Lπ : M⌢C).
({σ} , , σ0,H0, σc)⌢(H0;F; I)
A monitor and a component agree if they focus on the same set of locations, protected with the same
capabilities H0
15.2 Properties of Lτ
Definition 22 (Lτ Semantics Attacker).
C ⊢attacker A
def
=
{
∀ℓ ∈ dom(C.∆), ℓ /∈ fn(A)
no let x = newτ e in s in A such that τ 6= UN
This semantic definition of an attacker is captured by typing below, which allows for simpler reasoning.
Definition 23 (Lτ Attacker).
C ⊢att A
def
= C = ∆;F; I,∆ ⊢UN A
C ⊢att π
def
= π = (s)f;f and f ∈ C.itfs
C ⊢att Π −→ Π
′ def= Π = Π1 ‖ π ‖ Π2 and Π′ = Π1 ‖ π′ ‖ Π2
and C ⊢att π and C ⊢att π′
The two notions of attackers coincide.
Lemma 5 (Semantics and typed attackers coincide).
C ⊢attacker A ⇐⇒ (C ⊢att A)
Theorem 11 (Typability Implies Robust Safety in Lτ ).
∀C,M
if ⊢ C : UN
C⌢M
then M ⊢ C : rs
15.3 Properties of Lpi
Definition 24 (Lπ Attacker).
C ⊢att A
def
= C = H0;F; I, ∀k ∈ H0.k /∈ fv(A)
C ⊢att π
def
= π = (s)f ;f and f ∈ C.itfs
C ⊢att Π −→ Π
′ def= Π = Π1 ‖ π ‖ Π2 and Π′ = Π1 ‖ π′ ‖ Π2
and C ⊢att π and C ⊢att π′
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16 Compiler from Lτ to Lπ
16.1 Assumed Relation between Lτ and Lpi Elements
We can scale the ≈β relation to monitors, heaps, actions and processes as follows.
M≈M
(Ok Mon)
M = ({σ} , , σ0,H0, σc)
∀σ ∈ {σ}, ∀mon-care(H;∆)≈β mon-care(H,H0).
if ⊢ H : ∆ then ∃σ′.(σ, mon-care(H,H0), σ′) ∈ 
β,∆ ⊢M
( Monitor relation )
M = ({σ} , , σ0,∆, σc) M = ({σ} , , σ0,H0, σc)
β0,∆ ⊢M β0 = (dom(∆), dom(H0),H0.η)
M≈M
∆ ⊢β H0 ∆,H ⊢ v : τ
(Initial-heap)
∆ ⊢H ∆,H ⊢β v: τ
ℓ≈β 〈n,k〉
∆, ℓ : τ ⊢β H;n 7→ v : k
(Initial-value)
(τ ≡ Bool ∧ v ≡ 0) ∨ (τ ≡ Nat ∧ v ≡ 0) ∨
(τ ≡ Ref τ ∧ v ≡ n′ ∧ n′ 7→ v′ : k′ ∈ H ∧ ℓ′≈β 〈n
′,k′〉 ∧ ℓ : τ ∈ ∆,∆,H ⊢ v′: τ ) ∨
(τ ≡ τ1 × τ2 ∧ v ≡ 〈v1,v2〉 ∧∆,H ⊢ v1: τ1 ∧∆,H ⊢ v2: τ2)
∆,H ⊢β v: τ
Π≈βΠ
(Single process relation)
f ≈ f
(skip)f ≈β (skip)f
(Process relation)
Π≈βΠ π≈β π
Π ‖ π≈βΠ ‖ π
16.2 Compiler Definition
Definition 25 (Compiler Lτ to Lπ). J·KLτLpi : C→ C
Given that C = ∆;F; I if ⊢ C : UN then JCKLτLpi is defined as follows:uwwwwwv
(TLτ -component)
C ≡ ∆;F; I
C ⊢ F : UN
names(F) ∩ names(I) = ∅
∆ ⊢ ok
⊢ C : UN
}~
Lτ
Lpi
= H0;
q
F
yLτ
Lpi
;
q
I
yLτ
Lpi
if ∆ ⊢β0 H0 (J·KLτLpi -Component)
uwwwwwv
(TLτ -function)
F ≡ f(x : UN) 7→ s; return;
C,∆; x : UN ⊢ s
∀f ∈ fn(s), f ∈ dom(C.funs)
∨f ∈ dom(C.intfs)
C ⊢ F : UN
}~
Lτ
Lpi
= f(x) 7→ JC;∆; x : UN ⊢ sKLτLpi ; return; (J·KLτLpi -Function)
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JfKLτLpi = f (J·KLτLpi -Interfaces)
Expressions
uv (TLτ -true)∆, Γ ⊢ ⋄
∆, Γ ⊢ true : Bool
}~L
τ
Lpi
= 0 if true≈β 0 (J·KLτLpi -True)
uv (TLτ -false)∆, Γ ⊢ ⋄
∆, Γ ⊢ false : Bool
}~L
τ
Lpi
= 1 if false≈β 1 (J·KLτLpi -False)
uv (TLτ -nat)∆, Γ ⊢ ⋄
∆, Γ ⊢ n : Nat
}~L
τ
Lpi
= n if n≈β n (J·KLτLpi -Nat)
t
(TLτ -var)
x : τ ∈ Γ
∆, Γ ⊢ x : τ
|Lτ
Lpi
= x (J·KLτLpi -Var)
t
(TLτ -loc)
ℓ : τ ∈ ∆
∆, Γ ⊢ ℓ : τ
|Lτ
Lpi
= 〈n,v〉 if ℓ≈β 〈n,v〉 (J·KLτLpi -Loc)uwwv
(TLτ -pair)
∆, Γ ⊢ e1 : τ
∆, Γ ⊢ e2 : τ
′
∆, Γ ⊢ 〈e1, e2〉 : τ × τ
′
}~
Lτ
Lpi
=
〈J∆, Γ ⊢ e1 : τKLτLpi , J∆, Γ ⊢ e2 : τ ′KLτLpi〉 (J·KLτLpi -Pair)
uv (TLτ -proj-1)∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ × τ ′
∆, Γ ⊢ e.1 : τ
}~L
τ
Lpi
= J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ × τ ′KLτLpi .1 (J·KLτLpi -P1)
uv (TLτ -proj-2)∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ × τ ′
∆, Γ ⊢ e.2 : τ ′
}~L
τ
Lpi
= J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ × τ ′KLτLpi .2 (J·KLτLpi -P2)
uv (TLτ -dereference)∆, Γ ⊢ e : Ref τ
∆, Γ ⊢ !e : τ
}~L
τ
Lpi
= !J∆, Γ ⊢ e : Ref τKLτLpi .1 with J∆, Γ ⊢ e : Ref τKLτLpi .2 (J·KLτLpi -Deref)
uwv (TL
τ -op)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : Nat
∆, Γ ⊢ e′ : Nat
∆, Γ ⊢ e⊕ e′ : Nat
}~
Lτ
Lpi
= J∆, Γ ⊢ e : NatKLτLpi ⊕ J∆, Γ ⊢ e′ : NatKLτLpi (J·KLτLpi -op)
uwv (TL
τ -cmp)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : Nat
∆, Γ ⊢ e′ : Nat
∆, Γ ⊢ e⊗ e′ : Bool
}~
Lτ
Lpi
= J∆, Γ ⊢ e : NatKLτLpi ⊗ J∆, Γ ⊢ e′ : NatKLτLpi (J·KLτLpi -cmp)
uv (TLτ -coercion)∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ τ ⊢ ◦
∆, Γ ⊢ e : UN
}~L
τ
Lpi
= J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi (J·KLτLpi -Coerce)
Statements
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t
(TLτ -skip)
C,∆, Γ ⊢ skip
|Lτ
Lpi
= skip (J·KLτLpi -Skip)
uwv (TL
τ -new)
C,∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ
C,∆, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ let x = newτ e in s
}~
Lτ
Lpi
=


let xo = new J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi
in let x = 〈xo,0〉
in JC,∆, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ sKLτLpi
if τ = UN
let x = newhide J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi
in JC,∆, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ sKLτLpi
else
(J·KLτLpi -New)
uwwwv
(TLτ -function-call)
((f ∈ dom(C.funs))
∨(f ∈ dom(C.intfs)))
∆, Γ ⊢ e : UN
∆, Γ ⊢ call f e
}~
Lτ
Lpi
= call f J∆, Γ ⊢ e : UNKLτLpi (J·KLτLpi -call)
uwwwv
(TLτ -if)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : Bool
C,∆, Γ ⊢ st
C,∆, Γ ⊢ se
C,∆, Γ ⊢ if e then st else se
}~
Lτ
Lpi
=
ifz J∆, Γ ⊢ e : BoolKLτLpi
then JC,∆, Γ ⊢ stKLτLpi
else JC,∆, Γ ⊢ seKLτLpi
(J·KLτLpi -If)
uwv (TL
τ -sequence)
C,∆, Γ ⊢ su
C,∆, Γ ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ su; s
}~
Lτ
Lpi
= JC,∆, Γ ⊢ suKLτLpi ; JC,∆, Γ; Γ′ ⊢ sKLτLpi (J·KLτLpi -Seq)
uwv (TL
τ -letin)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ
C,∆, Γ; x : τ ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ let x : τ = e in s
}~
Lτ
Lpi
=
let x=J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi
in JC,∆, Γ; x : τ ⊢ sKLτLpi (J·KL
τ
Lpi -Letin)
uwv (TL
τ -assign)
∆, Γ ⊢ x : Ref τ
∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ
C,∆, Γ ⊢ x := e
}~
Lτ
Lpi
=
let x1 = x.1
in let x2 = x.2
in x1 := J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi with x2 (J·K
Lτ
Lpi -Assign)
uv (TLτ -fork)C,∆, Γ ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ (‖ s)
}~L
τ
Lpi
=
(
‖ JC,∆, Γ ⊢ sKLτLpi) (J·KLτLpi -Fork)
uv (TLτ -process)C,∆, Γ ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ (s)f
}~L
τ
Lpi
= (JC,∆, Γ ⊢ sKLτLpi )JfKLτ
Lpi
(J·KLτLpi -Proc)
uwwv
(TLτ -soup)
C,∆, Γ ⊢ π
C,∆, Γ ⊢ Π
C,∆, Γ ⊢ π ‖ Π
}~
Lτ
Lpi
= JC,∆, Γ ⊢ πKLτLpi ‖ JC,∆, Γ ⊢ ΠKLτLpi (J·KLτLpi -Soup)
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uwv (TL
τ -endorse)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : UN
C,∆, Γ; (x : ϕ) ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ endorse x = e as ϕ in s
}~
Lτ
Lpi
=


destruct x = J∆, Γ ⊢ e : UNKLτLpi as nat in
ifz x thenJC,∆, Γ; (x : ϕ) ⊢ sKLτLpi
else ifz x− 1 thenJC,∆, Γ; (x : ϕ) ⊢ sKLτLpi
else wrong
or wrong
if ϕ = Bool
destruct x = J∆, Γ ⊢ e : UNKLτLpi as nat inJC,∆, Γ; (x : ϕ) ⊢ sKLτLpi
or wrong
if ϕ = Nat
destruct x = J∆, Γ ⊢ e : UNKLτLpi as pair inJC,∆, Γ; (x : ϕ) ⊢ sKLτLpi
or wrong
if ϕ = UN× UN
destruct x = J∆, Γ ⊢ e : UNKLτLpi as pair in
!x.1 with x.2;JC,∆, Γ; (x : ϕ) ⊢ sKLτLpi
or wrong
if ϕ = Ref UN
(J·KLτLpi -Endorse)
We write wrong as a shortcut for a failign expression like 3+ true.
The remark about optimisation for J·KLULP in Section 12 is also valid for the Rule (J·KLτLpi -Deref) case above.
As expressions are executed atomically, we are sure that albeit inefficient, dereferencing will correctly succeed.
We can add reference to superficial types and check this dynamically in the source, as we have the heap
there. But how do we check this in the target? We only assume that reference must be passed as a pair:
location- key from the attacker. Thus the last case of Rule (J·KLτLpi -Endorse), where we check that we can
access the location, otherwise we’d get stuck.
NonAtomic Implementation of New-Hide We can also implement Rule (J·KLτLpi -New) using non-atomic
instructions are defined in Rule (J·KLτLpi -New-nonat) below.
uwv (TL
τ -new)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ
C,∆, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ let x = newτ e in s
}~
Lτ
Lpi
=


let xo = new J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi
in let x = 〈xo,0〉
in JC,∆, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ sKLτLpi
if τ = UN
let x = new 0 in
let xk = hide x in
let xc = J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi in
x := xc with xk;JC,∆, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ sKLτLpi
otherwise
(J·KLτLpi -New-nonat)
16.3 Properties of the Lτ -Lpi Compiler
Theorem 12 (Compiler J·KLτLpi is CC ). ⊢ J·KLτLpi : CC
Theorem 13 (Compiler J·KLτLpi is RSC ). ⊢ J·KLτLpi : RSC
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16.4 Cross-language Relation ∼∼β
We define a more lenient relation on states ∼∼β analogous to ≈β (Rule Related states – Whole) but that
ensures that all target locations that are related to secure source ones only vary accordingly: i.e., the
attacker cannot change them.
Ω∼∼βΩ
(Lτ -Secure heap)
H′ = {ℓ 7→ v : τ | ℓ 7→ v : τ ∈ H and τ 0 ◦}
⊢ secure(H) = H′
(Lpi-Low Location)
∄ℓ ∈ secure(H) ℓ≈β 〈n,_〉 n ∈ dom(H)
H,H ⊢ low-loc(n)
(Lpi-High Location)
ℓ ∈ secure(H) ℓ≈β 〈n,k〉 n 7→ _ : k ∈ H
H,H ⊢ high-loc(n) = ℓ,k
(Lpi -High Capability)
ℓ ∈ secure(H). ℓ≈β 〈n,k〉 n 7→ _ : k ∈ H
H,H ⊢ high-cap(k)
(Related states – Secure)
Ω = ∆;F,F′; I;H ⊲ Π Ω = H0;F,
q
F′
yLτ
Lpi
; I;H ⊲Π ∆ ⊢β H0
∀k,n, ℓ. if H,H ⊢ high-loc(n) = ℓ,k then
(1) ∀π ∈ Π if C ⊢ π : attacker then k /∈ fv(π)
(2) ∀n′ 7→ v : η ∈ H,
(2a) if η = k then n = n′ and ℓ≈β 〈n,k〉 and ℓ 7→ v : τ ∈ H and v≈β v
(2b) if η 6= k then H,H ⊢ low-loc(n′) and ∀k′.H,H ⊢ high-cap(k′),v 6= k′
Ω∼∼βΩ
There is no secure( · ) function for the target because they would be all locations that are related to a source
location that itself is secure in the source. An alternative is to define secure( · ) as all locations protected
by a key k but the point of secure( · ) is to setup the invariant to ensure the proof hold, so this alternative
would be misleading.
Rule Lπ-Low Location tells when a target location is not secure. That is, when there is no secure source
location that is related to it. This can be because the source location is not secure or because the relation
does not exist, as in order for it to exist the triple must be added to β and we only add the triple for secure
locations.
The intuition behind Rule Related states – Secure is that two states are related if the set of locations they
monitor is related and then: for any target location n that is high (i.e., it has a related source counterpart ℓ
whose type is secure and that is protected with a capability k that we call a high capability), then we have:
(1) the capability k used to lock it is not in in any attacker code; (2) for any target level location n′: (2a)
either it is locked with a high capability k (i.e., a capability used to hide a high location) thus n′ is also
high, in which case it is related to a source location ℓ and the values v, v they point to are related; or (2b)
it is not locked with a high capability, so we can derive that n′ is a low location and its content v is not any
high capability k′.
♠
Lemma 6 (A target location is either high or low).
∀
if H≈βH
n 7→ v : η ∈ H
then either H,H ⊢ low-loc(n)
or ∃ℓ ∈ dom(H).
H,H ⊢ high-loc(n) = ℓ, η
Proof. Trivial, as Rule Lπ-Low Location and Rule Lπ-High Location are duals.
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17 RSC : Third Instance with Target Memory Isolation
Both compilers presented so far used a capability-based target language. To avoid giving the false impression
that RSC is only useful for this kind of a target, we show here how to attain RSC when the protection
mechanism in the target is completely different. We consider a new target language, LI , which does not
have capabilities, but instead offers coarse-grained memory isolation based on enclaves. This mechanism
is supported (in hardware) in mainstream x86-64 and ARM CPUs (Intel calls this SGX [50]; ARM calls it
TrustZone [77]). This is also straightforward to implement purely in software using any physical, VM-based,
process-based, or in-process isolation technique. This section provides a high-level discussion on how to
devise compiler J·KLτLI from our source language Lτ to LI and why it attains RSC . Full formal details are
presented in subsequent sections.
17.1 LI , a Target Language with Memory Isolation
Language LI replaces Lπ’s capabilities with a simple security abstraction called an enclave. An enclave is
a collection of code and memory locations, with the properties that: (a) only code within the enclave can
access the memory locations of the enclave, and (b) Code from outside can transfer control only to designated
entry points in the enclave’s code. For simplicity, LI supports only one enclave. Generalizing this to many
enclaves is straightforward.
To model the enclave, a LI program has an additional component E , the list of functions that reside in
the enclave. A component thus has the form C ::= H0 ;F ; I ;E . Only functions that are listed in E can
create (let x = newiso e in s), read (!e) and write (x := e) locations in the enclave. Locations in LI are
integers (not natural numbers). By convention, non-negative locations are outside the enclave (accessible
from any function), while negative locations are inside the enclave (accessible only from functions in E ).
The semantics are almost those of Lπ , but the expression semantics change to C;H; f ⊲ e →֒→ v, recording
which function f is currently executing. The operational rule for any memory operation checks that either
the access is to a location outside the enclave or that f ∈ E (formalized by C ⊢ f : prog). Monitors of LI
are the same as those of Lπ .
17.2 Compiler from Lτ to LI
The high-level structure of the compiler J·KLτLI is similar to that of J·KLτLpi . J·KLτLI ensures that all the (and
only the) functions of the (trusted) component we write are part of the enclave, i.e., constitute E (first
rule below). Additionally, the compiler populates the safety-relevant heap H0 based on the information in
∆ (captured by the judgement ∆ ⊢ H0 , whose details we elide here). Importantly, J·KLτLI also ensures that
trusted locations are stored in the enclave. As before, the compiler relies on typing information for this.
Locations whose types are shareable (subtypes of UN) are placed outside the enclave while those that trusted
(not subtypes of UN) are placed inside.
As mentioned, J·KLτLI also attains RSC . The intuition is simple: all trusted locations (including safety-
relevant locations) are in the enclave and adversarial code cannot tamper with them. The proof follows the
proof of the previous compiler: We build a cross-language relation, which we show to be an invariant on
executions of source and corresponding compiled programs. The only change is that every location in the
trusted target heap is isolated in the enclave.
18 The Second Target Language: LI
For clarity, we use a pink , italics font for LI .
18.1 Syntax
Whole Programs P ::= H0 ;F ; I ;E
Components C ::= H0 ;F ; I ;E
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Contexts A ::= F [·]
Interfaces I ::= f
Enclave functions E ::= f
Functions F ::= f (x ) 7→ s ; return;
Operations ⊕ ::= + | −
Comparison ⊗ ::= == | < | >
Values v ::= n ∈ Z | 〈v , v〉 | k
Expressions e ::= x | v | e ⊕ e | e ⊗ e | 〈e, e〉 | e.1 | e.2 | !e
Statements s ::= skip | s ; s | let x = e in s | ifz e then s else s | call f e
| | (‖ s) | destruct x = e as B in s or s
| x := e | let x = new e in s | let x = newiso e in s
Patterns B ::= nat | pair
Eval . Ctxs . E ::= [·] | e ⊕ E | E ⊕ n | e ⊗ E | E ⊗ n | !E
| 〈e,E 〉 | 〈E , v〉 | E .1 | E .2
Heaps H ::= ∅ | H ; n 7→ v
Monitors M ::= ({σ} , , σ0 ,H0 , σc)
Mon. States σ ∈ S
Mon. Reds .  ::= ∅ | ; (s ,H , s)
Substitutions ρ ::= ∅ | ρ[v / x ]
Single Process π ::= (s)f
Processes Π ::= ∅ | Π ‖ π
Prog. States Ω ::= C ,H ⊲Π
Labels λ ::= ǫ | α
Actions α ::= call f v H ? | call f v H ! | ret H ! | ret H ?
Traces α ::= ∅ | α · α
18.2 Operational Semantics of LI
Helpers
(LI -Jump-Internal)
((f ′ ∈ I ∧ f ∈ I )∨
(f ′ /∈ I ∧ f /∈ I ))
I ⊢ f , f ′ : internal
(LI -Jump-IN)
f ∈ I ∧ f ′ /∈ I
I ⊢ f , f ′ : in
(LI -Jump-OUT)
f /∈ I ∧ f ′ ∈ I
I ⊢ f , f ′ : out
(LI -prog-execs)
C = H0 ;F ; I ;E f ∈ E
C ⊢ f : prog
(LI -Plug)
A ≡ F [·] C ≡ H0 ;F ′; I ;E
⊢ C ,F : whole main(x ) 7→ s ; return; ∈ F
A [C ] = H0 ;F ;F ′; I ;E
(LI -Whole)
C ≡ H0 ;F ′; I ;E
names(F ) ∩ names(F ′) = ∅ names(I ) ⊆ names(F ) ∀n 7→ v ∈ H0 , n < 0
⊢ C ,F : whole
(LI -Initial State)
P ≡ H0 ;F ; I ;E
Ω0 (P) = P ;H0 ⊲ call main 0
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18.2.1 Component Semantics
C ;H ; f ⊲ e →֒→ e ′ Expression e reduces to e ′.
C ,H ⊲Π
ǫ
−−→ C ′,H ′ ⊲Π ′ Processes Π reduce to Π ′ and evolve the rest accordingly.
emitting label λ.
Ω
α
==⇒ Ω ′ Program state Ω steps to Ω ′ emitting trace α.
C ;H ; f ⊲ e →֒→ e ′
(ELI -val)
C ;H ; f ⊲ v →֒→ v
(ELI -p1)
C ;H ; f ⊲ 〈v , v ′〉 .1 →֒→ v
(ELI -p2)
C ;H ; f ⊲ 〈v , v ′〉 .1 →֒→ v ′
(ELI -op)
n⊕ n′ = n′′
C ;H ; f ⊲ n ⊕ n ′ →֒→ n ′′
(ELI -comp)
if n⊗ n′ = true then n ′′ = 0 else n ′′ = 1
C ;H ; f ⊲ n ⊗ n ′ →֒→ n ′′
(ELI -deref)
n 7→ v ∈ H n ≥ 0
C ;H ; f ⊲!n →֒→ v
(ELI -deref-iso)
n 7→ v ∈ H n < 0 C ⊢ f : prog
C ;H ; f ; f ⊲!n →֒→ v
(ELI -ctx)
C ;H ; f ⊲ e →֒→ e ′
C ;H ; f ⊲ E [e] →֒→ E [e ′]
C ;H ⊲ s
λ
−−→ C ′;H ′ ⊲ s ′
We elide the suffix with the stack of functions when obvious.
(ELI -sequence)
C ,H ⊲ skip; s
ǫ
−−→ C ,H ⊲ s
(ELI -step)
C ,H ⊲ s
λ
−−→ C ,H ⊲ s ′
C ,H ⊲ s ; s ′′
λ
−−→ C ,H ⊲ s ′; s
(ELI -if-true)
C ;H ; f ⊲ e →֒→ 0
C ,H ⊲ ifz e then s else s ′
ǫ
−−→ C ,H ⊲ s
(ELI -if-false)
C ;H ; f ⊲ e →֒→ n n 6≡ 0
C ,H ⊲ ifz e then s else s ′
ǫ
−−→ C ,H ⊲ s ′
(ELI -letin)
C ;H ; f ⊲ e →֒→ v
C ,H ⊲ let x = e in s
ǫ
−−→ C ,H ⊲ s [v / x ]
(ELI -new)
H = H1 ; n 7→ _ C ;H ; f ⊲ e →֒→ v
C ,H ⊲ let x = new e in s
ǫ
−−→ C ,H ; n + 1 7→ v ⊲ s [n + 1 / x ]
(ELI -isolate)
H = n 7→ _;H1 C ;H ; f ⊲ e →֒→ v
f = f ′ · f C ⊢ f : prog
C ,H ⊲ (let x = newiso e in s)f
ǫ
−−→ C , n − 1 7→ v ;H ⊲ (s [n − 1 / x ])f
(ELI -assign)
C ;H ; f ⊲ e →֒→ v
H = H1 ; n 7→ _;H2 H ′ = H1 ; n 7→ v ;H2 n ≥ 0
C ,H ⊲ n := e
ǫ
−−→ C ,H ′ ⊲ skip
(ELI -assign-iso)
C ;H ; f ⊲ e →֒→ v f = f ′ · f C ⊢ f : prog
H = H1 ; n 7→ _;H2 H ′ = H1 ; n 7→ v ;H2 n < 0
C ,H ⊲ (n := e)f
ǫ
−−→ C ,H ′ ⊲ (skip)f
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(ELI -call-internal)
C .intfs ⊢ f , f ′ : internal f ′ = f ′′; f ′
f (x ) 7→ s ; return; ∈ C .funs C ;H ; f ⊲ e →֒→ v
C ,H ⊲ (call f e)f ′
ǫ
−−→ C ,H ⊲ (s ; return;[v / x ])f ′;f
(ELI -callback)
f ′ = f ′′; f ′ f (x ) 7→ s ; return; ∈ F
C .intfs ⊢ f ′, f : out C ;H ; f ⊲ e →֒→ v
C ,H ⊲ (call f e)f ′
call f v H !
−−−−−−−−−→ C ,H ⊲ (s ; return;[v / x ])f ′;f
(ELI -call)
f ′ = f ′′; f ′ f (x ) 7→ s ; return; ∈ C .funs
C .intfs ⊢ f ′, f : in C ;H ; f ⊲ e →֒→ v
C ,H ⊲ (call f e)f ′
call f v H?
−−−−−−−−−→ C ,H ⊲ (s ; return;[v / x ])f ′;f
(ELI -reo-internal)
C .intfs ⊢ f , f ′ : internal f ′ = f ′′; f ′
C ,H ⊲ (return;)f ′;f
ǫ
−−→ C ,H ⊲ (skip)f ′
(ELI -retback)
C .intfs ⊢ f , f ′ : in f ′ = f ′′; f ′
C ,H ⊲ (return;)f ′;f
ret H?
−−−−−−→ C ,H ⊲ (skip)f ′
(ELI -return)
C .intfs ⊢ f , f ′ : out f ′ = f ′′; f ′
C ,H ⊲ (return;)f ′;f
ret H !
−−−−−→ C ,H ⊲ (skip)f ′
(ELI -destruct-nat)
C ;H ; f ⊲ e →֒→ n
C ,H ⊲ destruct x = e as nat in s or s ′
ǫ
−−→ C ,H ⊲ s [n / x ]
(ELI -destruct-pair)
C ;H ; f ⊲ e →֒→ 〈v , v ′〉
C ,H ⊲ destruct x = e as pair in s or s ′
ǫ
−−→ C ,H ⊲ s [〈v , v ′〉 / x ]
(ELI -destruct-not)
otherwise
C ,H ⊲ destruct x = e as B in s or s ′
ǫ
−−→ C ,H ⊲ s ′
C ,H ⊲Π →֒→ C ′,H ′ ⊲Π ′
(ELI -par)
Π = Π1 ‖ (s)f ‖ Π2
Π ′ = Π1 ‖ (s
′)f ′ ‖ Π2
C ,H ⊲ (s)f →֒→ C
′,H ′ ⊲ (s ′)f ′
C ,H ⊲Π →֒→ C ′,H ′ ⊲Π ′
(ELI -fork)
Π = Π1 ‖ ((‖ s))f ;f ‖ Π2
Π ′ = Π1 ‖ (0 )f ;f ‖ Π2 ‖ (s)f
C ,H ⊲Π →֒→ C ,H ⊲Π ′
Ω
α
==⇒ Ω ′
(ELI -single)
Ω −→ Ω ′′
Ω ′′
α
==⇒ Ω ′
Ω
α
==⇒ Ω ′
(ELI -silent)
Ω
ǫ
−−→ Ω ′
Ω =⇒ Ω ′
(ELI -trans)
Ω
α
==⇒ Ω ′′
Ω ′′
α′
==⇒ Ω ′
Ω
α·α′
====⇒ Ω ′
18.3 Monitor Semantics
mon-care( · )
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(LI -Monitor-related heap)
H ′ = {n 7→ v : η | n ∈ dom(H0 ) and n 7→ v : η ∈ H }
mon-care(H ,H0 ) = H ′
M ;H  M ′
(LI -Monitor Step)
M = ({σ} , , σ0 ,H0 , σc) M
′ = ({σ} , , σ0 ,H0 , σf )
(sc, mon-care(H ,H0 ), sf ) ∈ 
M ;H  M ′
(LI -Monitor Step Trace Base)
M ;∅ M
(LI -Monitor Step Trace)
M ;H  M ′′ M ′′;H  M ′
M ;H · H  M ′
(LI -valid trace)
M ;H  M ′
M ⊢ mon H
18.4 Monitor Agreement for LI
Definition 26 (LI : M ⌢C ).
({σ} , , σ0 ,H0 , σc)⌢(H0 ;F ; I ;E )
A monitor and a component agree if they focus on the same set of locations H0 .
18.5 Properties of LI
Definition 27 (LI Attacker).
C ⊢att A
def
= C = H0 ;F ; I ;E ,A = F ′, names(F ) ∩ names(F ′) = ∅
C ⊢att π
def
= π = (s)f ;f and f ∈ C .itfs
C ⊢att Π −→ Π
′ def= Π = Π1 ‖ π ‖ Π2 and Π
′ = Π1 ‖ π
′ ‖ Π2
and C ⊢att π and C ⊢att π′
19 Second Compiler from Lτ to LI
For this compiler we need a different partial bijection, which we indicate with ϕ and its type is ℓ× n. It has
the same properties of β listed in Section 11.3.
The cross-language relation ≈ is unchanged but for the relation of locations, as they are no longer
compiled as pairs:
• ℓ≈ϕ n if (ℓ,n) ∈ ϕ
Actions relation is unchanged from Rule Call relation etc.
Heaps relation is unchanged (modulo the elision of capabilities) from Rule Heap relation.
Process relation is unchanged from Rule Single process relation etc.
State relation is unchanged from Rule Related states – Whole.
The monitor relation M≈M is defined as in Rule Monitor relation .
Some auxiliary functions are changed:
∆ ⊢ϕ H0 ∆,H ⊢ v : τ
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(Initial-heap)
∆ ⊢ H ∆,H ⊢ v : τ
ℓ≈ϕ n
∆, ℓ : τ ⊢ϕ H ; n 7→ v
(Initial-value)
(τ ≡ Bool ∧ v ≡ 0 ) ∨ (τ ≡ Nat ∧ v ≡ 0 ) ∨
(τ ≡ Ref τ ∧ v ≡ n ′ ∧ n ′ 7→ v ′ ∈ H ∧ ℓ′≈ϕ n
′ ∧ ℓ : τ ∈ ∆,∆,H ⊢ v ′: τ ) ∨
(τ ≡ τ1 × τ2 ∧ v ≡ 〈v1 , v2 〉 ∧∆,H ⊢ v1 : τ1 ∧∆,H ⊢ v2 : τ2)
∆,H ⊢ϕ v : τ
Definition 28 (Compiler Lτ to LI ). J·KLτLI : C→ C
Given that C = ∆;F; I if ⊢ C : UN then JCKLτLI is defined as follows:uwwwwwv
(TLτ -component)
C ≡ ∆;F; I
C ⊢ F : UN
names(F) ∩ names(I) = ∅
∆ ⊢ ok
⊢ C : UN
}~
Lτ
LI
= H0 ;
q
F
yLτ
LI
;
q
I
yLτ
LI
; dom(F) if ∆ ⊢ϕ0 H0
(J·KLτLI -Component)uwwwwwv
(TLτ -function)
F ≡ f(x : UN) 7→ s; return;
C,∆; x : UN ⊢ s
∀f ∈ fn(s), f ∈ dom(C.funs)
∨f ∈ dom(C.intfs)
C ⊢ F : UN
}~
Lτ
LI
= f (x ) 7→ JC;∆; x : UN ⊢ sKLτLI ; return; (J·KLτLI -Function)
JfKLτLI = f (J·KLτLI -Interfaces)
Expressions
uv (TLτ -true)∆, Γ ⊢ ⋄
∆, Γ ⊢ true : Bool
}~L
τ
LI
= 0 if true≈ϕ 0 (J·KLτLI -True)
uv (TLτ -false)∆, Γ ⊢ ⋄
∆, Γ ⊢ false : Bool
}~L
τ
LI
= 1 if false≈ϕ 1 (J·KLτLI -False)
uv (TLτ -nat)∆, Γ ⊢ ⋄
∆, Γ ⊢ n : Nat
}~L
τ
LI
= n if n≈ϕ n (J·KLτLI -Nat)
t
(TLτ -var)
x : τ ∈ Γ
∆, Γ ⊢ x : τ
|Lτ
LI
= x (J·KLτLI -Var)
t
(TLτ -loc)
ℓ : τ ∈ ∆
∆, Γ ⊢ ℓ : τ
|Lτ
LI
= n if ℓ≈ϕ n (J·KLτLI -Loc)uwwv
(TLτ -pair)
∆, Γ ⊢ e1 : τ
∆, Γ ⊢ e2 : τ
′
∆, Γ ⊢ 〈e1, e2〉 : τ × τ
′
}~
Lτ
LI
=
〈J∆, Γ ⊢ e1 : τKLτLI , J∆, Γ ⊢ e2 : τ ′KLτLI〉 (J·KLτLI -Pair)
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uv (TLτ -proj-1)∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ × τ ′
∆, Γ ⊢ e.1 : τ
}~L
τ
LI
= J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ × τ ′KLτLI .1 (J·KLτLI -P1)
uv (TLτ -proj-2)∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ × τ ′
∆, Γ ⊢ e.2 : τ ′
}~L
τ
LI
= J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ × τ ′KLτLI .2 (J·KLτLI -P2)
uv (TLτ -dereference)∆, Γ ⊢ e : Ref τ
∆, Γ ⊢ !e : τ
}~L
τ
LI
= !J∆, Γ ⊢ e : Ref τKLτLI .1 (J·KLτLI -Deref)
uwv (TL
τ -op)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : Nat
∆, Γ ⊢ e′ : Nat
∆, Γ ⊢ e⊕ e′ : Nat
}~
Lτ
LI
= J∆, Γ ⊢ e : NatKLτLI ⊕ J∆, Γ ⊢ e′ : NatKLτLI (J·KLτLI -op)
uwv (TL
τ -cmp)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : Nat
∆, Γ ⊢ e′ : Nat
∆, Γ ⊢ e⊗ e′ : Bool
}~
Lτ
LI
= J∆, Γ ⊢ e : NatKLτLI ⊗ J∆, Γ ⊢ e′ : NatKLτLI (J·KLτLI -cmp)
uv (TLτ -coercion)∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ τ ⊢ ◦
∆, Γ ⊢ e : UN
}~L
τ
LI
= J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLI (J·KLτLI -Coerce)
Statements
t
(TLτ -skip)
C,∆, Γ ⊢ skip
|Lτ
LI
= skip (J·KLτLI -Skip)
uwv (TL
τ -new)
C,∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ
C,∆, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ let x = newτ e in s
}~
Lτ
LI
=


let x = new J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLI
in JC,∆, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ sKLτLI
if τ = UN
let x = newiso J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLI
in JC,∆, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ sKLτLI
else
(J·KLτLI -New)
uwwwv
(TLτ -function-call)
((f ∈ dom(C.funs))
∨(f ∈ dom(C.intfs)))
∆, Γ ⊢ e : UN
∆, Γ ⊢ call f e
}~
Lτ
LI
= call f J∆, Γ ⊢ e : UNKLτLI (J·KLτLI -call)
uwwwv
(TLτ -if)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : Bool
C,∆, Γ ⊢ st
C,∆, Γ ⊢ se
C,∆, Γ ⊢ if e then st else se
}~
Lτ
LI
=
ifz J∆, Γ ⊢ e : BoolKLτLI
then JC,∆, Γ ⊢ stKLτLI
else JC,∆, Γ ⊢ seKLτLI
(J·KLτLI -If)
uwv (TL
τ -sequence)
C,∆, Γ ⊢ su
C,∆, Γ ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ su; s
}~
Lτ
LI
= JC,∆, Γ ⊢ suKLτLI ; JC,∆, Γ; Γ′ ⊢ sKLτLI (J·KLτLI -Seq)
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uwv (TL
τ -letin)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ
C,∆, Γ; x : τ ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ let x : τ = e in s
}~
Lτ
LI
=
let x=J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLI
in JC,∆, Γ; x : τ ⊢ sKLτLI (J·KL
τ
LI -Letin)
uwv (TL
τ -assign)
∆, Γ ⊢ x : Ref τ
∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ
C,∆, Γ ⊢ x := e
}~
Lτ
LI
= J∆, Γ ⊢ x : Ref τKLτLI := J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLI (J·KLτLI -Assign)
uv (TLτ -fork)C,∆, Γ ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ (‖ s)
}~L
τ
LI
=
(
‖ JC,∆, Γ ⊢ sKLτLI) (J·KLτLI -Fork)
uv (TLτ -process)C,∆, Γ ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ (s)f
}~L
τ
LI
= (JC,∆, Γ ⊢ sKLτLI )JfKLτ
LI
(J·KLτLI -Proc)
uwwv
(TLτ -soup)
C,∆, Γ ⊢ π
C,∆, Γ ⊢ Π
C,∆, Γ ⊢ π ‖ Π
}~
Lτ
LI
= JC,∆, Γ ⊢ πKLτLI ‖ JC,∆, Γ ⊢ ΠKLτLI (J·KLτLI -Soup)
uwv (TL
τ -endorse)
∆, Γ ⊢ e : UN
C,∆, Γ; (x : ϕ) ⊢ s
C,∆, Γ ⊢ endorse x = e as ϕ in s
}~
Lτ
LI
=


destruct x = J∆, Γ ⊢ e : UNKLτLI as nat in
ifz x thenJC,∆, Γ; (x : ϕ) ⊢ sKLτLI
else ifz x − 1 thenJC,∆, Γ; (x : ϕ) ⊢ sKLτLI
else wrong
or wrong
if ϕ = Bool
destruct x = J∆, Γ ⊢ e : UNKLτLI as nat inJC,∆, Γ; (x : ϕ) ⊢ sKLτLI
or wrong
if ϕ = Nat
destruct x = J∆, Γ ⊢ e : UNKLτLI as pair inJC,∆, Γ; (x : ϕ) ⊢ sKLτLI
or wrong
if ϕ = UN× UN
destruct x = J∆, Γ ⊢ e : UNKLτLI as nat in
!x ;JC,∆, Γ; (x : ϕ) ⊢ sKLτLI
or wrong
if ϕ = Ref UN
(J·KLτLI -Endorse)
We use wrong as before for wrong.
19.1 Properties of the Lτ -LI Compiler
Theorem 14 (Compiler J·KLτLI is CC ). ⊢ J·KLτLI : CC
Theorem 15 (Compiler J·KLτLI is RSC ). ⊢ J·KLτLI : RSC
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19.2 Cross-language Relation ∼∼ϕ
As before, we define a more lenient relation on states ∼∼ϕ
Ω∼∼ϕ Ω
(LI -Low Location)
∄ℓ ∈ secure(H) ℓ≈ϕ n n ≥ 0
H,H ⊢ low-loc(n)
(LI -High Location)
ℓ ∈ secure(H) ℓ≈ϕ n n < 0
H,H ⊢ high-loc(n) = ℓ
(Related states – Secure)
Ω = ∆;F,F′; I;H ⊲ Π Ω = H0 ;F ,
q
F′
yLτ
Lpi
; I ;E ;H ⊲Π ∆ ⊢ϕ H0
∀n , ℓ. if H,H ⊢ high-loc(n) = ℓ then
n 7→ v ∈ H and ℓ 7→ v : τ ∈ H and v≈ϕ v
Ω∼∼ϕΩ
We change the definition of a “high location” to be one that is in the enclave, i.e., whose address is less
than 0.
The intuition behind Rule Related states – Secure is that high locations only need to be in sync, nothing
is enforced on low locations. Compared to Rule Related states – Secure, we have less conditions because we
don’t have to track fine-grained capabilities but just if an address is part of the enclave or not.
♠
Lemma 7 (A LI target location is either high or low).
∀
if H≈ϕH
n 7→ v ∈ H
then either H,H ⊢ low-loc(n)
or ∃ℓ ∈ dom(H).
H,H ⊢ high-loc(n) = ℓ
Proof. Trivial, as Rule LI -Low Location and Rule LI -High Location are duals.
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20 Proofs
20.1 Proof of Theorem 7 (PF -RSC and RSC are equivalent)
Proof. ⇒ HP
if ∀A, α. JCKST ⊢ A : attacker
⊢ A
[JCKST] : whole Ω0 (JCKST) α==⇒ Ω
then ∃A, αC ⊢ A : attacker
⊢ A [C] : whole Ω0 (A [C])
α
==⇒ Ω
relevant(α)≈β relevant(α)
TH
if M≈βM
∀A, α. ⊢ A [C] : whole if Ω0 (C)
α
==⇒ Ω
then M ⊢ α
then ∀A, α. ⊢ A
[JCKST] : whole if Ω0 (JC,MKST) α==⇒ Ω
then M ⊢ α
We proceed by contradiction and assume that M 0 α while C ⊢ α.
By the relatedness of the traces, by Rules Call relation to Returnback relation we have H≈βH for all
heaps in the traces.
But if the heaps are related and the source steps (by unfolding M ⊢ α), then by point 3.b in Defini-
tion 12 (MRM) we have that the target monitor also steps, so M ⊢ α.
We have reached a contradiction, so this case holds.
⇐ Switch HP and TH from the point above.
Analgously, we proceed by contradiction:
• ∀A, α. ⊢ A [C] : whole and Ω0 (A [C])
α
==⇒ Ω and relevant(α) 6 ≈β relevant(α)
By the same reasoning as above, with the HP we have we obtain M ⊢ α and M ⊢ α.
Again by 3.b in Definition 12 (MRM) we know that the heaps of all actions in the traces are related.
Therefore, relevant(α)≈β relevant(α), which gives us a contradiction.
20.2 Proof of Theorem 8 (Compiler J·KLULP is CC )
Proof. The proof proceeds for β0 = (ℓ,0,kroot) and then, given that the languages are deterministic, by
Lemma 9 (Generalised compiler correctness for J·KLULP) as initial states are related by definition.
♠
Lemma 8 (Expressions compiled with J·KLULP are related).
∀
if H≈βH
H ⊲ eρ →֒→ v
then H ⊲ JeKLULPJρKLULP →֒→ JvKLULP
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Proof. This proof proceeds by structural induction on e.
Base case: Values
true By Rule (J·KLULP-True), JtrueKLULP = 0.
As true≈β 0, this case holds.
false Analogous to the first case by Rule (J·KLULP-False).
n∈ N Analogous to the first case by Rule (J·KLULP-nat).
x Analogous to the first case, by Rule (J·KLULP -Var) and by the relatedness of the substitutions.
ℓ Analogous to the first case by Rule (J·KLULP -Loc).
〈v, v〉 By induction on v by Rule (J·KLULP -Pair) and then it is analogous to the first case.
Inductive case: Expressions
e⊕ e′ By Rule (J·KLULP-op) we have thatJe⊕ e′KLULP = JeKLULP ⊕ Je′KLULP
By HP we have that H ⊲ eρ →֒→ n and H ⊲ e′ρ →֒→ n′.
By Rule ELU-op we have that H ⊲ n⊕ n′ →֒→ n′′.
By IH we have that H ⊲ JeKLULPJρKLULP →֒→ JnKLULP and H ⊲ Je′KLULPJρKLULP →֒→ Jn′KLULP .
By Rule ELP-op we have that H ⊲ JnKLULP ⊕ Jn′KLULP →֒→ Jn′′KLULP .
So this case holds.
e⊗ e′ Analogous to the case above by IH, Rule (J·KLULP -cmp), Rule ELU-comp and Rules ELP-op
and ELP-if-true.
!e Analogous to the case above by IH twice, Rule (J·KLULP-Deref), Rule ELU-dereference and Rules ELP-p1,
ELP-p2 and ELP-letin and a case analysis by Rules ELP-deref-top and ELP-deref-k.
〈e, e〉 Analogous to the case above by IH and Rule (J·KLULP -Pair).
e.1 By Rule (J·KLULP-P1) Je.1KLULP = JeKLULP .1.
By HP H ⊲ e.1ρ →֒→ 〈v1, v2〉 →֒→ v1.
By IH we have that H ⊲ JeKLULP .1JρKLULP →֒→ J〈v1, v2〉KLULP .1.
By Rule (J·KLULP-Pair) we have that J〈v1, v2〉KLULP .1 = 〈Jv1KLULP , Jv2KLULP〉 .1.
Now H ⊲
〈Jv1KLULP , Jv2KLULP〉 .1 →֒→ Jv1KLULP .
So this case holds.
e.2 Analogous to the case above by Rule (J·KLULP -P2), Rule ELU-p2 and Rule ELP-p2.
♠
Lemma 9 (Generalised compiler correctness for J·KLULP).
Proof.
∀...∃β′
if ⊢ C : whole
C = ∆;F; I
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JCKLτLpi = kroot;F; I = C
C,H ⊲ s≈βC,H ⊲ JsKLτLpi
C,H ⊲ sρ
λ
−−→ C′,H′ ⊲ s′ρ′
then C,H ⊲ JsKLτLpiJρKLULP λ−−→ C′,H′ ⊲ Js′KLτLpiJρ′KLULP
C′ = kroot;F; I
C,H ⊲ s′ρ′≈β′ C,H ⊲ Js′KLτLpiJρ′KLULP
β ⊆ β′
The proof proceeds by induction on C and the on the reduction steps.
Base case
skip By Rule (J·KLULP-Skip) this case follows trivially.
Inductive
let x = new e in s
By Rule (J·KLULP-New) Jlet x = new e in sKLULP =
let xloc = new JeKLULP in
let xcap = hide xloc in
let x = 〈xloc,xcap〉 in JsKLULP
By HP H ⊲ eρ →֒→ v
So by Lemma 8 we have HPE: H ⊲ JeKLULPJρKLULP →֒→ JvKLULP and HPV v≈β JvKLULP .
By Rule ELU-alloc: C;H ⊲ let x = new e in s
ǫ
−−→ C;H; ℓ 7→ v ⊲ s[ℓ / x].
So by HPE:
C;H⊲let xloc = new JeKLULP in
let xcap = hide xloc in
let x = 〈xloc,xcap〉 in JsKLULPρ
Rule ELP-new
ǫ
−−→ C;H;n 7→ JvKLULP : ⊥⊲ let xcap = hide xloc in
let x = 〈xloc,xcap〉 in JsKLULPJρKLULP [n / xloc]
≡ C;H;n 7→ JvKLULP : ⊥⊲ let xcap = hide n in
let x = 〈n,xcap〉 in JsKLULPJρKLULP
Rule ELP-hide
ǫ
−−→ C;H;n 7→ JvKLULP : k;k⊲ let x = 〈n,xcap〉 in JsKLULPJρKLULP [k / xcap]
≡ C;H;n 7→ JvKLULP : k;k⊲ let x = 〈n,k〉 in JsKLULPρ
Rule ELP-letin
ǫ
−−→ C;H;n 7→ JvKLULP : k;k⊲ JsKLULPJρKLULP [〈n,k〉 / x]
Let β′ = β ∪ (ℓ,n,k).
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By definition of ≈β′ and by β′ we get HPL ℓ≈β′ 〈n,k〉.
By a simple weakening lemma for β for substitutions and values applied to HP and HPV we can
get HPVB v≈β′ JvKLULP .
As H≈βH by HP, by a simple weakening lemma get that H≈β′ H too and by Rule Heap relation
with HPL and HPVB we get H′≈β′ H′.
We have that ρ′ = ρ[ℓ / x] and ρ′ = JρKLULP [〈n,k〉 / x].
So by HPL we get that ρ′≈β′ ρ′.
s; s′ Analogous to the case above by IH, Rule (J·KLULP -Seq) and a case analysis on what s reduces to,
either with Rule ELU-sequence and Rule ELP-sequence or with Rule ELU-step and Rule ELP-step.
let x = e in s Analogous to the case above by IH, Rule (J·KLULP -Letin), Rule ELU-letin and Rule ELP-letin.
x := e′ Analogous to the case above by Rule (J·KLULP-Assign), Rule ELU-update and Rule ELP-letin
(twice), Rules ELP-p1 and ELP-p2 and then a case analysis by Rules ELP-assign-top and ELP-assign-k.
if e then s else s′ Analogous to the case above by IH, Rule (J·KLULP-If) and then either Rule ELU-if-true
and Rule ELP-if-true or Rule ELU-if-false and Rule ELP-if-false.
call f e By Rule (J·KLULP-call) Jcall f eKLULP = call f JeKLULP
By HP H ⊲ eρ →֒→ v
So by Lemma 8 we have HPE: H ⊲ JeKLULPρ →֒→ JvKLULP and HPR v≈β JvKLULP .
So as C is whole, we apply Rule ELU-call-internal
C,H ⊲ (call f eρ)f′
ǫ
−−→
C,H ⊲ (s; return;ρ[v / x])f′;f
By Rule ELP-call-internal
C,H ⊲ (call f JeKLULPJρKLULP)f ′ ǫ−−→
C,H ⊲ (s; return;JρKLULP[JvKLULP / x])f ′;f
By the first induction on C we get
IH1 C,H ⊲ (s; return;ρ′)f′;f ≈βC,H ⊲ (s; return;ρ
′)f ′;f
We instantiate ρ′ with ρ[v / x] and ρ′ with JρKLULP[JvKLULP / x].
So by HP and HPR we have that ρ[v / x]≈β JρKLULP[JvKLULP / x]
We we can use IH1 to conclude
C,H ⊲ (s; return;ρ[v / x])f′;f ≈βC,H ⊲ (s; return;JρKLULP[JvKLULP / x])f ′;f
As β′ = β, this case holds.
♠
20.3 Proof of Theorem 9 (Compiler J·KLULP is RSC )
Proof. HPM: M≈βM
HP1: M ⊢ C : rs
TH1: M ⊢ JCKLULP : rs
We can state it in contrapositive form as:
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HP2: M 0 JCKLULP : rs
TH2: M 0 C : rs
By expanding the definition of rs in HP2 and TH2, we get
HP21 ∃A, α.M ⊢ A : attacker and either 0 A
[JCKLULP] : whole or
HPRT1 (Ω0
(
A
[JCKLULP]) α==⇒ _ and HPRMT1 M 0 α)
TH21 ∃A, α.M ⊢ A : attacker and either 0 A [C] : whole or TH2 (Ω0 (A [C])
α
==⇒ _ and TH4 M 0 α)
We consider the case of a whole A, the other is trivial.
We can apply Theorem 10 (〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU is correct) with HPRT1 and instantiate A with a A from 〈〈A〉〉 and we
get the following unfolded HPs
HPRS Ω0 (A [C])
α
==⇒ Ω
HPRel α≈β α.
So TH3 holds by HPRS.
We need to show TH4
Assume by contradiction HPBOT: the monitor in the source does not fail: M ⊢ α)
By Rule LU-valid trace we know that forall α ∈ α such that relevant(α) = H, this holds: HPHR
M;H M′.
We can expand HPHR by Rule LU-Monitor Step and get:
HPMR: (σc,H′h, σf) ∈ 
for a heap H′h ⊆ Hh
By HPM M≈βM for initial states.
By Definition 13 (M≈M) and the second clause of Definition 12 (MRM) with HPMR we know that
M≈βM for the current states.
By the first clause of Definition 12 (MRM) we know that
HPMRBI: (σc,H,_) ∈ ⇐⇒ (σc,H,_) ∈ 
By HPMRBI with HPMR we know that
HPMRTC: (σc,H′h, σf ) ∈ 
However, by HPRMT1 and Rule LP-valid trace we know that
HPNR: M;H 6 
so we get
HPCON: ∄(σc,H′h, σf ) ∈ 
By HPCON and HPMRTC we get the contradiction, so the proof holds.
♠
20.4 Proof of Lemma 2 (Compiled code steps imply existence of source steps)
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on
α!
==⇒ .
Base case:
α!
==⇒
By Rule ELP-single we need to prove the silent steps and the α! action.
ǫ
The proof proceeds by analysis of the target reductions.
Rule ELP-sequence In this case we do not need to pick and the thesis holds by Rule ELU-sequence.
Rule ELP-step In this case we do not need to pick and the thesis holds by Rule ELU-step.
Rule ELP-if-true We have: H ⊲ JeKLULPρ →֒→ 0
We apply Lemma 10 (Compiled code expression steps implies existence of source expression steps)
and obtain a v≈β 0
By definition we have 0≈β 0 and true≈β 0, we pick the second.
So we have H ⊲ eρ →֒→ true
We can now apply Rule ELU-if-true and this case follows.
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Rule ELP-if-false This is analogous to the case above.
Rule ELP-assign-top Analogous to the case above.
Rule ELP-assign-k This is analogous to the case above but for v = ℓ≈β 〈n,k〉.
Rule ELP-letin This follows by Lemma 10 and by Rule ELU-letin.
Rule ELP-new This follows by Lemma 10 and by Rule ELU-alloc.
Rule ELP-hide By analisis of compiled code we know this only happens after a new is executed.
In this case we do not need to perform a step in the source and the thesis holds.
Rule ELP-call-internal This follows by Lemma 10 and by Rule ELU-call-internal.
Rule ELP-ret-internal In this case we do not need to pick and the thesis holds by Rule ELU-ret-internal.
α!
The proof proceeds by case analysis on α!
call f v H! This follows by Lemma 10 (Compiled code expression steps implies existence of source expression steps)
and by Rule ELU-callback.
ret H! In this case we do not need to pick and the thesis holds by Rule ELU-return.
Inductive case: This follows from IH and the same reasoning as for the single action above.
♠
Lemma 10 (Compiled code expression steps implies existence of source expression steps).
∀
if H ⊲ JeKLULPρ →֒→ v
and if {ρ} = {ρ | ρ≈β ρ}
v≈β v
H≈βH
then ∃ρj ∈ {ρ} .H ⊲ eρj →֒→ v
Proof. This proceeds by structural induction on e.
Base case: true This follows from Rule (J·KLULP-True).
false This follows from Rule (J·KLULP-False).
n ∈ N This follows from Rule (J·KLULP-nat).
x This follows from the relation of the substitutions and the totality of ≈β and Rule (J·KLULP-Var).
〈v, v′〉 This follows from induction on v and v′.
Inductive case: e⊕ e′ By definition of ≈β we know that v and v′ could be either natural numbers or
booleans.
We apply the IH with:
IHV1 n≈β n
IHV2 n′≈β n′
By IH we get
IHTE1 H ⊲ JeKLULPρ →֒→ n
IHTE2 H ⊲ Je′KLULPρ →֒→ n′
IHSE1 H ⊲ eρj →֒→ n
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IHSE2 H ⊲ e′ρj →֒→ n′
By Rule (J·KLULP-op) we have that Je⊕ e′KLULP=JeKLULP ⊕ Je′KLULP .
By Rule ELP-op with IHTE1 and IHTE2 we have that H ⊲ JeKLULP ⊕ Je′KLULP →֒→ n′′ where IHVT
n′′ = n⊕ n′
By Rule ELU-op with IHSE1 and IHSE2 we have that H ⊲ e⊕ e′ →֒→ n′′ if n′′ = n⊕ n′
This follows from IHVT and IHV1 and IHV2.
e⊗ e′ As above, this follows from IH and Rule (J·KLULP -cmp) and Rule ELU-comp.
〈e, e′〉 As above, this follows from IH and Rule (J·KLULP -Pair).
e.1 As above, this follows from IH and Rule (J·KLULP -P1) and Rule ELU-p1.
e.2 Analogous to the case above.
!e As above, this follows from IH and Rule (J·KLULP-Deref) and Rule ELU-dereference but with the
hypothesis that e evaluates to a v related to a 〈n,v〉.
♠
20.5 Proof of Theorem 10 (〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU is correct)
Proof. HP1 Ω0
(
A
[JCKLULP]) α==⇒ Ω
HPF Ω
ǫ
=⇒ Ω′
HPN I = names(A)
HPT α ≡ α′ · α?
HPL ℓi; ℓglob /∈ β
THE ∃A ∈ 〈〈I, α〉〉L
P
LU
TH1 Ω0 (A [C])
α
==⇒ Ω
THA α≈β α
THS Ω≈βΩ
THC Ω.H.ℓi = ||α||+ 1
The proof proceeds by induction on α′.
Base case: We perform a case analysis on α?
call f v H?
Given
HP1 Ω0
(
A
[JCKLULP]) call f v H?=========⇒ Ω
We need to show that
THE ∃A ∈ 〈〈I, α〉〉L
P
LU
TH1 Ω0 (A [C])
α
==⇒ Ω
THA call f v H?≈β call f v H?
THS Ω≈βΩ
THC Ω.H.ℓi = ||α||+ 1
By Rule (〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -call) the back-translated context executes this code inside main:
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if !ℓi == n then
incrementCounter()
let x1 = new v1 in register(〈x1, n1〉)
· · ·
let xj = new vj in register(〈xj, nj〉)
call f v
else skip
As Hpre is ∅, no updates are added.
Given that ℓi is initialised to 1 in Rule (〈〈·〉〉
LP
LU -skel), this code is executed and it generates action
call f v H? where H=ℓ1 7→ v1; · · · ; ℓn 7→ vn for all ni ∈ dom(H) such that ℓi≈β 〈ni,_〉 and:
HPHR H≈βH
By HPHR, Lemma 12 (Backtranslated values are related) and Lemma 2 (Compiled code steps imply existence of source steps)
with HPF we get THA, THE and TH1.
By Rule Related states – Secure, THS holds too.
Execution of incrementCounter() satisfies THC.
ret H? This cannot happen as by Rule ELP-retback there needs to be a running process with a non-
empty stack and by Rule LP-Initial State the stack of initial states is empty and the only way to
add to the stack is performing a call via Rule ELP-call, which would be a different label.
Inductive case:
We know that (eliding conditions HP that are trivially satisfied):
IHP1 Ω0
(
A
[JCKLULP]) α==⇒ Ω′ α!==⇒ Ω′′ α?==⇒ Ω
And we need to prove:
ITH1 Ω0
(
〈〈I, α〉〉L
P
LU [C]
)
α
==⇒ Ω′
α!
==⇒ Ω′′
α?
==⇒ Ω
ITHA αα!α?≈β αα!α?
ITHS Ω≈βΩ
And the inductive HP is (for ∅ ⊆ β′):
IH-HP1 Ω0
(
A
[JCKLULP]) α==⇒ Ω′
IH-TH1 Ω0
(
〈〈I, α〉〉
LP
LU [C]
)
α
==⇒ Ω′
IH-THA α≈β′ α
IH-THS Ω′≈β′ Ω′
By IHP1 and HPF we can apply Lemma 2 (Compiled code steps imply existence of source steps) and
so we can apply the IH to get IH-TH1, IH-THA and IH-THS.
We perform a case analysis on α!, and show that the back-translated code performs α!.
By IH we have that the existing code is generated by Rule (〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -listact-i):
〈〈
α, n,Hpre, ak, f
〉〉LP
LU
.
The next action α! produces code according to:
HPF
〈〈
α!, n,Hpre, ak, f
〉〉LP
LU
.
By Rule (〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -join), code of this action is the first if statement executed.
call f v H! By Rule (〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -callback-loc) this code is placed at function f so it is executed when
compiled code jumps there
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if !ℓi == n then
incrementCounter()
let l1 = e1 in register(〈l1, n1〉)
· · ·
let lj = ej in register(〈lj, nj〉)
else skip
By IH we have that ℓi 7→ n, so we get
IHL ℓi 7→ n+ 1
By Definition 19 (Reachable) we have for i ∈ 1..j that a reachable location ni ∈ dom(H) has a
related counterpart in ℓi ∈ dom(H) such that H ⊲ ei →֒→ ℓi.
By Lemma 11 (Lτ attacker always has access to all capabilities) we know all capabilities to access
any ni are in ak.
We use ak to get the right increment of the reach.
ret H! In this case from IHF we know that f = f′f′.
This code is placed at f′, so we identify the last called function and the code is placed there.
Source code returns to f′ so this code is executed Rule (〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -ret-loc)
if !ℓi == n then
incrementCounter()
let l1 = e1 in register(〈l1, n1〉)
· · ·
let lj = ej in register(〈lj, nj〉)
else skip
This case now follows the same reasoning as the one above.
So we get (for β′ ⊆ β′′):
HP-AC! α!≈β′′ α!
By IH-THS and Rule Related states – Whole and HP-AC! we get HP-OM2:
HP-OM2: Ω′′≈β′′ Ω′′
The next action α? produces code according to:
IHF1
〈〈
α?, n+ 1,H′pre, ak
′, f′
〉〉LP
LU
.
We perform a case analysis on α? and show that the back-translated code performs α?:
ret H? By Rule (〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -retback), after n actions, we have from IHF1 that f
′ = f′f′′ and inside function
f′ there is this code:
if !ℓi == n then
let x1 = new v1 in register(〈x1, n1〉)
· · ·
let xj = new vj in register(〈xj, nj〉)
update(m1, u1)
· · ·
update(ml, ul)
else skip
By IHL, ℓi 7→ n+ 1, so the if gets executed.
By definition, forall n ∈ dom(H) we have that n ∈ Hn or n ∈ Hc (from the case definition).
By Lemma 11 (Lτ attacker always has access to all capabilities) we know all capabilities to access
any n are in ak.
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We induce on the size of H; the base case is trivial and the inductive case follows from IH and
the following:
Hn: and n is newly allocated.
In this case when we execute
C;H′ ⊲ let x1 = new v1 in register(〈x1, n1〉)
ǫ
−−→ C;H′; ℓ′′ 7→ 〈〈v1〉〉
LP
LU ⊲ register(〈ℓ
′′, n1〉)
and we create β′′ by adding ℓ′′,n, η′ to β′.
By Lemma 3 (register(ℓ, n) does not add duplicates for n) we have that:
C;H′; ℓ′′ 7→ 〈〈v1〉〉
LP
LU ⊲ register(〈ℓ
′′, n1〉)
ǫ
−−→ C;H′; ℓ′′ 7→ 〈〈v1〉〉
LP
LU ⊲ skip
and we can lookup ℓ′′ via n.
Hc: and n is already allocated.
In this case
C;H′ ⊲ update(m1, u1)
ǫ
−−→ C;H′′ ⊲ skip
By Lemma 4 (update(n, v) never gets stuck) we know that H′′ = H′[ℓ′′ 7→ _ / ℓ′′ 7→ u1]
and ℓ′′ such that (ℓ′′,m1, η′′) ∈ β′.
By Lemma 12 (Backtranslated values are related) on the values stored on the heap, let the heap
after these reduction steps be H, we can conclude
HPRH H≈β′′ H.
As no other if inside f is executed, eventually we hit its return statement, which by Rule (〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -join)
and Rule (〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -fun) is incrementCounter(); return;.
Execution of incrementCounter() satisfies THC.
So we have Ω′′
ret H?
=====⇒ Ω (by Lemma 12) and with HPRH.
call f v H? Similar to the base case, only with update bits, which follow the same reasoning above.
So we get (for β′′ ⊆ β):
HP-AC? α?≈β α?
By IH-THA and HP-AC! and HP-AC? we get ITHA.
Now by Rule Related states – Whole again and HP-AC? we get ITHS and ITH1, so the theorem holds.
♠
Lemma 11 (Lτ attacker always has access to all capabilities).
∀
if
〈〈
α, n,H, ak, f
〉〉LP
LU
=
{
s, ak′,H′, f′, f
}
k.n 7→ v : k ∈ H
then n ∈ reach(ak′.loc, ak′.cap,H)
Proof. Trivial case analyisis on Rules (〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -ret-loc) to (〈〈·〉〉
LP
LU -callback-loc).
♠
Lemma 12 (Backtranslated values are related).
∀v, β.
〈〈v〉〉
LP
LU ≈β v
Proof. Trivial analysis of Section 12.2.1.
♠
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20.6 Proof of Theorem 11 (Typability Implies Robust Safety in Lτ)
Proof. HP1 ⊢ C : UN
HP2 C⌢M
TH M ⊢ C : rs
We expand TH: ∀A, α.M ⊢ A : attacker and ⊢ A [C] : whole if HPR Ω0 (A [C])
α
==⇒ _ then THM M ⊢ α
By definition of relevant(α) and by Rule Lτ -valid trace we get a H to induce on.
The base case holds by Rule Lτ -Monitor Step Trace Base.
In the inductive case we are considering H · H and the IH covers the first part of the trace.
By Lemma 13 (Lτ -α reductions respect heap typing), given that the state generating the action is C,H ⊲ Π
we know that, HPH ⊢ mon-care(H,∆) : ∆
By Rule Lτ -valid trace and by Rule Lτ -Monitor Step we need to show that ⊢ H : ∆.
This follows by HPH.
We thus need to prove that the initial steps are related heaps are secure.
By Rule Lτ -Plug we need to show that the heaps consituting the initial heap – both H and H0 – are well
typed.
The latter, ⊢ H0 : ∆, holds by Rule Lτ -Plug.
The former holds by definition of the attacker: Rules TULτ -base and TULτ -loc.
♠
20.6.1 Proof of Lemma 5 (Semantics and typed attackers coincide)
Proof. This is proven by trivial induction on the syntax of A.
By the rules of Section 13.1.3, points 1 and 3 follow, point 2 follows from the HP Rule Lτ -Plug.
♠
Lemma 13 (Lτ -α reductions respect heap typing).
if C ≡ ∆; · · ·
⊢ mon-care(H,∆) : ∆
C,H ⊲ Πρ
α
==⇒ C′,H′ ⊲Π′ρ′
then ⊢ mon-care(H′,∆) : ∆
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on α.
Base case This trivially holds by HP.
Inductive case This holds by IH plus a case analysis on the last action:
call f v? This holds by Lemma 18 (Lτ -? actions respect heap typing).
call f v! This holds by Lemma 19 (Lτ -! actions respect heap typing)
ret ! This holds by Lemma 19 (Lτ -! actions respect heap typing)
ret ? This holds by Lemma 18 (Lτ -? actions respect heap typing)
♠
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Lemma 14 (Lτ An attacker only reaches UN locations).
∀
if ℓ 7→ v : UN ∈ H
then ∄e
H ⊲ e →֒→ ℓ′
ℓ′ 7→ v : τ ∈ H
τ 6= UN
Proof. This proof proceeds by contradiction.
Suppose e exists, there are two cases for ℓ′
• ℓ′ was allocated by the attacker:
This contradicts the judgements of Section 13.1.3.
• ℓ′ was allocated by the compiled code:
The only way this was possible was an assignment of ℓ′ to ℓ, but Rule TLτ -assign prevents it.
♠
Lemma 15 (Lτ attacker reduction respects heap typing).
if C ≡ ∆; · · ·
C ⊢att Π −→ Π
′
C,H ⊲ Πρ
λ
−−→ C,H′ ⊲ Πρ′
then mon-care(H,∆) = mon-care(H′,∆)
Proof. Trivial induction on the derivation ofΠ, which is typed with ⊢UN and by Lemma 14 (Lτ An attacker only reaches UN locations)
has no access to locations in ∆ or with a type τ ⊢ ◦.
♠
Lemma 16 (Lτ typed reduction respects heap typing).
if C ≡ ∆; · · ·
C, Γ ⊢ s
C, Γ ⊢ s′
⊢ mon-care(H,∆) : ∆
C,H ⊲ sρ
λ
−−→ C′,H′ ⊲ s′ρ′
then ⊢ mon-care(H′,∆) : ∆
Proof. This is done by induction on the derivation of the reducing statement.
There, the only non-trivial cases are:
Rule TLτ -new By IH we have that
H ⊲ eρ →֒→ v
So
C;H ⊲ let x = newτ e in s
ǫ
−−→ C;Hℓ 7→ v : τ ⊲ s[ℓ / x]
By IH we need to prove that ⊢ mon-care(ℓ 7→ v : τ ,∆) : ∆
As ℓ /∈ dom(∆), by Rule Lτ -Heap-ok-i this case holds.
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Rule TLτ -assign By IH we have (HPH) H ⊲ e →֒→ v
such that ℓ : Ref τ and v : τ .
So
C;H ⊲ x := eρ
ǫ
−−→ C;H′ ⊲ skip
where [x / ℓ] ∈ ρ and
H = H1; ℓ 7→ v
′ : τ ;H2
H′ = H1; ℓ 7→ v : τ ;H2
There are two cases
ℓ ∈ dom(∆) By Rule Lτ -Heap-ok-i we need to prove that ℓ : Ref τ ∈ ∆.
This holds by HPH and Rule Lτ -Initial State, as the initial state ensures that location ℓ in the
heap has the same type as in ∆ .
ℓ /∈ dom(∆) This case is trivial as for allocation.
Rule TLτ -coercion We have that C, Γ ⊢ e : τ and HPT τ ⊢ ◦.
By IH H ⊲ e →֒→ v such that ⊢ mon-care(H′,∆) : ∆.
By HPT we get that mon-care(H) = mon-care(H′) as by Rule Lτ -Secure heap function mon-care( · )
only considers locations whose type is τ 0 ◦, so none affected by e.
So this case by IH.
Rule TLτ -endorse By Rule ELτ -endorse we have that H ⊲ e →֒→ v and that C,H ⊲ endorse x = e as ϕ in s →֒→ C,H ⊲ s[v / x].
So this holds by IH.
♠
Lemma 17 (Lτ any non-cross reduction respects heap typing).
if C ≡ ∆; · · ·
⊢ mon-care(H,∆) : ∆
C,H ⊲ Πρ
λ
−−→ C′,H′ ⊲ Π′ρ′
then ⊢ mon-care(H′,∆) : ∆
Proof. By induction on the reductions and by application of Rule ELτ -par. The base case follows by the
assumptions directly. In the inductive case we have the following:
C,H ⊲ Πρ
λ
−−→ C′′,H′′ ⊲ Π′′ρ′′
λ
−−→ C′,H′ ⊲ Π′ρ′
This has 2 sub-cases, if the reduction is in an attacker function or not.
C ⊢att Π
′′ −→ Π: this follows by induction on Π′′ and from IH and Lemma 15 (Lτ attacker reduction respects heap typing).
C 6⊢att Π
′′ −→ Π: In this case we induce on Π′′.
The base case is trivial.
The inductive case is (s)f ‖ Π, which follows from IH and Lemma 16 (L
τ typed reduction respects heap typing).
♠
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Lemma 18 (Lτ -? actions respect heap typing).
if C ≡ ∆; · · ·
C,H ⊲ Πρ
α?
==⇒ C,H′ ⊲ v′
then mon-care(H,∆) = mon-care(H′,∆)
Proof. By Lemma 17 (Lτ any non-cross reduction respects heap typing), and a simple case analysis on α?
(which does not modify the heap).
♠
Lemma 19 (Lτ -! actions respect heap typing).
if C ≡ ∆; · · ·
C,H ⊲ Πρ
α!
==⇒ C′,H′ ⊲ v′
⊢ mon-care(H,∆) : ∆
then ⊢ mon-care(H′,∆) : ∆
Proof. By Lemma 17 (Lτ any non-cross reduction respects heap typing) and a simple case analyis on α!
(which does not modify the heap).
♠
20.7 Proof of Theorem 12 (Compiler J·KLτLpi is CC )
Proof. By definition initial states have related components, related heaps and well-typed, related starting
processes, for β0 = (dom(∆), dom(H0),H0.η) so we have:
HRS Ω0 (C)≈β0 Ω0
(JCKLτLpi).
As the languages have no notion of internal nondeterminism we can apply Lemma 21 (Generalised compiler correctness for J·KLτLpi)
with HRS to conclude.
♠
Lemma 20 (Expressions compiled with J·KLτLpi are related).
∀
if H≈βH
H ⊲ eρ →֒→ v
then H ⊲ JeKLτLpi JρKLτLpi →֒→ JvKLτLpi
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 8 (Expressions compiled with J·KLULP are related) as the
compilers perform the same steps and expression reductions are atomic.
♠
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Lemma 21 (Generalised compiler correctness for J·KLτLpi).
∀...∃β′
if C; Γ ⊢ Π,
⊢ C : whole
C = ∆;F; IJCKLτLpi = H0;F; I = C
C,H ⊲Π≈βC,H ⊲ JC; Γ ⊢ ΠKLτLpi
C,H ⊲Πρ =⇒ C,H′ ⊲ Π′ρ′
then C,H ⊲ JC; Γ ⊢ ΠKLτLpiJρKLτLpi =⇒ C,H′ ⊲ JC; Γ ⊢ Π′KLτLpiJρ′KLτLpi
C,H ⊲Π′ρ′≈β′ C,H ⊲ JC; Γ ⊢ Π′KLτLpiJρ′KLτLpi
β ⊆ β′
Proof. This proof proceeds by induction on the typing of Π and then of π.
Base Case skip Trivial by Rule (J·KLτLpi -Skip).
Inductive Case
In this case we proceed by induction on the typing of s
Inductive Cases Rule TLτ -new There are 2 cases, they are analogous.
τ = UN By HP
Γ ⊢ e : τ
H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ let x = newτ e in sρ
ǫ
−−→ C,H; ℓ 7→ v : τ ⊲ s[ℓ / x]ρ
By Lemma 20 we have:
IHR1 H ⊲ JΓ ⊢ e : τKLτLpiJρKLτLpi →֒→ JΓ ⊢ v : τKLτLpi
By Rule (J·KLτLpi -New) we get
let xo = new JΓ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi
in let x = 〈xo,0〉
in JC, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ sKLτLpi
So:
C,H ⊲ let xo = new JΓ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi
in let x = 〈xo,0〉
in JC, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ sKLτLpi
ǫ
−−→ C,H;n 7→ JΓ ⊢ v : τKLτLpi : ⊥ ⊲ let x = 〈n,0〉
in JC, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ sKLτLpi
ǫ
−−→ C,H;n 7→ JΓ ⊢ v : τKLτLpi : ⊥ ⊲ JC, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ sKLτLpi [〈n,0〉 / x]
For β′ = β ∪ (ℓ,n,⊥), this case holds.
else The other case holds follows the same reasoning but
for β′ = β ∪ (ℓ,n,k) and for H′=H;n 7→ JC, Γ ⊢ v : τKLτLpi : k;k.
Rule TLτ -sequence By HP
Γ ⊢ s; Γ ⊢ s′
C,H ⊲ sρ =⇒ C′,H′ ⊲ s′′ρ′′
There are two cases
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s′′=skip Rule ELU-sequence
C′,H′ ⊲ skipρ′′; s′ρ
ǫ
−−→ C′,H′ ⊲ s′ρ
By IH
C,H ⊲ JΓ ⊢ sKLτLpiJρKLτLpi =⇒ C′,H′ ⊲ JΓ ⊢ skipKLτLpi Jρ′′KLτLpi
By Rule (J·KLτLpi -Seq)JC, Γ ⊢ sKLτLpi ; JC, Γ ⊢ s′KLτLpi
So
C,H ⊲ JC, Γ ⊢ sKLτLpiJρKLτLpi ; JC, Γ ⊢ s′KLτLpiJρKLτLpi
=⇒ C′,H′ ⊲ JΓ ⊢ skipKLτLpiJρ′′KLτLpi ; JC, Γ ⊢ s′KLτLpiJρKLτLpi
ǫ
−−→ C′,H′ ⊲ JC, Γ ⊢ s′KLτLpiJρKLτLpi
At this stage we apply IH and the case holds.
else By Rule ELU-step we have
C,H ⊲ s; s′ =⇒ C′,H′ ⊲ s′′; s′
This case follows by IH and HPs.
Rule TLτ -function-call Analogous to the cases above.
Rule TLτ -letin Analogous to the cases above.
Rule TLτ -assign Analogous to the cases above.
Rule TLτ -if Analogous to the cases above.
Rule TLτ -fork Analogous to the cases above.
Rule TLτ -coercion By Rule (J·KLτLpi -Coerce), this follows from IH directly.
Rule TLτ -endorse This has a number of trivial cases based on Rule (J·KLτLpi -Endorse) that are
analogous to the ones above.
♠
20.8 Proof of Theorem 13 (Compiler J·KLτLpi is RSC )
Proof. Given:
HP1: M ⊢ C : rs
HPM: M≈βM
We need to prove:
TP1: M ⊢ JCKST : rs
We unfold the definitions of rs and obtain:
∀A.M ⊢ A : attacker,⊢ A [C] : whole
HPE1: if Ω0 (A [C])
α
==⇒ _ then M ⊢ relevant(α)
∀A.M ⊢ A : attacker,⊢ A
[JCKLτLpi] : whole
THE1: if HPRT Ω0
(
A
[JCKLτLpi]) α==⇒ _ then THE1 M ⊢ relevant(α)
By definition of the compiler we have that
HPISR: Ω0 (A [C])∼∼β Ω0
(
A
[JCKLτLpi])
for β = dom(∆),H0 such that M = ({σ} , , σ0,∆, σc) and M = ({σ} , , σ0,H0, σc)
By relevant(α) and Rule Lπ-valid trace we get a H to induce on.
Base case: this holds by Rule Lπ-Monitor Step Trace Base.
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Inductive case: By Rule Lπ-Monitor Step Trace,M;H M′′ holds by IH, we need to proveM′′;H M′.
By Rule Lπ-Monitor Step e need to prove that THMR: ∃σ′.(σ, mon-care(H,H0), σ′) ∈ .
By HPISR and with applications of Lemmas 23 and 24 we know that states are always related with
∼∼β during reduction.
So by Lemma 25 (∼∼ϕ implies relatedness of the high heaps) we know that HPHH mon-care(H,∆)≈β mon-care(H,H0),
for H, H being the last heaps in the reduction.
By HPM and Rule Monitor relation we have β0,∆ ⊢M.
By this and Rule Ok Mon we have that HPHR ∀mon-care(H,∆)≈β mon-care(H,H0). if ⊢ H : ∆
then ∃σ′.(σ, mon-care(H,H0), σ′) ∈ so by HPHH we can instantiate this with H and H.
By Theorem 11 (Typability Implies Robust Safety in Lτ ) applied to HPE1, as J·KLτLpi operates on well-
typed components, we know that HPMR: M ⊢ relevant(α) for all α.
So by Rule Lτ -Monitor Step with HPMT we get HPHD ⊢ H : ∆ for the H above.
By HPHD with HPHR we get THMR ∃σ′.(σ, mon-care(H,H0), σ′) ∈ , so this case holds.
♠
Lemma 22 (∼∼β implies relatedness of the high heaps).
if Ω = ∆;F,F′; I;H ⊲ Π
Ω = H0;F,
q
F′
yLτ
Lpi
; I;H ⊲Π
Ω∼∼βΩ
then mon-care(H,∆)≈β mon-care(H,H0)
Proof. By point 2a in Rule Related states – Secure.
♠
Lemma 23 (Lτ -compiled actions preserve ∼∼β).
∀...
if C,H ⊲ Πρ
λ
−−→ C,H′ ⊲ Π′ρ′
C,H ⊲ JC; Γ ⊢ ΠKLτLpiJρKLτLpi λ==⇒ C,H′ ⊲ JC; Γ ⊢ Π′KLτLpiJρ′KLτLpi
C,H ⊲ Πρ∼∼β C,H ⊲ JC; Γ ⊢ ΠKLτLpiρ
C; Γ ⊢ Π
then C,H′ ⊲ Π′ρ′∼∼βC,H
′ ⊲ JC; Γ ⊢ Π′KLτLpi Jρ′KLτLpi
Proof. Trivial induction on the derivation ofΠ, analogous to Lemma 21 (Generalised compiler correctness for J·KLτLpi).
Rule TLτ -new There are 2 cases, they are analogous.
τ = UN By HP
Γ ⊢ e : τ
H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ let x = newτ e in sρ
ǫ
−−→ C,H; ℓ 7→ v : τ ⊲ s[ℓ / x]ρ
91
By Lemma 20 (Expressions compiled with J·KLτLpi are related) we have:
IHR1 H ⊲ JΓ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi JρKLτLpi →֒→ JΓ ⊢ v : τKLτLpi
By Rule (J·KLτLpi -New) we get
let xo = new JΓ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi
in let x = 〈xo,0〉
in JC, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ sKLτLpi
So:
C,H ⊲ let xo = new JΓ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi
in let x = 〈xo,0〉
in JC, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ sKLτLpi
ǫ
−−→ C,H;n 7→ JΓ ⊢ v : τKLτLpi : ⊥ ⊲ let x = 〈n,0〉
in JC, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ sKLτLpi
ǫ
−−→ C,H;n 7→ JΓ ⊢ v : τKLτLpi : ⊥ ⊲ JC, Γ; x : Ref τ ⊢ sKLτLpi [〈n,0〉 / x]
For β′ = β, this case holds.
else The other case holds follows the same reasoning but
for β′ = β ∪ (ℓ,n,k) and for H′=H;n 7→ JC, Γ ⊢ v : τKLτLpi : k;k.
We need to show that this preserves Rule Related states – Secure, specifically it preserves point
(2a): ℓ≈β 〈n,k〉 and ℓ 7→ v : τ ∈ H and v≈β v
These follow all from the observation above and by Lemma 20 (Expressions compiled with J·KLτLpi are related).
♠
Lemma 24 (LP Attacker actions preserve ∼∼).
∀...
if C,H ⊲ Πρ
λ
−−→ C,H′ ⊲ Π′ρ′
C,H ⊲Πρ
λ
−−→ C,H′ ⊲Π′ρ′
C,H ⊲ Πρ∼∼β C,H ⊲Πρ
C ⊢att Πρ
λ
−−→ Π′ρ′
C ⊢att Πρ
λ
−−→ Π′ρ′
then C,H′ ⊲ Π′ρ′∼∼β C,H
′ ⊲Π′ρ′
Proof. For the source reductions we can use Lemma 17 (Lτ any non-cross reduction respects heap typing)
to know that mon-care(H) = mon-care(H′), so they don’t change the interested bits of the ∼∼β .
Suppose this does not hold by contradiction, there can be three clauses that do not hold based on
Rule Related states – Secure:
• violation of (1): ∃π ∈ Π.C ⊢ π : attacker and k ∈ fv(π).
By HP5 this is a contradiction.
• violation of (2a): n 7→ v : k ∈ H and ℓ≈β 〈n,k〉 and ℓ 7→ v : τ ∈ H and ¬(v≈β v)
To change this value the attacker needs k which contradicts points (1) and (2b).
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• violation of (2b): either of these:
– H,H 0 low-loc(n′)
Since Rule Lπ-High Location does not hold, by Lemma 6 this is a contradiction.
– v = k′ for H,H ⊢ high-cap(k′)
This can follow from another two cases
∗ forgery of k;: an ispection of the semantics rules contradicts this
∗ update of a location to k′: however k′ is not in the code (contradicts point (1)) and by
induction on the heap H we have that k′ is stored in no other location, so this is also a
contradiction.
♠
20.9 Proofs for the Non-Atomic Variant of Lτ (Section 16.2)
The only proof that needs changing is that for Lemma 23: there is this new case.
For this we weaken ∼∼β and define ∼β as follows:
Ω∼βΩ
(Non Atomic State Relation)
Ω∼∼β Ω
Ω∼βΩ
(Non Atomic State Relation -stuck)
Ω = C,H ⊲ Π C = ∆,F, I Ω = C,H ⊲Π
∃π ∈ Π.C 0 π : attacker
π = (hide n; s)f ;f C,H ⊲ π
× ∃f ∈ dom(F). f ≈β f
∀ℓ. ℓ ∈ dom( ⊢ secure(H)) n 7→ v;k ∈ H ℓ 6∼β 〈n,k〉 ℓ∼β 〈n,0〉
Ω∼β Ω
Two states are now related if:
• either they are related by ∼∼β
• or the red process is stuck on a hide n where n 7→ v;k but ℓ ∼ 〈n,k〉 does not hold for a ℓ that is
secure, and we have that ℓ ∼ 〈n,0〉 (as this was after the new). And the hide on which the process
is stuck is not in attacker code.
Having this in proofs would not cause problems because now all proofs have an initial case analysis whether
the state is stuck or not, but because it steps it’s not stuck.
This relation only changes the second case of the proof of Lemma 23 for Rule (J·KLτLpi -New-nonat) as
follows:
Proof. new· · is implemented as defined in Rule (J·KLτLpi -New-nonat).
τ 6= UN By HP
Γ ⊢ e : τ
H ⊲ e →֒→ v
C,H ⊲ let x = newτ e in sρ
ǫ
−−→ C,H; ℓ 7→ v : τ ⊲ s[ℓ / x]ρ
By Lemma 20 we have:
IHR1 H ⊲ JΓ ⊢ e : τKLτLpiJρKLτLpi →֒→ JΓ ⊢ v : τKLτLpi
By Rule (J·KLτLpi -New-nonat) we get
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let x = new 0 in
let xk = hide x in
let xc = J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi in
x := xc with xk;JC,∆, Γ ⊢ sKLτLpi
So:
C,H ⊲ let x = new 0 in
let xk = hide x in
let xc = J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi in
x := xc with xk;JC,∆, Γ ⊢ sKLτLpi
ǫ
−−→ C,H,n 7→ 0 : ⊥ ⊲ let xk = hide n in
let xc = J∆, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi in
x := xc with xk;JC,∆, Γ ⊢ sKLτLpi
And β′ = β ∪ (ℓ,n,0).
Now there are two cases:
• A concurrent attacker reduction performs hide n, so the state changes.
C,H,n 7→ 0 : k;k ⊲ let xk = hide n in
let xc = JC, Γ ⊢ e : τKLτLpi in
x := xc with xk;JC,∆, Γ ⊢ sKLτLpi
At this stage the state is stuck: Rule ELP-hide does not apply.
Also, we have that this holds by the new β′: (ℓ∼β′ 〈n,0〉)
And so this does not hold: (ℓ∼β′ 〈n,k〉)
As the stuck statement is not in attacker code, we can use Rule Non Atomic State Relation -stuck
to conclude.
• The attacker does not. In this case the proof continues as in Lemma 23.
♠
20.10 Proof of Theorem 14 (Compiler J·KLτLI is CC )
Proof. Analogous to that of Section 20.7.
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20.11 Proof of Theorem 15 (Compiler J·KLτLI is RSC )
Proof. Given:
HP1: M ⊢ C : rs
HPM: M≈ϕM
We need to prove:
TP1: M ⊢ JCKLτLI : rs
We unfold the definitions of rs and obtain:
∀A.M ⊢ A : attacker,⊢ A [C] : whole
HPE1: if Ω0 (A [C])
α
==⇒ _ then M ⊢ relevant(α)
∀A.M ⊢ A : attacker ,⊢ A
[JCKLτLpi] : whole
THE1: if HPRT Ω0
(
A
[JCKLτLpi]) α==⇒ _ then THE1 M ⊢ relevant(α)
By definition of the compiler we have that
HPISR: Ω0 (A [C])∼∼ϕ Ω0
(
A
[JCKLτLpi])
for ϕ = dom(∆),H0 such that M = ({σ} , , σ0,∆, σc) and M = ({σ} , , σ0 ,H0 , σc)
By relevant(α) and Rule LI -valid trace we get a H to induce on.
Base case: this holds by Rule LI -Monitor Step Trace Base.
Inductive case: By Rule LI -Monitor Step Trace,M ;H  M ′′ holds by IH, we need to proveM ′′;H  M ′.
By Rule LI -Monitor Step e need to prove that THMR: ∃σ′.(σ, mon-care(H ,H0 ), σ′) ∈ .
By HPISR and with applications of Lemmas 26 and 27 we know that states are always related with
∼∼ϕ during reduction.
So by Lemma 25 (∼∼ϕ implies relatedness of the high heaps) we know that HPHH mon-care(H,∆)≈ϕ mon-care(H ,H0 ),
for H, H being the last heaps in the reduction.
By HPM and Rule Monitor relation (adjusted for LI ) we have ϕ0,∆ ⊢ M .
By this and Rule Ok Mon (adjusted for LI ) we have that
HPHR ∀mon-care(H,∆)≈ϕ mon-care(H ,H0 ). if ⊢ H : ∆ then
∃σ′.(σ, mon-care(H ,H0 ), σ′) ∈ so by HPHH we can instantiate this with H and H .
By Theorem 11 (Typability Implies Robust Safety in Lτ ) applied to HPE1, as J·KLτLpi operates on well-
typed components, we know that HPMR: M ⊢ relevant(α) for all α.
So by Rule Lτ -Monitor Step with HPMT we get HPHD ⊢ H : ∆ for the H above.
By HPHD with HPHR we get THMR ∃σ′.(σ, mon-care(H ,H0 ), σ′) ∈ , so this case holds.
♠
Lemma 25 (∼∼ϕ implies relatedness of the high heaps).
if Ω = ∆;F,F′; I;H ⊲ Π
Ω = H0 ;F ,
q
F′
yLτ
LI
; I ;E ;H ⊲Π
Ω∼∼ϕΩ
then mon-care(H,∆)≈ϕ mon-care(H ,H0 )
Proof. By Rule Related states – Secure.
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♠Lemma 26 (Lτ -compiled actions preserve ∼∼ϕ).
∀...
if C,H ⊲ Πρ
λ
−−→ C,H′ ⊲ Π′ρ′
C ,H ⊲ JC; Γ ⊢ ΠKLτLI JρKLτLI λ==⇒ C ,H ′ ⊲ JC; Γ ⊢ Π′KLτLI Jρ′KLτLI
C,H ⊲ Πρ∼∼ϕC ,H ⊲ JC; Γ ⊢ ΠKLτLI ρ
C; Γ ⊢ Π
then C,H′ ⊲ Π′ρ′∼∼ϕ C ,H
′ ⊲ JC; Γ ⊢ Π′KLτLI Jρ′KLτLI
Proof. Trivial induction on the derivation ofΠ, analogous to Lemma 21 (Generalised compiler correctness for J·KLτLpi)
and Lemma 23 (Lτ -compiled actions preserve ∼∼β).
♠
Lemma 27 (LP Attacker actions preserve ∼∼).
∀...
if C,H ⊲ Πρ
λ
−−→ C,H′ ⊲ Π′ρ′
C ,H ⊲Π ρ
λ
−−→ C ,H ′ ⊲Π ′ρ′
C,H ⊲ Πρ∼∼ϕC ,H ⊲Π ρ
C ⊢att Πρ
λ
−−→ Π′ρ′
C ⊢att Π ρ
λ
−−→ Π ′ρ′
then C,H′ ⊲ Π′ρ′∼∼ϕC ,H
′ ⊲Π ′ρ′
Proof. For the source reductions we can use Lemma 17 (Lτ any non-cross reduction respects heap typing)
to know that mon-care(H) = mon-care(H′), so they don’t change the interested bits of the ∼∼ϕ.
Suppose this does not hold by contradiction, there can be one clause that does not hold based on
Rule Related states – Secure:
• two related high-locations ℓ and n point to unrelated values.
Two cases arise: creation and update of a location to an unrelated value.
Both cases are impossible because Rule ELI -assign-iso and Rule ELI -isolate check C ⊢ f : prog and
Rule LI -Whole ensures that the attacker defines different names from the program, so the attacker can
never execute them.
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21 A Fully Abstract Compiler from LU to LP
We perform the aforementioned changes to languages.
21.1 The Source Language LU
In LU we need to add a functionality to get the size of a heap, as that is an observable that exists in the
target. In fact, in the target if one allocates something, that reveals how much it’s been allocated entirely.
Components C ::= F; I;E
Exports E ::= f
Expressions e ::= · · · | size
(LU-Size)
||H|| = n
H ⊲ size →֒ n
Helpers
(LU-Jump-Internal)
((f′ ∈ I ∧ f ∈ I)∨
(f′ ∈ E ∧ f ∈ E))
I,E ⊢ f, f′ : internal
(LU-Jump-IN)
f ∈ I ∧ f′ /∈ E
I,E ⊢ f, f′ : in
(LU-Jump-OUT)
f ∈ E ∧ f′ ∈ I
I,E ⊢ f, f′ : out
(LU-Plug)
A ≡ H;F [·] C ≡ F′; I;E ⊢ C,F : whole main ∈ names(F)
∀f ∈ E, f /∈ fn(F) ∀f ∈ fn(F′), f ∈ I ∨ f ∈ F′
A [C] = H;F;F′; I;E
(LU-Whole)
C ≡ F′; I;E
names(F) ∩ names(F′) = ∅
names(I) ⊆ names(F) ∪ names(F′)
fv(F) ∪ fv(F′) = ∅
⊢ C,F : whole
(LU-Initial State)
P ≡ H;F; I;E
C ≡ F; I;E
Ω0 (P) = C;H ⊲ call main 0
The semantics is unchanged, it only relies on the new helper functions above.
21.2 The Target Language LP
21.2.1 Syntax Changes
Components C ::= F; I;E;kroot,kcom
Exports E ::= f
Expressions e ::= · · · | isloc(e) | ispair(e) | eqcap(e, e)
Trace states Θ ::= (C;H;n ⊲ (t)f )
Trace bodies t ::= s | unk
Trace labels δ ::= ǫ | β
Trace actions β ::= call f v H? | call f v H! | ret H! | ret H? | ↓ | ↑ | write(v,n)
Traces β ::= ∅ | β · β
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We assume programs are given two capabilities they own: kroot and kcom and that the attacker does not
have. The former is used to create a part of the heap for component-managed datastructures. The latter
does not even hide a location, we need it as a placeholder.
Traces in this case have the same syntactic structure as before, but they do not carry the whole heap.
So we use a different symbol (β), to visually distinguish between the two traces and the kind of information
carried by them.
We need a write label write(v,n) that tells that masked location n has been updated to value v. This
captures the usage of compiler-inserted functions to read and write masked locations (concepts that will be
clear once the compiler is defined). The read label is not needed because its effect are captured anyway by
call/return.
Trace states are either operational semantics states or an unknown state, mimicking the execution in a
context. The former has an addtional element n, the list of locations shared with the context. The latter
carries the information about the component and the heap comprising the one private to the component and
the one shared with the context. It also carries the stack of function calls, where we add symbol unk to
indicate when the called function was in the context.
Helper functions are as above.
21.2.2 Semantics Changes
In LP we need functionality to tell if a pair is a location or not and to traverse values in order to extract
such locations.
(LP-isloc)
(H ⊲ e →֒ 〈n,v〉 n 7→ _; η ∈ H η = v or η = ⊥) ⇒ b = true
otherwise b = false
H ⊲ isloc(e) →֒ b
(LP-ispair)
H ⊲ e →֒ 〈v,v〉 ⇒ b = true
otherwise b = false
H ⊲ ispair(e) →֒ b
These are used to traverse the value stored at a location and extract all sublocations stored in there. There
may be pairs containing pairs etc, and thus when we need to know if something is a pair before projecting
out. Also, we need to know if a pair is a location or not, in order to know whether or not we can dereference
it.
Additionally, we need a functionality to tell if two capabilities are the same. Now, this could be prob-
lematic because it could reveal capability allocation order and thus introduce observations that we do not
want. However, the compiler will ensure that the context only receives kcom as a capability and never a
newly-allocated capability. So the context will not be able to test equality of capabilities generated by the
compiled component as it will effectively see only one.
(LP-eqcap-true)
H ⊲ e →֒ k H ⊲ e′ →֒ k
H ⊲ eqcap(e, e′) →֒ true
(LP-eqcap-false)
H ⊲ e →֒ k H ⊲ e′ →֒ k′ k 6= k′
H ⊲ eqcap(e, e′) →֒ false
21.2.3 A Fully Abstract Trace Semantics for LP
Θ
β
−−→ Θ′ State Θ emits visible action β becoming Θ′.
Θ
β
==⇒ Θ′ State Θ emits trace β becoming Θ′.
Helper functions
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(Reachable)
n ∈ reach(nst,kst,H) nst 7→ _ : _ ∈ H′
kst ∈ kroot ∪H
′ n 7→ v : η ∈ H
H ⊢ reachable(n,H′)
(Valid value)
∀k ∈ H. k /∈ v
⊢ valid(v,H)
(Valid heap)
H = Hpriv ∪Hsha H
′ = Hpriv ∪H
′
sha ∪Hnew
H′′ = H′sha ∪Hnew dom(H) = n dom(H
′′) = n′
k ∈ Hsha ⇐⇒ k ∈ H
′
sha
∀k′ ∈ Hnew. k
′ /∈ Hpriv ∪Hsha
∀n 7→ v; η ∈ Hsha. n 7→ v
′′; η ∈ H′sha∧ ⊢ valid(v
′′,H)
∀n′ 7→ v′ : η′ ∈ Hnew. ⊢ valid(v
′,Hpriv ∪H
′
sha)∧
H′′ ⊢ reachable(v′,Hpriv ∪H
′
sha)
⊢ validHeap(H,H′,H′′,n,n′)
Θ
β
−−→ Θ′
(LP-Traces-Silent)
(C;H;n ⊲ (s)f )
ǫ
−−→ (C;H′;n ⊲ (s′)f ′)
(C;H;n ⊲ (s)f )
ǫ
−−→ (C;H′;n ⊲ (s′)f ′)
(LP-Traces-Call)
C = F; I;E f ∈ E f(x) 7→ s; return; ∈ F
f ′ = f · f H ⊢ valid(v)
⊢ validHeap(H,H′′,H′,n,n′)
(C;H;n ⊲ (unk)f )
call f v H′?
−−−−−−−−−−→→ (C;H′′;n′ ⊲ (s; return;)f ′)
(LP-Traces-Returnback)
f = f ′ · f
⊢ validHeap(H,H′′,H′,n,n′)
(C;H;n ⊲ (unk)f )
ret ?H′
−−−−−−→→ (C;H′′;n′ ⊲ (skip)f ′)
(LP-Traces-Callback)
s = call f e H ⊲ e →֒ v
C = F; I;E f ′ = f · f f ∈ I
n ⊆ n′ = {n | H ⊢ reachable(n,H)} H′ = H|n′
(C;H;n ⊲ (s)f )
call f v H′!
−−−−−−−−−→→ (C;H;n′ ⊲ (unk)f ′)
(LP-Traces-Return)
C = F; I;E f = f ′ · f f ∈ E
n ⊆ n′ = {n | H ⊢ reachable(n,H)} H′ = H|n′
(C;H;n ⊲ (return;)f )
ret !H′
−−−−−−→→ (C;H;n′ ⊲ (unk)f ′)
(LP-Traces-Terminate)
(C;H;n ⊲ (s)f ) 6
ǫ
−−→ _
(C;H;n ⊲ (s)f )
↓
−−→ (C;H;n ⊲ (s)f )
(LP-Traces-Diverge)
∀n. (C;H;n ⊲ (s)f )
ǫ
−−→n (C;H′;n′ ⊲ (s′)f ′)
(C;H;n ⊲ (s)f )
↑
−−→→ (C;H;n ⊲ (s)f )
(LP-Traces-Write)
C = F; I;E write ∈ E write(x) 7→ s; return; ∈ F
C;H ⊲ s[n / x]; return; −→ ∗C;H′ ⊲ return;
(C;H;n ⊲ (unk)f )
write(v,n)
−−−−−−−−→ (C;H′;n ⊲ (unk)f )
(LP-Traces-Read)
C = F; I;E read ∈ E read(x) 7→ s; return; ∈ F
C;H ⊲ s; return; −→ ∗C;H′ ⊲ return;
(C;H;n ⊲ (unk)f )
ǫ
−−→ (C;H′;n ⊲ (unk)f )
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Θ
β
==⇒⇒ Θ′
(ELP-single)
Ω =⇒ Ω′′ Ω′′
β
−−→ Ω′
Ω
β
==⇒ Ω′
(ELP-silent)
Ω
ǫ
−−→ Ω′
Ω =⇒ Ω′
(ELP-trans)
Ω
β
==⇒ Ω′′ Ω′′
β′
==⇒ Ω′
Ω
β·β′
===⇒ Ω′
(LP-Traces-Initial)
n ∈ n ⇐⇒ n 7→ v; η ∈ H main /∈ dom(F) C = F; I;E
Θ0 (C) = (C;H;n ⊲ (unk)main)
TR (C) =
{
β
∣∣∣∣ Θ0 (C) β==⇒⇒ _
}
21.2.4 Results about the Trace Semantics
The following results hold for C1 =
r
C1
zLU
LP
and C2 =
r
C2
zLU
LP
.
Property 1 (Heap locations). AS mentioned, the trace semantics carries the whole shared heap: locations
created by the compiled component and then passed to the context and locations created by the context and
passed to the compiled component. We can really partition the heap as follows then:
location \creator
r
C
zLU
LP
C
private (1) to
r
C
zLU
LP
(2) to C
shared (3) with C (4) with
r
C
zLU
LP
Now, for compiled components there never are locations of kind 3. That is because those locations are
masked and never passed, never made accessible to the context. So really, the trace semantics only collects
locations of kind 4 on the traces.
Lemma 28 (Correctness).
if C1≃ctx C2
then TR (C1) = TR (C2)
Proof Sketch. By contraposition:
if TR (C1) 6= TR (C2)
then ∃A. A [C1]
⇓ ∧A [C2]⇑(wlog)
We are thus given β1 = β · β1 and β2 = β · β2 and β1 6= β2.
We can construct a context A that replicates the behaviour of β and then performs the differentiation.
This is a tedious procedure that is analogous to existing results [42, 60] and analogous to the backtrans-
lation of Section 12.2.
The actions only share the heap that is reachable from both sides, the heap that is private to the
component is never touched, so reconstructing the heap is possible. The reachability conditions on the heap
also ensure this.
The differentiation is based on differences on the actions which are visible and reachable, so that is also
possible. ✷
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Lemma 29 (Completeness).
if TR (C1) = TR (C2)
then C1≃ctx C2
Proof Sketch. By contradiction let us assume that
∃A. A [C1] ⇓ ∧A [C2]⇑(wlog)
Contexts are deterministic, so they cannot behave differently based on the values of locations that are
never shared with C1 or C2.
The semantics forbids guessing, so a context will never have access to the locations that C1 or C2 do
not share.
Thus a context can exhibit a difference in behaviour by relying on something that C1 modified unlike
C2 and that can be:
• a parameter passed in a call.
This contradicts the hypothesis that the trace semantics is the same as that parameter is captured in
the call f v H! label.
• the value of a shared location.
This contradicts the hypothesis that the trace semantics is the same as all locations that are reachable
both by the context and by C1 and C2 are captured on the labels
Having reached a contradiction, this case holds. ✷
Lemma 30 (Full abstraction of the trace semantics for compiled components).
TR
(r
C1
zLU
LP
)
= TR
(r
C2
zLU
LP
)
⇐⇒
r
C1
zLU
LP
≃ctx
r
C2
zLU
LP
Proof. By Lemmas 28 and 29.
21.3 The Compiler J · KLU
LP
r
F; I;E
zLU
LP
=
r
F
zLU
LP
, read(x) 7→ sread,write(x) 7→ swrite,
mask(x) 7→ smask,unmask(x) 7→ sunmask, · · · ;r
I
zLU
LP
;r
E
zLU
LP
, read,write;
kroot,kcom
(
q
·
yLU
LP
-Comp)
r
f(x) 7→ s; return;
zLU
LP
= f(x) 7→ sadd(x);
spre;JsKLULP ;
spost;
return;
(
q
·
yLU
LP
-Function)
r
f
zLU
LP
= f (
q
·
yLU
LP
-Interfaces)r
f
zLU
LP
= f (
q
·
yLU
LP
-Exports)
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Expression translation unmodified:
q
e
yLU
LP
= JeKLULP
Statement translation unmodified except forr
let x = new e in s
zLU
LP
= let xloc = new
q
e
yLU
LP
in
let xcap = hide xloc in
sregister(xloc,xcap);
let x = 〈xloc,xcap〉 in
q
s
yLU
LP
(
q
·
yLU
LP
-New)
r
call f e
zLU
LP
= let x =
q
e
yLU
LP
in sadd(x); spost; call f x; spre (
q
·
yLU
LP
-Call)
So the compiler is mostly unchanged.
The compiled code will maintain the following invariant:
• no locations (even though protected by capabilities) are ever made accessible “in clear” to the context;
• “made accessible” means either passed as a parameter or through a shared location;
• instead, before passing control to the context, all component-created locations that are shared with
the context are masked, i.e., their representation 〈n,k〉 is replaced with 〈n′,kcom〉, where n′ is their
index in the list of shared locations that the compiled component keeps.
• when receiving control from the context, the compiled component ensures that all component-created
locations that are shared are unmasked, i.e., upon regaining control the component replaces all values
〈n′,kcom〉 that are sub-values of reachable locations with 〈n,k〉, which is the n′th pair in the list of
component-allocated locations;
• what is a “component-shared” location? A shared location is a pair 〈n,k〉 where (i) k is a capability
created by the compiled component and (ii) the pair is stored in the heap at a location that the context
can dereference (perhaps not directly).
• In order to define what is a shared location, the compiled component keeps a list of all the locations
that have been passed to it and that the context created. These locations can only be in 〈n,_〉 form,
where _ is either a capability or not depending whether the context hid the location. These locations
can only be pairs since we know that a compiled component will only use pairs as locations, mimicking
the source semantics.
We normally do not know what locations will be accessed, but given a parameter that is a location,
we can scan its contents to understand what new locations are passed.
• The compiled component thus can keep a list of “shared” locations: those whose contents are accessible
both by the context and by itself. These locations created by the context are acquired as parameters
or as locations reachable by a parameter. These locations created by the component are tracked as
those hidden with a component-created capability and reachable from a shared location.
• The only concern that can arise is if we create location n and then add it to the list of shared locations
at index n′. That location 〈n,k〉 would be masked as 〈n′,kcom〉, which grants the context direct access
to it. This is where we need to use kcom as leaking different capabilities would lead to differentiation
between components. Fortunately, the context starts execution and, in order to call the compiled
component, it must allocate at least one location, so this problem cannot arise.
21.3.1 Syntactic Sugar
The languages we have do not let us return directly a value. In the following however, for readability, we
write
let x = func v in s
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to intend: call function func with parameter v and store its returned value in x for use in s.
We indicate how that statement can be expressed in our language with the following desugaring:
let y = new 0 in let z = 〈v,y〉 in call func z; let x =!z.2 with 0 in s
21.3.2 Support Data Structures
The compiler relies on a number of data structures it keeps starting from location 0, which is accessible via
kroot.
These data structures are:
• a list of capabilities, which we denote withK. These capabilities are those that the compiled component
has allocated.
• a list of component-allocated locations, which we denote with L. These are locations 〈n,k〉 that are
created by the compiled component and whose k are elements of K
• a list of shared locations, which we denote with S. These are either (i) locations that are created by
the context and passed to the compiled component or (ii) locations that are created by the compiled
component and passed to the context.
Given a list L of elements e, we use these helper functions:
• indexof(L, e) returns n, the index of e in L, or 0 if e is not in L;
• L(n) returns the nth element e of L or 0 if the list length is shorter than n;
• L :: e if e is not in L, it adds element e to the list, increasing its length by 1;
• rem(L, e) removes element e from L;
• e ∈ L returns true or false depending on whether e is in L or not.
We keep this abstract syntax for handling lists and do not write the necessary recursive functions as they
would only be tedious and hardly readable. Realistically, we would also need a temporary list for accumu-
lating results etc, again, this is omitted for simplicity and readability.
21.3.3 Support Functions
Read
sread = let xn=x.1.1 in
let xk=x.1.2 in
let xreal=L(xn) in
let xdest=x.2.1 in
let xdcap=x.2.2 in
let xval=!xreal with xk in
xdest := xval with xdcap
In order to read a location 〈n,k〉, we receive that as the first projection of parameter x. Because we do
not explicitly return values, we need the second projection of x to contain the destination where to target
receives the result of the read.
We split the pair in the masking index xn and in the capability to access the location xk. Then we
lookup the location in the list of component-created locations and return its value. We do not need to mask
its contents as we know that they have already been masked when this location was shared with the context
(line 5 of the postamble). We do not need to add its contents to the list of shared locations as that is already
done in lines 2 and 3 of the postamble.
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Write
swrite = let xn=x.1.1 in
let xk=x.1.2 in
let xreal=L(xn) in
xreal := x.2 with xk;
In order to write value v a location 〈n,k〉 we receive a parameter structured as follows: x ≡ 〈n,k〉 ,v. Then
we unfold the elements of the parameter and lookup element n in the list of component-defined locations.
We use this looked-up element to write the value v there.
We do not need to mask v because it cannot point to locations that are created by the compiled compo-
nent.
At this stage, v may contain new locations created by the context and that are now shared. We do not
add them now to the list of shared locations because we know that upon giving control again to the compiled
component, the preamble will do this.
Mask
smask = ∀〈n,k〉 ∈ x. isloc(〈n,k〉)
if k ∈ K
replace 〈n,k〉 with
〈
indexof(L,n),kcom
〉
We use the abstract construct replace... to indicate the following. We want to keep the value passed as
parameter x unchanged but replace its subvalues that are pairs and, more specifically, component-created
locations, with a pair with its location masked to be the index in the list of component-allocated locations.
This can be implemented by checking the sub-values of a value via the ispair and isloc expressions, we
omit its details for simplicity. To ensure ∈ K is implementable, we use the eqcap expression.
Masked locations cannot mention their capability or they would leak this information and generate
different traces for equivalent compiled programs.
Unmask
sunmask = ∀〈n,k〉 ∈ x
if k == kcom
replace 〈n,k〉 with L(n)
In the case of unmasking, we receive a value through parameter x and we know that there may be subvalues
of it of the form 〈n,k〉 where n is an index in the component-created shared locations. So we lookup the
element from that list and replace it in x.
21.3.4 Inlined Additional Statements (Preamble, Postamble, etc)
Adding
sadd(x) = if isloc(x) then
S :: x;
if x.2 ∈ K then L :: x else skip
This common part ensures that the parameter x is added to the list of shared locations (line 1) and then, if
the capability is locally-created, it is also added to the list of locally-shared locations (line 2).
The second line is for when this code is called before a
r
call f
zLU
LP
.
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Registration
sregister(xloc,xcap) = K :: xcap;
This statement registers capability xcap in the list of component-created capabilities.
Preamble The preamble is responsible of adding all context-created locations to the list of shared locations
and to ensure that all contents of shared locations are unmasked, as the compiled code will operate on them.
spre = ∀〈n,k〉 ∈ reach(S). isloc(〈n,k〉)
if 〈n,k〉 /∈ S then S :: 〈n,k〉 ; else skip
∀〈n,k〉 ∈ S. isloc(〈n,k〉)
let x = unmask(!n with k) in n := x with k
First any location that is reachable from the shared locations (line 1) and that is not a shared location
already is added to the list of shared locations (line 2). By where this code is placed we know that these
new locations can only be context-created.
Then, for all shared locations (line 3), we unmask their contents using the unmask function (line 4).
Postamble The postamble is responsible of adding all component-created locations to the list of shared
locations and of component-created shared locations and to ensure that all shared locations are masked as
the context will operate on them.
spost(x) = ∀〈n,k〉 ∈ reach(S). isloc(〈n,k〉)
if 〈n,k〉 /∈ S then S :: 〈n,k〉 ;L :: 〈n,k〉 ; else skip
∀〈n,k〉 ∈ S. isloc(〈n,k〉)
let x =mask(!n with k) in n := x with k
Then for all locations that are reachable from a shared location (line 1), and that are not already there
(line 2), we add those locations to the list of shared locations and to the list of component-created shared
locations (line 2). Then for all shared locations (line 3), we mask their contents using the mask function
(line 4).
21.4 The Trace-based Backtranslation: 〈〈 · 〉〉L
P
LU
Value backtranslation is the same, so
〈〈
v
〉〉LP
LU
= 〈〈v〉〉
LP
LU .
21.4.1 The Skeleton
The skeleton is almost as before (Section 12.2.2), with the only addition of another list B explained below.
The only additions are two functions terminate and diverge, which do what their name suggests:
terminate(x) 7→ fail
diverge(x) 7→ call diverge 0
21.4.2 The Common Prefix
call f v H? As in Rule (〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -call), we keep a list of the context-allocated locations and we update them.
Also, we extend that list.
ret ?H As above.
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call f v H! This is analogous to Rule (〈〈·〉〉L
P
LU -callback-loc) but with a major complication.
Now this is complex because in the target we don’t receive locations 〈n,k〉 from the compiled compo-
nent, but masked indices 〈i,kcom〉. (using i as a metavariable for natural numbers outputted by the
masking function) We need to extract them based on where they are located in memory, knowing that
the same syntactic structure is maintained in the source. So what before was relying on the relation on
values ℓ≈β 〈n,k〉 now is no longer true because we have ℓ≈β 〈i,kcom〉 which cannot hold. We need to
keep a this relation as a runtime argument in the backtrnanslation and base it solely on the syntactic
occurrencies of 〈i,kcom〉. So this runtime relation maps target masking indices to source locations.
So this relation is really a list B where each entry has the form
〈〈〈
i
〉〉LP
LU
, ℓ
〉
.
Intuitively, consider heapH from the action. For all of its content n 7→ v : η, we do a structural analysis
of v. This happens at the meta-level, in the backtranslation algorithm. v may contain subvalues of
the form 〈i,kcom〉, and accessing this subvalue we know is a matter of ·.1 etc. So we produce an
expression e with the same instructions (·.1 etc) in the source in order to scan at runtime the heap H
we receive after the callback is done. (so after the action here is executed and where backtranslation
code executes)
Given that expression e evaluate to location ℓ, we now need to add to B the pair 〈i, ℓ〉 (also given that
i=
〈〈
i
〉〉LP
LU
).
ret !H As above.
write(v, i) In this case we need to make use of the runtime-kept relation B. We need to know what source
location ℓ corresponds to i so we can produce the correct code: ℓ :=
〈〈
v
〉〉LP
LU
.
ℓ is looked up as B(
〈〈
i
〉〉LP
LU
).
21.4.3 The Differentiator
The differentiator needs to put the right code at the right place. The backtranslation already carries all
necessary information to know what the right place is, this is as in previous work: the index of the action i
(at the meta level) stored in location ℓi (at runtime) and the call stack f
We now go over the various cases of trace difference and see that the differentiation code exists. We
consider α1 to be the last action in the trace of JC1KST while α2 is the last one of JC2KST, both made after a
common prefix.
α1 = call f v H! and α2 = call g v H! Code if !ℓi == i then call terminate 0 else skip is placed in the body
of f while the code if !ℓi == i then call diverge 0 else skip is placed in the body of g.
α1 = call f v H! and α2 = call f w H! Code
if !ℓ == i then
if x ==
〈〈
v
〉〉LP
LU
then call terminate 0 else call diverge 0 else skip
is placed in f.
α1 = call f v H! and α2 = call f v H
′! Here few cases can arise, consider H = H1,n 7→ v : η,H2 and
H′ = H1,n
′ 7→ v′ : η′,H′2:
v 6= v′ We use shortcut Lglob(n) to indicate the location bound to name n in the list of shared locations
(same as in Section 12.2.3).
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Code
if !ℓi == i then
let x=Lglob(
〈〈
n
〉〉LP
LU
) in
if x ==
〈〈
v
〉〉LP
LU
then call terminate 0 else call diverge 0
else skip
is placed in the body of f.
n 6= n′ In this case one of the two addresses must be bigger than the other. Wlog, let’s consider
n = n′ + 1.
So H1= H′1,n
′ 7→ v′; η′ and H′2=∅ (otherwise we’d have a binding for n there).
The code in this case must access the location related to n, it will get stuck in one case and
succeed in the other:
if !ℓi == i then let x = update(
〈〈
n
〉〉LP
LU
, 0) in call diverge 0 else skip
η 6= η′ Two cases arise:
• the location is context-created: in this case the tag must be the same, so we have a contra-
diction;
• the location is component-created, but in this case we know that no such location is ever
passed to the context (see Property 1), so we have a contradiction.
α1 = ret H! and α2 = ret ! As above.
α1 = call f v H! and α2 = ret ! Code if !ℓi == i then call terminate 0 else skip is placed at f while if !ℓi == i then call diverge 0 else skip
is placed at the top of f.
α1 = call f v H! and α2 = ↓ Code if !ℓi == i then call diverge 0 else skip is placed at f.
α1 = call f v H! and α2 = ↑ Code if !ℓi == i then call terminate 0 else skip is placed at f.
α1 = ret H! and α2 = ↓ Code if !ℓi == i then call diverge 0 else skip is placed at the top of f.
α1 = ret H! and α2 = ↑ Code if !ℓi == i then call terminate 0 else skip is placed at the top of f.
α1 = ↓ and α2 = ↑ Nothing to do, the compiled component performs the differentiation on its own.
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